221–230 of 237 posts
"The blockchain is an undeniably ingenious invention – the brainchild of a person or group of people known by the pseudonym, Satoshi Nakamoto." It isn't even definitively known who invented blockchain, it is behind the pyramid scheme known as bitcoin and no, no way should that ever be used in voting system computers.
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I wonder about biometrics though. How expensive would it be to connect the national fingerprint database with a ballot scanner of some sort?
Paper ballots are handled by multiple people, not just the voter. Even if you manage to filter out all the volunteers, getting access to the actual ballots might prove difficult, as they're handled quite publicly.
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But how can I (a voter), audit it in the voting booth? How can I verify that the extensively audited software is actually running on the machine in front of me?
You can't. Especially at scale (every person validating the software before voting). Paper ballots with a anonymised ledger of votes placed is, in my opinion, the best method.
You could even create your ballot offline, even by hand.
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And how do you prove that all of those citizens exist? We have a secure, provable, relatively cheap method right now: Paper ballots and public observers at elections. Compared to the stakes the cost is peanuts.
I live in Denmark, every citizen has a social security number and we all have access to a digital identification method called "nemID". It's basically a login that's tied to a piece of paper containing a hash table of numbers you use for two factoring. It's the safest citizen verification system we've ever had and it's basically used for any for of identification in the digital world from banking to using our public…
1. I take someone's ID, I look them up on the voter list. If they are not on the voter list I take their proof or the sworn testimony of someone that does live in the district that they live where they say they live. Either way, observers can record their name and supposed address.
2. I hand them a folded ballot and they go, with assistance from a family member if necessary, to behind a security wall to mark their ballot.
3. They place the ballot in the slit of the box, folded so their vote is secret, but visible to all observers so that they couldn't not have snuck in a second ballot.
4. The ballot box never leaves public view. In the event of an emergency I take the ballot box and hold it high so that everyone can see it, especially the observers, until we get outside.
5. Anyone in line by the time the polls close is allowed to vote and number of voting locations are determined by a public service (not politicians) so we don't disenfranchise voters or unduly burden voters.
6. In full view of my assistant poll clerk and all observers we count every ballot. As DRO I have final say over questionable ballots. If I make an obviously unfair call observers can alert my superiors at Elections Canada. I only had to make one decision on one ballot out of around 500.
7. We compare the count of people, the count of the ballots we gave out, and the count of the ballots in the box. These all must match. If they do not match we count again. It's harder than you'd think because people accidentally fuck up ballots or someone can have the same name but be a different person. This can even happen at the same address! Usually a son being named after a father.
8. I fill out the vote totals and give one copy to Elections Canada, one copy to each party observer, and I keep one copy for myself. We then put security tape around a tamper evident bag with the original ballots for them to be counted again by Elections Canada HQ.
Now tell me, how are you going to fraud that system? We wrote down everyone's name, at most you might be able to get someone to vote on behalf of their brother here or there. Or the people voting by mail might have their ballots disregarded or changed, but most people vote on election day and Elections Canada is trustworthy and explainable to anyone.
I could never fully trust your NemId system because you could never prove to me that everyone that supposedly voted existed. In Canada's system we can literally count the people walking through the door and we can literally count the individual ballots.
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I live in Denmark, every citizen has a social security number and we all have access to a digital identification method called "nemID". It's basically a login that's tied to a piece of paper containing a hash table of numbers you use for two factoring. It's the safest citizen verification system we've ever had and it's basically used for any for of identification in the digital world from banking to using our public…
I've worked as a DRO in the Canadian election. There is no way to steal an election in Canada. Whatever the Balkans have, that isn't what I'm talking about because the way it works in Canada is like this: 1. I take someone's ID, I look them up on the voter list. If they are not on the voter list I take their proof or the sworn testimony of someone that does live in the district that they live where they say they live…
Aside from that it's literally impossible to obtain a nemid if you don't exist, and, once you cease existing so does your id.
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Why use a voting machine at all? Isn't the main point of having a polling location simply so you can verify your identity? If we could come up with a system that allowed one's identity to be verified online, or by postal service, then do we really need thousands of machines collecting the votes. Couldn't it be centralized to a handful of more easily audited systems?
There's some challenging requirements around this. You need to positively identify someone as having the right and ability to vote (no dead people voting like in Illinois). You need to make sure they vote only once (no ballot box stuffing). You need to make sure their vote wasn't coerced (as far as you can). You need to make sure their vote is anonymous (to protect the voters from retaliation). And it needs to be eas…
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How do you verify the entities that are registered on the chain are who they are supposed to be? It may show a commit log of Citizen X voted in a certain way, but how do you verify it was Citizen X that actually voted or that they even exist?
The same way you verify that the person using the banking app is the one they are supposed to be. Or any other service. Obviously you use your device, and you can lock it with a password. You can use two factor authentication. It's straightforward, really. You sound like identity has never been solved electronically. If anything, holding a physical paper id document is far less secure than a personal device with your…
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The same way you verify that the person using the banking app is the one they are supposed to be. Or any other service. Obviously you use your device, and you can lock it with a password. You can use two factor authentication. It's straightforward, really. You sound like identity has never been solved electronically. If anything, holding a physical paper id document is far less secure than a personal device with your…
It's not been solved though, at least here in the UK where people are against mandatory ID cards.
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Why do you need to have an address? What is wrong with being homeless?
I was reacting to the parent comment. For some reason in Northern Ireland example cited there proof of address was required. Government can issue IDs without proof of address. This is matter of implementation. For national election at least you shouldn't need it. For local elections it should be required.
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I was reacting to the parent comment. For some reason in Northern Ireland example cited there proof of address was required. Government can issue IDs without proof of address. This is matter of implementation. For national election at least you shouldn't need it. For local elections it should be required.
Governments can and do issue ID using whatever criteria they see fit. But the lesser the criteria the weaker the proof. I mean, you need a photo at least, right? And presumably some means of proving that photo is you (for passports in UK you have to get a doctor or similar person of authority to sign a declaration). So it's not such a simple matter.