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Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

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211–220 of 235 posts

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#211

People here like it, but end-to-end encryption is an objectively worse user experience for people that don't care about that feature

My issue with app-style E2E encryption is the app can still see your message in plaintext, and there's no way to verify it isn't doing anything with it.

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#212

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Being in a prison cell is a great way to avoid traffic accidents, I agree.

It’s people like you who go in the dark forest because “the prison is tight”, get mugged, then complain that the sheriff doesn’t operate there. Call it a prison cell, or a fortified city. Whatever, dude…

Nah, I would never be using an Apple product to begin with because I'm not a magpie to be wooed by a shiny nickel in the mud.

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#213
a cynical part of me thinks this can be a lucrative angle to sell an added verified program with end to end encryption.

a lot of shady messages go around in Insta DMs - whether it's cheating spouses, athletes getting exposed etc then of course other criminal shit.

if only, only if - you as the platform can sell added insurance (verified) program that screenshots can't be taken without the other party consenting etc.

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#214
Anyone that cares about privacy and uses Instagram won't care about this. It's not a good thing for Meta to do this but the last two+ decades has demonstrated people prefer to be ignorant and accept whatever comes. Let them eat cake and rot. I tire of being called paranoid because I know how all this can be abused.

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#215

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm asking you about how you want the world to work.

Well then, I think E2EE is a good thing and I'll take the minor inconveniences.

Not being able to receive messages except on one device isn't a minor inconvenience.

To fix this, you either need to authorize each device (and web browser) from another device that's logged in, or the central authority holds your keys.

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#216

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Centralized FOSS software can do the same thing and remove encryption. Open source is not a requirement for security.

FOSS is however a prerequisite to Kerckhoff's principle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerckhoffs%27s_principle

At the risk of being pedantic, that's not exactly what the principle says. It's claim is that a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system except the private key is public knowledge. It doesn't require that the system be public, only that the security of a non-public system shouldn't rely on it's non-public nature. A closed source cryptosystem designed to still be secure even if someone discovers how it works satisfies the principle just fine.

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#217
post #88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

By disabling Apple "Intelligence" you bypass the risk of your prompts going to OpenAI.

What is your concern about prompts to go OpenAI? Apple has a contract with OpenAI that explicitly prevents them from logging, storing, training, or making any use of your prompts other than to satisfy the specific current request. Apple has some good lawyers and I’m sure that the teeth are prominent in that contract.

The person I was responding to had privacy concerns. The closest thing to a privacy concern about LLM usage on iOS is Apple Intelligence, which sends some prompts to OpenAI to fulfill them. Thank you for the information about Apple's privacy program.

I send hundreds of prompts to OpenAI's LLM daily. I do not have a concern about it.

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#218

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You shouldn't be talking down like this, you're wrong about it. Alice and Bob need to exchange keys beforehand in some trusted out-of-band way. There's no protocol that solves this if Eve can be in the middle. I'm not sure what you mean by fingerprints, but if you describe a protocol, I can describe the mitm attack.

You’re not sure what key fingerprints are? Bob and Alice are setting up their e2e channel, and because they have some extra level of concern about snooping, they telephone each other and read off some form of hash of the public key to each other. A more complex variant would be something like PGP implemented, where Bob and Alice could both sign each others keys after this exchange, ensuring that someone who hadn’t me…

If there's no concern of mitm on the telephone then yeah.

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well then, I think E2EE is a good thing and I'll take the minor inconveniences.

Not being able to receive messages except on one device isn't a minor inconvenience. To fix this, you either need to authorize each device (and web browser) from another device that's logged in, or the central authority holds your keys.

I run WhatsApp concurrently on two phones and receive all messages on both devices. But generally speaking this is where we disagree - requiring all devices to be authorised by me is feature not a bug as far as I'm concerned.

Re: Meta Shuts Down End-to-End Encryption for Instagram Messaging

#220

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, it's not at all this simple. This is why so many "e2ee" apps like Telegram are bogus, they ended up prioritizing UX over security because there are many places where you can't pick both.

Webs of trust based on OOB key verification and signing, or centralized trust authorities are the two primary models I’m aware of. I’ve always been enamored of the idea of DNS as a back end protocol to enable the former largely decentralized solution. Bob looks up Alice and receives her key from Alice’s namespace within the DNS hierarchy, along with her trust claims. David then looks up Alice’s key within her namespa…

In practice it's possible to make a system that's hard to mitm if users are diligent. WhatsApp publishes a public record of hashes of the keys. If both sides check that record against their local keys, it's hard for WhatsApp to present different versions to each. Though that's a more recent development.

The harder part that Instagram is most likely concerned about is getting low-effort users to keep their private keys safe without losing them.

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