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A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

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Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#221

So, here's my take on all this 'surveillance is good for you'. It more or less proves (to me at least) that the government(s) and the various secret services have absolutely no idea who to monitor specifically. So instead of targeting their operations they want to monitor all of us, just in case something of interest pops out that then allows them to focus their attention. It's a pretty scary thought: just imagine, a…

You nailed it, I think. If surveillance works, then Paris, Beirut, Bagdad et al wouldn't have happed. Realizing it's a pipe dream, I'd love to see a world accept that we the west have done so much damage that nothing will stop terrorism. Accepting that means we can throw those wasted resources at things that have a better chance of working - throw the tech that detects copyright infringements at detecting pro-ISIL si…

Fund new research to put effective bomb and weapon detectors into every doorway.

I don't want to live in a world that has bomb detectors in every doorway.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#222
post #213

Amazing, a government apologist is top comment, I'm sure there's no astro turfing going on here! Ask people who work in policy, the reason things are a certain way is rarely technical, its usually political, which is a qaint way of saying decisions are made by corrupt power brokers.

We detached this subthread from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10590512 and marked it off-topic. You're not allowed to accuse other users of astroturfing or shilling without evidence. Having an opposing view doesn't count as evidence. If you have sincere suspicion that someone is astroturfing, you're asked to email hn@ycombinator.com. We take such emails seriously, look at the data, and if we find evidence, we…

Out of curiosity, has anyone been banned specifically because it was believed they were compensated for their comments?

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#223

So, here's my take on all this 'surveillance is good for you'. It more or less proves (to me at least) that the government(s) and the various secret services have absolutely no idea who to monitor specifically. So instead of targeting their operations they want to monitor all of us, just in case something of interest pops out that then allows them to focus their attention. It's a pretty scary thought: just imagine, a…

The only way to deal with any form of mass shooting is to have systems in public places that can automatically detect and disable the shooter within milliseconds of their first shot. Anything else - encryption backdoors, etc. - is absolutely pointless and will at best prevent only a small percentage of incidents. If you want to deal with the problem, do it directly.

We all know that while terrorism gives these initiatives fuel, they ultimately have little to do with terrorism and much more to do with governments wanting as much surveillance and control over their populations as possible. The odds of dying in a terrorist attack are approximately 1 in 20 million; for comparison, you are 25X more likely to die by drowning in a bathtub and 1,000X more likely to die in a car crash [1]. If terrorists are 1/25th as effective at killing people as bathtubs, how many of our civil liberties should we be willing to give up to stop them?

There are currently at least 3,278 prisoners in the US serving life without parole for non-violent offenses [2]. Perhaps we should stop terrorizing our own citizens before we worry about foreign terrorists that can't even keep up with bathtubs.

[1] https://reason.com/archives/2011/09/06/how-scared-of-terrori...

[2] https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/111813-lwop-complete-repor...

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#224

So, here's my take on all this 'surveillance is good for you'. It more or less proves (to me at least) that the government(s) and the various secret services have absolutely no idea who to monitor specifically. So instead of targeting their operations they want to monitor all of us, just in case something of interest pops out that then allows them to focus their attention. It's a pretty scary thought: just imagine, a…

The simpler explanation: they understand knowledge is power and are happy to use any convenient excuse to acquire it.

If knowledge was power then by the argument advanced above, they would be able to stop terrorist attacks. Why don't they? Surely the obvious effective program being claimed to not exist would be an excellent argument to expand surveillance operations.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#225

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You nailed it, I think. If surveillance works, then Paris, Beirut, Bagdad et al wouldn't have happed. Realizing it's a pipe dream, I'd love to see a world accept that we the west have done so much damage that nothing will stop terrorism. Accepting that means we can throw those wasted resources at things that have a better chance of working - throw the tech that detects copyright infringements at detecting pro-ISIL si…

Fund new research to put effective bomb and weapon detectors into every doorway . I don't want to live in a world that has bomb detectors in every doorway.

I live in a country that has bomb detectors in every doorway. It's not that bad - at the very least, everybody preferrs a bomb detector to another suicide bombing.

I think that when terror is something that can happen constantly for months at a time, people learn to keep living their lives without fear, but also to take measurable actions that really prevent the next attack.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#226

So, here's my take on all this 'surveillance is good for you'. It more or less proves (to me at least) that the government(s) and the various secret services have absolutely no idea who to monitor specifically. So instead of targeting their operations they want to monitor all of us, just in case something of interest pops out that then allows them to focus their attention. It's a pretty scary thought: just imagine, a…

The only way to deal with any form of mass shooting is to have systems in public places that can automatically detect and disable the shooter within milliseconds of their first shot. Anything else - encryption backdoors, etc. - is absolutely pointless and will at best prevent only a small percentage of incidents. If you want to deal with the problem, do it directly. We all know that while terrorism gives these initia…

Better not go blowing up paper bags then. False positives would be a bit messy and would likely kill more people than any terrorists ever would. It would have to automatically and reliably detect and disable the shooter, and they'd still be able to fire that first shot. It also does not protect against bombs.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#227

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The only way to deal with any form of mass shooting is to have systems in public places that can automatically detect and disable the shooter within milliseconds of their first shot. Anything else - encryption backdoors, etc. - is absolutely pointless and will at best prevent only a small percentage of incidents. If you want to deal with the problem, do it directly. We all know that while terrorism gives these initia…

Better not go blowing up paper bags then. False positives would be a bit messy and would likely kill more people than any terrorists ever would. It would have to automatically and reliably detect and disable the shooter, and they'd still be able to fire that first shot. It also does not protect against bombs.

Paper bags don't emit projectiles traveling at 1,700 mph. Bullets fired from a gun have a very specific profile including speed, size, and shape that are shared by literally nothing else. There are multiple ways to track the speed, size, and shape of objects traveling within any public space. With this kind of detection, even attackers using silenced weapons could be targeted and neutralized within milliseconds of their very first shot.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#228

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Better not go blowing up paper bags then. False positives would be a bit messy and would likely kill more people than any terrorists ever would. It would have to automatically and reliably detect and disable the shooter, and they'd still be able to fire that first shot. It also does not protect against bombs.

Paper bags don't emit projectiles traveling at 1,700 mph. Bullets fired from a gun have a very specific profile including speed, size, and shape that are shared by literally nothing else. There are multiple ways to track the speed, size, and shape of objects traveling within any public space. With this kind of detection, even attackers using silenced weapons could be targeted and neutralized within milliseconds of th…

I don't see this scheme working. It would require a whole bunch of sensors and a chunk of local computing power to make a 'kill' decision (or at least, an attempt to immobilize) on an individual in a crowded space based on the reliable detection of bullets fired from a gun. The kill device could be disabled prior to discharging a fire-arm, it could trigger falsely, it could be made to trigger falsely on purpose and it could malfunction. I'm sure that if you pitch this idea to the right party they'll shower you with money, nothing like more security theater and false feelings of safety to get big $.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#229

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Paper bags don't emit projectiles traveling at 1,700 mph. Bullets fired from a gun have a very specific profile including speed, size, and shape that are shared by literally nothing else. There are multiple ways to track the speed, size, and shape of objects traveling within any public space. With this kind of detection, even attackers using silenced weapons could be targeted and neutralized within milliseconds of th…

I don't see this scheme working. It would require a whole bunch of sensors and a chunk of local computing power to make a 'kill' decision (or at least, an attempt to immobilize) on an individual in a crowded space based on the reliable detection of bullets fired from a gun. The kill device could be disabled prior to discharging a fire-arm, it could trigger falsely, it could be made to trigger falsely on purpose and i…

It wouldn't require "a bunch of sensors". Anyway, generally you're referring to technical challenges, all of which could be readily solved.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#230
post #15

How about this: we assume terrorists can fucking talk covertly whenever they like (since there are myriads of channels and codes that they can use) and that mass surveillance is not the way to catch them plotting their next act. And from then on, ONLY use surveillance on specific targets under investigation. And while at it, maybe even have a limit on the number of targets each agency can investigate, so they chose t…

>And while at it, maybe even have a limit on the number of targets each agency can investigate, so they chose them wisely. This is an insanely bad idea. I understand where you're coming from, but think about how that would play out in real life. I was going to write it out, but I really think that you can probably figure it out if you do think it through. From the perspective of the intel/policing agency, and from a…

>This is an insanely bad idea. I understand where you're coming from, but think about how that would play out in real life.

Make it a sane number, and it's not gonna play that bad at all. The only problem would be them claiming "if I had more allowable targets I would have caught this or that case before it happened" etc. Which we should just ignore.

After all, before they got these modern toys, they used to be content with 1/1000000 the available targeting that they have now.

In the seventies and eighties even, to target somebody involved lots of people actually in the streets, a semi-manual process to record his phonecalls (and you had to go through them with a real person, no keyword triggering etc), no "web" and other records automatically available etc. Checking half or all of the US at once at the scale we do today was not an option, not even 1/100000 that. You could ask for phone records and a couple other items at best.

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