Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can't have protection from eavesdropping without protection from MITM, because MITM can be used for eavesdropping (as well as actually inserting malicious traffic into the communication.) Which is why encryption without authentication is pointless (or, worse, illusory security) in most cases. On the internet, your communication is inherently being handed off through a number of intermediaries to an endpoint. If y…
I agree and disagree. Not all adversaries have active intercept capabilities. Some are just passive. Defending against them isn't entirely pointless. I really, really dislike the CA cabal. Self signed "encrypt only" certs combined with auto cert pinning in browsers would probably solve 99% of the problem.
Nobody likes the CA problem, but you can't handwave the problem away.
TACK (which provides auto-pinning) is hopefully going to be a solution to the lack of trustworthiness in CAs, but TACK's deployment model also presumes a CA infrastructure.