Earlier quoted context omitted.
The less information available about the infosec and (more importantly) the sys admins the better. Nation states are like any organization. They are resource and time constrained. If you set the bar high you will eliminate the low hanging fruit adversaries. Force them to put the work in... Plus if you show them you are very careful and watching everything you will force them to be extra careful, as not to tip off any…
That's false sense of security you and many have. It takes very little time for nation states to identify who works for XYZ company. If what you suggested is the right practice, then why is Google Zero Project members a public thing? A lot of them are publicly known. If infosec people are vulnerable, isn't your building security guard vulnerable? We got tens of thousands of hackers attending DefCon, Blackhats, and ot…
If it requires a person to spend time researching non-open source intelligence avenues then I disagree.
The point is by not doing something a company can gain something. That's not a big ask for the marketing team not to mention names in any public interface.
It's easy to assume that 'nation state' surveillance means that a sophisticated person will hunt down a piece of information. But that's actually quite a resource intensive request.
Quickly finding someones name on publicly available resources and adding it to a list is on quite a different level than having a hacker/trained person hunt down a hidden piece of information that must be triangulated from other disparate pieces of information. And I say this having spent quite a bit of time doxxing people for fun myself - it's a time intensive activity regardless if it was ultimately easy to do. The less information available the much hard it is to do.