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Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

anthropic.com

221–230 of 345 posts

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#221

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Ideally you use both. An AI model that has static analysis as part of the harness, so it can evaluate each potential finding. Ideally the static analysis tools are improved so that we don't need to piss away yet more tokens like we're competing on Mark's leaderboard just to find vulnerabilities.

When you reach that ideal world, let me know. My company has thrown a decade+ and multiple teams at the idea you've described. We still aren't there yet. Your proposal of relying purely on static analysis is over-idealistic and just not feasible for large, diverse codebases in the real world. That's where AI comes in.

> Your proposal of relying purely on static analysis is over-idealistic and just not feasible for large, diverse codebases in the real world.

"Just not feasible" is thought terminating, but regardless, I thought we were talking about ideals? Ideally you want the static analysis to work, not to rely on the non-deterministic bullshitter.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#222
post #163

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> haven't been disclosed, because they're not fixed. That's convinient. But wait, don't they have this amazing AI that can fix all the issues itself with a single /goal command? What's the holdup?

You should really read the article, every question asked so far in this thread has been very clearly answered. I miss the days when HN would RTFA.

[flagged]

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#223
post #181

Earlier quoted context omitted.

[flagged]

Did you... create a new account just to be able to respond to Thomas? Btw, he's a security researcher. You should be more respectful.

I don't care if they're respectful, but they should try to be less confusing. "Blue Pill" isn't a kind of exploit. I assumed they meant "blue hat".

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#224
post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Somehow this reminded me of the historical efforts of some government bounty collections for mouse tails which were discontinued due to fraud (such as hunters breeding mice to collect the reward). There is a reason why/how devs and QA keep each other in check. Guess in case of LLM writing code, one has to use different models for dev and security checks. On other hand, in real world, the developers learn from mistake…

> the developers learn from mistakes and avoid them in the future No. Humans learn from mistakes and try to avoid them in the future, but there is a whole pile of other stuff in the bag of neurons between our ears that prevent us from avoiding repetition of errors. I have seen extremely talented engineers write trivial to avoid memory corruption bugs because they were thinking about the problem they were trying to so…

I think a similar thing comes into play when you ask a developer to write tests for the feature they just implemented. They’re going to have selective blindness for the edge cases (or requirements) that they failed to consider during implementation, unless they’re good at context switching into a testing mindset. And that’s something that benefits from training.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#225
post #122

I’m not sure how to reconcile anthropic’s update / some of the exuberant comments here with recent feedback like the following from curl maintainer Daniel Steinberg: “I see no evidence that this setup [Mythos] finds issues to any particular higher or more advanced degree than the other tools have done before Mythos. Maybe this model is a little bit better, but even if it is, it is not better to a degree that seems to…

It's a weird accident of fate that curl has somehow become the reference target for LLM bugfinding. Curl is not an especially interesting project. What seems to have happened is that Stenberg made waves (legitimately) complaining about LLM slop submissions, then more waves when LLM bug reports got good, and so now everyone seems to think a good measure of a vuln researcher is how many curl findings they generate. No.…

Or SSH, OpenSSL, Envoy, Nginx, etc. Curl has a real footprint, but it isn't just out there passively attackable. Linux Kernel is right as a default.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#226

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a weird accident of fate that curl has somehow become the reference target for LLM bugfinding. Curl is not an especially interesting project. What seems to have happened is that Stenberg made waves (legitimately) complaining about LLM slop submissions, then more waves when LLM bug reports got good, and so now everyone seems to think a good measure of a vuln researcher is how many curl findings they generate. No.…

Or SSH, OpenSSL, Envoy, Nginx, etc. Curl has a real footprint, but it isn't just out there passively attackable. Linux Kernel is right as a default.

OpenSSH is a legitimately high bar, one of the hardest targets in all memory-unsafe software.

Curl is a high bar for a different reason (the same one as sudo): it doesn't do enough to be all that interesting. Stenberg is having trouble keeping up with all the inbounds, but look at the 2026 CVEs: they all seem kind of boring? Exploit developers aren't hunting for "wrong reuse of HTTP Negotiate connection". Like, yes, these are legitimate bugs, important that they get fixed, but none of them are prizes.

By rights, OpenSSH should be a smoking crater. It's not, I believe because of sheer engineering excellence.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#228
post #34

You can get a taste of this today yourself with Codex Security. I turned it on just as an experiment and in less than a week it has now become essential to all of us. I was shocked how accurate it is, how many security issues it found in existing code, how it continually finds them as we commit, and how NO ONE is immune from making these mistakes. I'd say it is about 90% accurate for us. Often even the "Low" findings…

This got me thinking, so what happens in two years? every tom, dick and harry who can type english has the tools to attack any software that isn't patched. tools that were accessible to specialized groups, now made available to anybody with a grudge and a few dollars for tokens. and what does anthropic and openai do? They form an inner ring to make the latest models available first to Enterprises. Enterprises will co…

You'll have access to the same models as your hypothetical attackers, and a big advantage if only you have access to the source code

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#229
post #147
post #142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You’re right, it’s a valid data point. But the U.K. government report is also a data point, and the Firefox report is a data point, and they suggest that it is, indeed, significantly better than current generation models. Maybe curl is significantly better hardened than most projects? In any event, it barely matters. As Anthropic acknowledges, next level models are comings, theirs is only one of them. Current generat…

> Maybe curl is significantly better hardened than most projects? Meanwhile from [1]: "Not even half-way through this #curl release cycle we are already at 11 confirmed vulnerabilities - and there are three left in the queue to assess and new reports keep arriving at a pace of more than one/day." "The simple reason is: the (AI powered) tools are this good now. And people use these tools against curl source code.They…

I’m trying to reconcile this with TFA. Because the article says that the majority of vulns found by Mythos are being reported by independent researchers after validation. They never said those reports inform that mythos was involved - and I suspect they don’t. So did any of these 11 CVEs come from that channel?

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#230
post #34

You can get a taste of this today yourself with Codex Security. I turned it on just as an experiment and in less than a week it has now become essential to all of us. I was shocked how accurate it is, how many security issues it found in existing code, how it continually finds them as we commit, and how NO ONE is immune from making these mistakes. I'd say it is about 90% accurate for us. Often even the "Low" findings…

This got me thinking, so what happens in two years? every tom, dick and harry who can type english has the tools to attack any software that isn't patched. tools that were accessible to specialized groups, now made available to anybody with a grudge and a few dollars for tokens. and what does anthropic and openai do? They form an inner ring to make the latest models available first to Enterprises. Enterprises will co…

Two years? That exists right now. You only have to point Codex Security at an open source repo. There are a lot of tools and companies that are spinning up today that do autonomous pentesting.

I'm not even sure a specialized model is needed here. It probably just needs the right harness around existing ones.

I expect the next two years to be absolutely brutal for hacks. Attackers have supercharged tools in their hands right now. Defenders are only getting started and will have to plow through a massive backlog of newly uncovered vulns.

The major short term downside is that open source or personal projects won't be able to afford things like Codex Security.

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