I think people are misunderstanding. This isn't CT logs, its a wildcard certificate so it wouldn't leak the "nas" part. It's sentry catching client-side traces and calling home with them, and then picking out the hostname from the request that sent them (ie, "nas.nothing-special.whatever.example.com") and trying to poll it for whatever reason, which is going to a separate server that is catching the wildcard domain a…
When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
221–230 of 265 posts
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#222Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#223that's actually a great spy trap idea, no? create an impossible internal hostname and watch for it to come back to you you don't even need a real TLD if I am not mistaken, use .ZZZ etc
if it's not a real TLD, you won't ever see the dns requests coming to you...
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#224Earlier quoted context omitted.
Obligatory Bruce Scneier: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/03/the_security_...
Good read, but: > This kind of thinking is not natural for most people. It’s not natural for engineers. Good engineering involves ... I have to disagree in the strongest terms. It doesn't matter what it is, the only way to do a good job designing something is to imagine the ways in which things could go wrong. You have to poke holes in your own design and then fix them rather than leaving it to the real world to tear…
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#225Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If you use LetsEncrypt for ssl certs (which you should) You meant you shouldn't right? Partially exactly for the reasons you stated later in the same sentence.
Let's Encrypt has nothing to do with this problem (of Certificate Transparency logs leaking domain names). CA/B Forum policy requires every CA to publish every issued certificate in the CT logs. So if you want a TLS certificate that's trusted by browsers, the domain name has to be published to the world, and it doesn't matter where you got your certificate, you are going to start getting requests from automated vulne…
They don't sell who asked because that's a regulatory nightmare they don't want, but they sell the list of names because it's valuable.
You might buy this because you're a bad guy (reputable sellers won't sell to you but that's easy to circumvent), because you're a more-or-less legit outfit looking for problems you can sell back to the person who has the problem, or even just for market research. Yes, some customers who own example.com and are using ZQF brand HR software won't name the server zqf.example.com but a lot of them will and so you can measure that.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#226Earlier quoted context omitted.
I feel like that car security situation also is sort of setup to tell us about how folks with a security mindset can go overboard? Some car dealership who never had a car stolen hires a consultant and they identify this pickup situation as a problem. Then they implement some wild security and now customers who just dropped off their car, just talked to the same customer service person about the weather ... have to go…
It certainly feels that way here in 2026. It seems like I'm spending so much time "verifying" and "authenticating" and clicking somewhere so that the service can send me a code in E-mail. And more and more services are getting super aggressive. Biometrics, 2FA, uploading government ID, uploading face scans... Good grief! I can imagine being in info-sec is a rough life. When you get breached, they're blamed. So they s…
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#227Earlier quoted context omitted.
She was (or is) at Facebook, and "clowntown" and "clowny" are words you see there.
[flagged]
You may not owe clown-resemblers better, but you owe this community better if you're participating in it.
We ban accounts that keep posting in this sort of pattern, as yours has, so if you'd please review https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html and stick to the rules when posting here, we'd appreciate it.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#228Is "clown GCP Host" a technical term I am unaware of, or is the author just voicing their discontent? Seems to me that the problem is the NAS's web interface using sentry for logging/monitoring, and part of what was logged were internal hostnames (which might be named in a way that has sensitive info, e.g, the corp-and-other-corp-merger example they gave. So it wouldn't matter that it's inaccessible in a private netw…
I remember the term "clown computing" to describe "cloud computing" from IRC earlier than 2016 I use a localhost TLS forward proxy for all TCP and HTTP over the LAN There is no access to remote DNS, only local DNS. I use stored DNS data periodically gathered in bulk from various sources. As such, HTTP and other traffic over TCP that use hostnames cannot reach hosts on the internet unless I allow it in local DNS or th…
FTFA:
Every time you load up the NAS [in your browser], you get some clown GCP host knocking on your door, presenting a SNI hostname of that thing you buried deep inside your infrastructure. Hope you didn't name it anything sensitive, like "mycorp-and-othercorp-planned-merger-storage", or something.
Around this time, you realize that the web interface for this thing has some stuff that phones home, and part of what it does is to send stack traces back to sentry.io. Yep, your browser is calling back to them, and it's telling them the hostname you use for your internal storage box. Then for some reason, they're making a TLS connection back to it, but they don't ever request anything. Curious, right?
This is when you fire up Little Snitch, block the whole domain for any app on the machine, and go on with life.
I disagree with your conclusion. The post speaks specifically about interactions with the NAS through a browser being the source of the problem and the use of an OSX application firewall program called Little Snitch to resolve the problem. [0] The author's ~fifteen years of posts demonstrate that she is a significantly accomplished and knowledgeable system administrator who has configured and debugged much trickier things than what's described in the article.It's not impossible that the source of the problem has been misidentified... but it's extremely unlikely. Having said that, one thing I do find likely is that the NAS in question is isolated from the Internet; that's just a smart thing that a savvy sysadmin would do.
[0] I find it... unlikely that the NAS in question is running OSX, so Little Snitch is almost certainly running on a client PC, rather than the NAS.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#229Earlier quoted context omitted.
Aren't there easier ways to steal cars? Like, go to an open parking lot, pick the lock, and start the car by connecting the right wires. It's risky, sure. But the garage situation also seems risky.
You'd have to be stupid and desperate to steal from a garage. The people who work there aren't office workers; you've got blue collar workers who spend all day working together and hanging out using heavy equipment right in the back. And they're going to be well acquainted with the local tow truck drivers and the local police - so unless you're somewhere like Detroit, you better be on your way across state lines the…
When Kia and Hyundai were recently selling models without real keys or ignition interlocks, that was the main thing folks did when they stole them.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#230Earlier quoted context omitted.
You'd have to be stupid and desperate to steal from a garage. The people who work there aren't office workers; you've got blue collar workers who spend all day working together and hanging out using heavy equipment right in the back. And they're going to be well acquainted with the local tow truck drivers and the local police - so unless you're somewhere like Detroit, you better be on your way across state lines the…
Stolen cars are often sold for low amounts of money - like $50 - and then used to commit crimes that are not traceable from their plates. It hasn't really been possible to steal and resell a car in the United States for many years, barring a few carefully watched loopholes (Vermont out-of-state registrations is one example that was recently closed). When Kia and Hyundai were recently selling models without real keys…