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Security through obscurity is not bad

mobeigi.com

211–220 of 228 posts

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#211

The problem with this argument is that you can justify an infinite amount of crap with it, the security equivalent of cockroach papers; which inevitably people ends up treating as real security. One example I remember is Pidgin storing its passwords in plain text in $HOME. They could have encrypted them with some hardcoded string, and made a lot of people happy that they would no longer grep their $HOME and find thei…

> The problem with this argument is that you can justify an infinite amount of crap with it Does that make it wrong?

If the model you're using tries to claim something that is false is actually true. Yes, your model is wrong.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#212

> Security through obscurity, as an additional layer, is good! If and only if the security advantage it gives outweighs the the numerous disadvantages. It never* does. That's why the comment calling it bad got so many upvotes. Mixed in with those cargoculting the meme, are people like me who have had to deal with obfuscation techniques, written by someone else, that the bad guys understood before I did. Obfuscation a…

> It never* does.

Can you substantiate this claim a bit?

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#214

> Security through obscurity, as an additional layer, is good! If and only if the security advantage it gives outweighs the the numerous disadvantages. It never* does. That's why the comment calling it bad got so many upvotes. Mixed in with those cargoculting the meme, are people like me who have had to deal with obfuscation techniques, written by someone else, that the bad guys understood before I did. Obfuscation a…

> It never* does. Can you substantiate this claim a bit?

> Can you substantiate this claim a bit?

I might, depending on how much objective evidence you'd demand for substance. The problem with obscurity as a security feature, is the group(s) that feels the impact the most. Heuristically, you can create 3 groups that are impacted. APTs, skiddies, devs/maintainers.

Obscurity will stop skiddies... effectively 100% ....but so will everything else. Regular updates, and a half good password also stops skiddies to effectively 100%. Obscurity has a net negative effect on the system because it doesn't increase the attack cost on skiddies, but does increase the maintenance cost to engineering. This is the vast majority of attackers you'd want to deal with.

Your Advanced Persistent Threats, will be slowed by some amount of obscurity, but they will not be be stopped by it at all, at best it's a road bump. Persistence and intent will overcome any amount of obscurity. Same idea as give enough eyes, all bugs are shallow. Given enough time, any/all amount of obscurity will be understood by the baddies.

The downsides to obscurity is it's cost both to maintenance of the system as a whole, but also to the heuristics non-security developers use to find/understand bugs. Obscurity introduces significant complexity into the system. That complexity makes it harder to find and understand real bugs, but worse, it also obscures the security of the system itself to non-experts. I do believe we'll never escape the reality that most developers see obscurity, and think "this 'secret' makes this secure" but obscurity is *not* a secret. It doesn't provide additional security/safety. It only marginally increases the time to find and deploy the exploit. Here, this extra layer of obscurity actually decreases security because developers will stop looking for ways to harden the system, because this "secret" is good enough. I.e. the obscurity added only has the opportunity cost replacing the effort that would have been spent on real security.

If you have a full security team managing the obscurity the maintenance cost to the system, will be less than the cost to your APTs, but if you don't have a full time team working on it (or at least a strong expert in both how obscurity benefits the system, but more important, a strong expert in real security), the maintenance costs will exceed the time/delay until exploitation.

It's likely that I could deploy some system securely, with obscurity layered over top. But I often don't because I don't wanna deal with it. It makes debugging harder. Depending on what specific flavor, it might also give the baddies a place to hide, because the signal of attacks no longer looks like the signal everyone expects.

If you can avoid *ALL* of the pitfalls. It will, without a doubt, increase the time to exploit. The problem being, if you're unable to avoid all the pitfalls of it, the negative aspects will have a much stronger cost and influence on the maintenance of the system, and the devs, contrasted with the cost it might have on any attack.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#215

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It never* does. Can you substantiate this claim a bit?

> Can you substantiate this claim a bit? I might, depending on how much objective evidence you'd demand for substance. The problem with obscurity as a security feature, is the group(s) that feels the impact the most. Heuristically, you can create 3 groups that are impacted. APTs, skiddies, devs/maintainers. Obscurity will stop skiddies... effectively 100% ....but so will everything else. Regular updates, and a half g…

These things are always a cost/benefit calculation. Obscurity increases the cost, and it works well enough at that. It doesn't increase the cost by a lot, so it's not a super effective countermeasure, but it usually has a positive ROI because it's cheap to add.

Your complexity argument does make sense, but that also factors into the ROI calculation. I'd say obscurity is beneficial much more often than ~never.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#216
post #67

Obscurity can be fine but it's not security. I think of it like cover and concealment in the military. Security is cover. Something you can get behind so the bullets don't hit you. Obscurity is concealment. Harder to see, harder to find, so the enemy doesn't know where to shoot, but it's not stopping any bullets. Both have advantages and disadvantages and can complement each other depending on how they're used.

Example: there are teenage gangs going around on high powered scooters in my city, carrying hammers and mini grinders. They pair up on a scooter, steal a bike and disappear. I watched them. They don't want to hang around longer than necessary. They will only approach a bike rack that is clearly visible from the road. They will only steal a bike that has unobstructed access to the road (no tricky bollards or other bik…

That's fine as long you are really clear in your mind about what's going on.

It IT there are a lot of people tossing a blanket over the scooter and believing they're affecting the ability of the the attacker when they're really changing the likelihood of an attack.

Imagine if every single person put a blanket over their bike. Now imagine if everyone got a chain that was 10 times stronger. Which world would you rather live in?

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#217
post #67

Obscurity can be fine but it's not security. I think of it like cover and concealment in the military. Security is cover. Something you can get behind so the bullets don't hit you. Obscurity is concealment. Harder to see, harder to find, so the enemy doesn't know where to shoot, but it's not stopping any bullets. Both have advantages and disadvantages and can complement each other depending on how they're used.

Obscurity isn't security but it can support security. Until it doesn't.

I think I got the difference in my head. How about this:

Obscurity is decreasingly effective as more people use it. Security is more effective as more people use it.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#218

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Example: there are teenage gangs going around on high powered scooters in my city, carrying hammers and mini grinders. They pair up on a scooter, steal a bike and disappear. I watched them. They don't want to hang around longer than necessary. They will only approach a bike rack that is clearly visible from the road. They will only steal a bike that has unobstructed access to the road (no tricky bollards or other bik…

That's fine as long you are really clear in your mind about what's going on. It IT there are a lot of people tossing a blanket over the scooter and believing they're affecting the ability of the the attacker when they're really changing the likelihood of an attack. Imagine if every single person put a blanket over their bike. Now imagine if everyone got a chain that was 10 times stronger. Which world would you rather…

Honey pots, tar pits, bot motels, janky configs, visible telemetry (for example): these slow down adversaries in two ways. 1) They directly slow the adversary down and force them to navigate deliberately. 2) They increase uncertainty in uncomfortable ways, the effectiveness of this depends on how important it is for the adversary to remain undiscovered, not "poke the bear". Together, the effect is more than additive.

In addition to likelihood, attacks have shape. And proper installations can force your adversaries' maneuvers to take a certain shape. I've heard this referred to as terraforming.

If you're going to "do it in the road" (a highly visible bike rack), your lock or chain works much better when it is better / stronger than the herd. If everyone has a chain which is 10x stronger, then a better grinder becomes a cost of doing business. Maybe I'd rather live in a world where I didn't use that bike rack.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#219
post #67

Obscurity can be fine but it's not security. I think of it like cover and concealment in the military. Security is cover. Something you can get behind so the bullets don't hit you. Obscurity is concealment. Harder to see, harder to find, so the enemy doesn't know where to shoot, but it's not stopping any bullets. Both have advantages and disadvantages and can complement each other depending on how they're used.

I don't think that really works because obscurity isn't harder to see or find. I don't know the analogy, it's like standing out in the open and being like "yeah but who would think to look here lol".

Interesting. Have you seen the movie Braveheart? That's the leadup to the later humiliation of the king in battle, there's a movie / drama about this one too. Saw it recently, don't remember the name.

Basically the insurgents choose terrain they know well, because they live there. They choose a swamp / mire in an open field between two hills. They build fortifications. They obscure the true nature of the ground they're standing on, out in the open. They goad the king's army into finishing them then and there. They fight on foot against knights on horseback. It's a mess. They win.

Re: Security through obscurity is not bad

#220

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This isn't about what's a good idea or bad idea. Perhaps it's best to simply leave analogies behind, otherwise we'll just focus on the wrong thing. Security through obscurity merely means that your system is atypical. It's not hidden, it's not secret, it's not hard to find, it's not hard to examine, it's not less visible, etc - there is nothing inherently different about the systems at all other than that one is more…

I'm having a hard time understanding what you mean here. If something is obscured, by definition it is less visible. Being 'less typical' is a form of security because most attacks rely on some form of pattern recognition, and obscurity literally dissolves patterns into noise.

Visiblility is also a mental construct of what we expect to see and what we know already and can map to what we see. "Obscure" is doing a lot of work here. It doesn't necessarily mean hidden, it can mean the object's true purpose or form is hidden from some particular vantage, and only that vantage.
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