Live data from Hacker News

Effective altruism is not effective

philosophersbeard.org

221–230 of 248 posts

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#221

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Effectiveness of charities has exactly the same problems as efficient market hypothesis: markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent. Or in other words, charities can remain full of shit for longer than you have money for.

Yes, and the same rules apply: - Don't invest more than you can comfortably lose. - Don't throw away the entire concept just because it's not perfect. - Get better at telling who's full of shit, or delegate it to someone you trust.

Don't 2 & 3 contradict each other in this case? Throwing away the yoke of institutional giving is predicated upon recognizing that overhead and start up costs eat up transferable dollars.

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#222

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure what probabilities have to do with anything here. It sounds like you're applying a prior that each individual on each side has some "badness" that is uniformly distributed. In effect, a uniform distribution is probably one of the weakest priors and leads to some of the highest variance results (save perhaps Jeffery's Prior). I would go so far as to say assuming uniform probability of "badness" is probabl…

Probability is the reflection of the state of your knowledge. If you know someone might become the next Hitler, but you don't know who that might be, or if they're even on the tracks right now, then this is reflected by assigning the same probability of "hitlerism" to all the people on tracks. And even if you had some suspicions, once you honestly factor in your certainty about predictive value of your suspicions, it…

> And even if you had some suspicions, once you honestly factor in your certainty about predictive value of your suspicions, it multiplies down to nothing - so in practice, an uniform prior is a pretty good choice.

Does it? You seem to be marginalizing across the entire population, but it's eminently obvious that most humans do _not_ see a human and erase all aspects of their being and then consider them to be one human in a uniformly distributed pool. Humans make snap judgements based on hundreds of subconscious factors all the time. Most humans look at a person and immediately bucket them into a cohort using some mix of physical attributes and prior beliefs of these attributes. Once we're in a cohort, relative probabilities can change. In this particular example, what happens if one of the 3 happens to be wearing military fatigues? What if they have a well-known authoritarian political symbol on their clothing?

Anyway, lots of intelligent philosophers have argued against utilitarianism and have brought up flaws in utilitarianism, such as Utility Monsters, and then there's the issue of even being able to impose a utility-based order between disparate things such as "tasty candy" and "rocks underneath my feet". Feel free to read those on the internet.

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#223
post #190

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this argument actually illustrates a big issue with EA: for many people the "worse outcome" is no worse than the status quo. I'm not going to argue that an authoritarian theocracy or military dictatorship would be an improvement on the corporatist kleptocracy (or however we want to negatively describe the status quo). But political change is mostly not carried by those already doing moderately well under the…

A simpler answer is that these people aren't actually leftists.

I'm not sure whom you are referring to when you say "these people".

Intersectionality (which btw refers to almost the exact opposite of what most people think of as "identity politics") is absolutely compatible with (and arguably necessary[0] for) leftism.

Class reductionists OTOH certainly think of themselves as leftists and can be instrumental to leftist politics. They however run the risk of also being useful to other political permutations (e.g. they might be more open to "red-brown alliances", which generally lead to non-leftist "red" ideologies like national bolshevism and ultimately fascism).

Not every intersectionalist is a leftist (e.g. liberals often acknowledge intersectionality to some degree but don't see private property as a social power structure) and not every leftist is an intersectionalist. I would argue that leftism without intersectionality is leftist, but in an incomplete form. That said, "leftism" is a somewhat arbitrary label as its original meaning simply referred to opposing the monarchy in France, so policing who gets to call themselves that is probably pointless.

[0]: An example for how racism and class warfare can intersect is how the widespread racism in the early 20th century US prevented Black workers from joining unions, resulting in them becoming strikebreakers and thus undermining the collective bargaining power of those unions.

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#224

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is a common philosophical problem. EA fits in a philosophical framework broadly known as utilitarianism (which is also popular among rationalists, a group known to be fans of EA). Buddhism's ideas of moral philosophy often lie in a mixture of what is commonly known as Divine Will Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Utilitarianism is quite popular among modern STEM discourse, but there are moral alternatives out there that…

> (e.g., in the trolley problem, what happens if you save the 3 people over the 1 person, but one of those 3 people ends up becoming (or is) a dictator who orchestrates a genocide.) Presumably by this logic, you'd have no opinion on whether a midwife should save a newborn baby's life, as it's unknowable whether the baby will one day orchestrate a genocide?

Well this gets into the absurdity of relative utility of goodness altogether. If I'm comparing a child's happiness from eating a candy to the unhappiness of stepping on a pebble, what are the relative magnitudes?

Regardless, there are lots of criticisms of utilitarianism, and utilitarianism is far from the ascendant moral philosophy, so feel free to find others online.

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#225

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Probability is the reflection of the state of your knowledge. If you know someone might become the next Hitler, but you don't know who that might be, or if they're even on the tracks right now, then this is reflected by assigning the same probability of "hitlerism" to all the people on tracks. And even if you had some suspicions, once you honestly factor in your certainty about predictive value of your suspicions, it…

> And even if you had some suspicions, once you honestly factor in your certainty about predictive value of your suspicions, it multiplies down to nothing - so in practice, an uniform prior is a pretty good choice. Does it? You seem to be marginalizing across the entire population, but it's eminently obvious that most humans do _not_ see a human and erase all aspects of their being and then consider them to be one hu…

> Most humans look at a person and immediately bucket them into a cohort using some mix of physical attributes and prior beliefs of these attributes. Once we're in a cohort, relative probabilities can change.

That indeed happens, but going by the gut isn't a bullet-proof moral philosophy. Snap judgements are something we can evaluate and consciously calibrate when we're not in the heat of the moment.

> lots of intelligent philosophers have argued against utilitarianism and have brought up flaws in utilitarianism

Yeah, I read some of those, many are really solid objections. I'm not arguing that utilitarianism is the be-all, end-all moral philosophy - just that it's a surprisingly good heuristic that can be pushed quite far before it starts to go "off the rails". And primarily, I'm arguing that working with approximations and heuristics is something we know how to do - not being able to compute a perfectly precise answer isn't a valid argument against a method.

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#226
post #68

I heard about EA from a person I respect, and so that really colored my perception of it because I think he, specifically, wouldn't do such a bad job. But having some time to think about it, that's really the problem with it: we have a need for altruism to begin with largely due to the concentration of resources (=> power) in the hands of a few to wield for everyone else. It's a cute example and certainly no substitu…

Obesity is a far bigger problem in the world today than hunger, even in developing nations. 11% of the world suffers from hunger still, down from 40% 3 decades ago. The kind of starving absolute poverty is rapidly disappearing. In first world countries, the unequal distribution of wealth mostly means who gets to live in larger houses, travel more, go to restaurants more, send kids to better schools, etc, rather than who gets all of their needs.

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#227

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, and the same rules apply: - Don't invest more than you can comfortably lose. - Don't throw away the entire concept just because it's not perfect. - Get better at telling who's full of shit, or delegate it to someone you trust.

Don't 2 & 3 contradict each other in this case? Throwing away the yoke of institutional giving is predicated upon recognizing that overhead and start up costs eat up transferable dollars.

They're complementary.

#2: Just because there are charities or companies that do bad things, doesn't mean the concepts of charities and companies, or philanthropy and markets, are fundamentally broken. There are good and bad charities/companies, even though it may be hard to tell which is which.

#3: You can make your donations more effective if you get better at telling which charity is good (same for investments and companies). There are diminishing returns on effort here - particularly if you aren't planning to specialize in charity evaluation. In that case, you can convert this problem into an easier problem of finding trustworthy specialists in charity evaluation, and donating to places they consider good/effective.

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#228
post #19

This article completely mischaracterizes the beliefs of most of the people quoted or referenced, then engages with those beliefs only via asserting the opposite without any supporting argument. I'm disappointed. For example: > The most charitable explanation of Singer’s dismissal of political action is that he is trying to sell being an altruist and he thinks a consumer -hero version is the one people are most likely…

> but does not himself provide an argument for it, just an assertion that political change is "the most obvious and powerful tool we have." (I think that's far from obvious!) Argentina, Venezuela and Zimbabwe are basically nations that destroyed themselves through bad political reforms. If there had been a way to prevent those reforms you could have prevented millions of people from slipping into poverty and needing…

> Argentina, Venezuela and Zimbabwe are basically nations that destroyed themselves through bad political reforms. If there had been a way to prevent those reforms you could have prevented millions of people from slipping into poverty and needing micro interventions.

Now imagine if the people championing those bad reforms had simply stayed out of politics? The more powerful a tool is, the more cautiously it should be wielded.

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#229
post #199
post #190

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this argument actually illustrates a big issue with EA: for many people the "worse outcome" is no worse than the status quo. I'm not going to argue that an authoritarian theocracy or military dictatorship would be an improvement on the corporatist kleptocracy (or however we want to negatively describe the status quo). But political change is mostly not carried by those already doing moderately well under the…

>for many people the "worse outcome" is no worse than the status quo. Is it really, though? In most cases where the worse outcome did happen, people were convinced they had nothing to lose and went with whatever radical idea was being proposed, then when things went pear-shaped they found out they did have a lot to lose. An extreme example is the Khmer Rouge.

> Is it really, though?

Yes, it is. If you're an unhoused diabetic living in the US without access to insulin, it literally doesn't matter if the country is run by Ivy League graduates or uncultured generalissimos. Note that I said "many", not "most". I'm not even making a claim about proportions but in the US alone there is a large quantity of people for whom the status quo is either a death sentence or at least entails a lifetime of suffering. This isn't even taking general trends (e.g. the income gap, militarization of the police, or Climate Change) into account.

Note that I said "worse outcome", not "worst outcome". Yes, almost all bottom-up political change is brought about with "populism" (i.e. saying things are bad and promising that they can be changed for the better) that doesn't mean that all populism is deceptive or false.

Generally drastic changes only happen when the situation is already sufficiently dire precisely because the status quo (no matter how undesirable) feels like a safer bet than a leap into the unknown. This is why these changes are often so drastic and the means to achieve them (by necessity) so violent: incrementalism has failed and left them no other choice.

Whether the outcome is better or worse mostly has to do with what power dynamics will remain in place when the existing dominant power structure is gone.

The Cambodian Civil War is messy and complicated but portraying it as "people wanted political change and got the Killing Fields" is reductionist to the point of satire. The government was on a left-leaning (and even pro-communist) progressive path leading up to the fraudulent 1966 election and then suddenly snapped to the violently repressive hard right only for the monarchy to intervene by imposing "centrism", alienating both sides. Note that all this went on while the US was also wrestling for control in the region and China was trying to shake off the Soviet Union. These things don't happen in a vacuum but even without the Khmer Rouge Cambodia was unstable and spiraling into chaos.

Dropping in the Khmer Rouge as if Pol Pot is a meaningful representation of all political change is absurd, even if you only consider drastic changes (i.e. revolutions, overthrows, secessions and annexations). Outside of imperialist conquest almost every nation on Earth, past or present, is the result of such struggles.

The foundational mistake is believing that the status quo is stable and permanent because it never is and never has been before. Even episodes in history that are considered "stable" (like the Roman Empire/Republic) are tumultuous and only seem somewhat stable because we're looking at them from a bird's eye view often thousands of years later.

Re: Effective altruism is not effective

#230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't against EA in general in the comment (I do have tons of reservations against it, but not time to write about it here atm). I respond to the grandparent's comment, specifically the part I explicitly quoted -- which does mention becoming rich. That said: > Who cares if it's more self serving as long as they do get the the second part? People like me, who don't consider it being altruistic or not as orthogonal t…

> being altruistic or not as orthogonal to Are you using 'orthogonal' to mean "unrelated to", or do you mean "in opposition to"? Because depending on which meaning you intend, your final sentence can be read in two very different ways. If it's the first, I'm not completely sure you and fighterpilot are necessarily disagreeing? If it's the second meaning, then it's a somewhat bold claim to say that personal benefit in…

People like me, who don't consider it being altruistic or not as orthogonal to the success of the second part.

>Are you using 'orthogonal' to mean "unrelated to", or do you mean "in opposition to"?

I'm using it to mean "unrelated to" (canonical CS meaning of "orthogonal" as well).

But, here's the catch, note that I used a double negative in my phrasing. so, I'm not saying they are othogonal, I'm saying they're not orthogonal. That is, I don't consider "being altruistic or not as orthogonal to the success of the second part" (the second part being the "helping" we were discussing).

So, it's not that "personal benefit in any form invalidates altruism", it's that lack of altruism works against effectivly helping people.

Post reply on HN