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New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

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Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#221
post #65
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah, particularly given it was against a US telecom company, the NSA would make sense as the source of the implant.

No that would make 0 sense. The NSA doesn't "attack" american companies with covert implants. They get FISA court orders that force american companies to attach their equipment.

[deleted]

Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#222
post #127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe you are not a high value target?

That raises an interesting question about just how targeted this kind of attack could be. At manufacture time, do the folks on the assembly line (so to speak) know who a particular board is going to? If not, they would have to add the extra chip to all outgoing boards, which means there should be plenty of them in the wild, no?

Or swap the boards out in transit.

Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#223
post #15

Finally a named source, but still no photos and the alleged hacked board is still not in the hands of a public security researcher. The "trojan ethernet connector" paragraph mentions similarity to an NSA implant, which appears to be this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_ANT_catalog#/media/File:NS... I'm now wondering if someone found an NSA implant and misreported it as Chinese. We're going to end up in the stupid…

Is it illegal to report an intelligence attack that is perceived to be foreign? If not, why not have all attack reports assume they are foreign to begin with? This would give the reporter credible deniability, and put the burden on the US government to argue otherwise. Regardless, the report is released without the reporter getting in hot water. Or am I missing something?

Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#224
post #133
post #106

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It could just be a sort of beacon to help identify where hardware went after the manufacturing process. If the same company is building the same hardware, the agent can slip in something more nefarious to make sure they target the right company. Servers are commodity products but they aren't manufactured in mass quantities like phones are. If a company orders thousands of them, that's likely thousands that will need…

How would such a beacon work though? As RL_Quine points out there's only so much you can do at this point, especially if you want to be super stealthy. If you wanted to send a ping to an external server you'd have to craft an ethernet frame with the right target MAC address containing an IP datagram with the right IP address to be routed correctly in the datacenter and through the public firewall. You better make sur…

You can sniff the right target MAC and source IP from the traffic flowing through the port itself. (Just assume the machine itself has internet access and use its source IP and the target MAC it uses for public addresses.)

As to the beacon itself… DNS is pretty good. Just send an innocuous DNS request to a machine you control (say a NIST time server), if you think an iterative request won't show up on radar. Or send a recursive DNS request along a path you've wiretapped. (I'd be surprised if the NSA doesn't have a feed of all DNS requests to 8.8.8.8.)

Of course you will want to wait to see whether the bugged machine itself sends any such packets out first, to ensure that yours can hide in the noise. Bad idea to send a DNS beacon from a machine that doesn't ever make DNS requests.

Actually on second thought, given the above capabilities, you don't even need to inject packets at all. Just mangle existing DNS queries in such a way that you can identify them in a wiretap. Say, for all DNS requests with a specific hash, mangle the ID field so that it matches some orthogonal hash (and unmangle it on the way back of course). Very unlikely to be noticed by an IPS, and you can statistically determine that machines sending more than expected packets whose ID field matches this second hash are successfully bugged.

Or, why even send packets? Instead, drop all DNS request packets matching some specific hash. They'll eventually get retried with a new server or new ID. Again, statistics applied to wiretapped data can determine whom you've bugged. You don't even need store+forward capability here; just emit noise over the tail of the packet and the switch will drop it for you.

Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#225

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The most compelling explanation I've heard is that the BMC chip could be programmed by two distinct flash chips, one for factory programming and one for some other purpose. In some SKUs, the latter isn't populated but it has a higher priority than the first chip. Since there are many flash chips fitting the same pin out, all it took was soldering a compromised flash chip (with firmware for the BMC chip) onto pads tha…

The BMCs on the newest Supermicro servers are from ASPEED. The X10 models have the AST2400 [0] and the X11 models have the AST2500 [1]. They have ARM CPUs and run, basically, an embedded Linux. If you wanted to "backdoor" motherboards that shipped with these BMCs, wouldn't it would be much easier to just install your own "customized" version of the firmware on them? It certainly seems that it'd be much more difficult…

well companies like Apple and Amazon are reflashing/updating, so that wouldn't stick.

Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#226
post #8

OK so this is a different hack than Bloomberg reported before: ethernet jack piggyback instead of bmc. I'm not sure this adds credibility to the allegations in the other story. The details that Bloomberg related previously are so different that this couldnt be what they originally were reporting on. This adds to the China hacking server board narrative, but it does nothing to prove the Bloomberg reporting actually tr…

Note that BMCs can also piggyback on ethernet ports; I've seen some vendors use a shared ethernet port for OOB and ethernet. Which is fun because you can accidentally put a super important insecure oob service on the same jack as an internet exposed web service.

IIRC... The DCMI spec actually requires that the BMC be capable of sharing an Ethernet port. A dedicated Ethernet port for the BMC is optional.

Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#227

That story is a bit odd, still -- normally behind the connector there is optionally magnetics, and at least a PHY... being able to integrate the magnetics in the connector exists allright, but adding the phy /as well/ must make it a marvel of integration regular manufacturers would dream of... especially at Gb speed! Also, you can't really 'piggyback' ethernet easily, for the same reasons; you would need TWO phy in t…

> Also, you can't really 'piggyback' ethernet easily, for the same reasons; you would need TWO phy in there to decode/reencode...

Pretty much every BMC in existence (well, the ones that comply with the Data Center Manageability Interface, at least) can "piggyback" on top of an onboard Ethernet interface.

Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#228

I've seen several comments regarding whether or not Apple, Amazon etc. would deny the hacking if its true and if that is fraud or not. I work at Amazon now and previously was in the Navy, holding a TS/SCI. My firm belief is if such a hack happened, it would not be disclosed to anyone without a clearance, and the organizations that are denying it have no knowledge that it occurred. Furthermore if there truly was a com…

The Bloomberg article specifically claimed that Apple themselves discovered the chip in a random spot check. If an Apple employee discovered it, it would have been communicated all the way up to the executive level prior to notifying anyone outside the company (such as the FBI), which means you can't just chalk this up to a handful of lower-level Apple employees being covered by a gag order and the executives not kno…

unless the NSA or another intelligence agency has an insider that could catch that before it made it up high enough to cause trouble. conceivably, someone below the insider could leak to Bloomberg realizing that they have limited options.

Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#229
post #65
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah, particularly given it was against a US telecom company, the NSA would make sense as the source of the implant.

No that would make 0 sense. The NSA doesn't "attack" american companies with covert implants. They get FISA court orders that force american companies to attach their equipment.

I used to work in engineering at one of the big wireless telecoms. The impression that I got was that many of the outsourced services were compromised. For instance, we had zero control over our voice mail systems, they were outsourced to Amdocs.

You can see how this benefits the NSA; if the voice mail is outsourced to a foreign company, and the NSA buys intel from that company, it's technically not spying on US citizens, particularly if they're getting metadata.

Re: New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in U.S. Telecom

#230
post #152

I've seen several comments regarding whether or not Apple, Amazon etc. would deny the hacking if its true and if that is fraud or not. I work at Amazon now and previously was in the Navy, holding a TS/SCI. My firm belief is if such a hack happened, it would not be disclosed to anyone without a clearance, and the organizations that are denying it have no knowledge that it occurred. Furthermore if there truly was a com…

What's the point of classifying national security threats?

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