Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're saying that mental instances of words are what constitutes thought. That is incorrect. Mental words are an output of a mental process downstream of thought. > I'm saying concepts generally need names before we can reason about them. This is also false. People adapt to patterns constantly; they rarely bother to name those patterns.
> This is also false. People adapt to patterns constantly; they rarely bother to name those patterns. I'm trying to maintain an open tone in the face of this, but I might stop soon. To address this particular point: "adapt to patterns" - such as? From context you seem to be saying this is identical to reasoning, but I don't see why that would be.
You already received a fantastic response with many examples, but I want to pile on another thing. Talk to an accomplished autodidact. That is, somebody who learned a skill on their own using only trial and error. Examples I'm familiar with are music (playing an instrument) and computer programming. Autodidacts regularly recognize and apply patterns, methods, systems, procedures or strategies, long before they find out whether people have a word for them. For instance, a basic bit of music theory is that you can resolve a C-major melody by returning from a G chord back to C. Autodidacts regularly discover that, and that it translates analogously to other modes, without knowing the terms “dominant” and “tonica” (or even “major” and “chord” and “resolve”).