Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is how people intend to run open claw instances too. Some folks are trying to add automated bug report creation by pointing agents at a company's social media mentions. I personally think it's crazy. I'm currently assisting in developing AI policies at work. As a proof of concept, I sent an email from a personal mail address whose content was a lot of angry words threatening contract cancellation and legal actio…
There was a great AI CTF 2 years ago that Microsoft hosted. You had to exfil data through an email agent, clearly testing Outlook Copilot and several of Microsofts Azure Guardrails. Our agent took 8th place, successfully completing half of the challenges entirely autonomously.
A GitHub Issue Title Compromised 4k Developer Machines
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Re: A GitHub Issue Title Compromised 4k Developer Machines
#212Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is how people intend to run open claw instances too. Some folks are trying to add automated bug report creation by pointing agents at a company's social media mentions. I personally think it's crazy. I'm currently assisting in developing AI policies at work. As a proof of concept, I sent an email from a personal mail address whose content was a lot of angry words threatening contract cancellation and legal actio…
> Some folks are trying to add automated bug report creation by pointing agents at a company's social media mentions. I wonder how long before we see prompt injection via social media instead of GitHub Issues or email. Seems like only a matter of time. The technical barriers (what few are left) to recklessly launching an OpenClaw will continue to ease, and more and more people will unleash their bots into the wild, p…
All those years of security training trying to get folks to double check senders, and to beware of what you share and what you click, and now we have to redo it for agents.
Re: A GitHub Issue Title Compromised 4k Developer Machines
#213Earlier quoted context omitted.
SQL I’m injection is a great parallel. Pervasive, easy to fix individual instances, hard to fix the patterns, and people still accidentally create vulns decades later.
This is substantially worse. SQL injection still happens a lot, it’s true, but the fix when it does is always the same: SQL clients have an ironclad way to differentiate instructions from data; you just have to use it. LLMs do not have that, yet. If an LLM can take privileged actions, there’s no deterministic, ironclad way to indicate “this input is untrusted, treat it as data and not instructions”. Sternly worded en…
We'll probably also have some sub agent inspecting what the main agent is doing and it'll be told to reach out to the owner if it spots suspicious exfiltration like behaviour. Until someone figures out how to poison that too.
The innovation factor of this tech while cool, drives me absolutely nuts with its non deterministic behaviour.
Re: A GitHub Issue Title Compromised 4k Developer Machines
#214Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah I'm not sure hunterpayne isn't an AI that did some research to answer my question and immediately found a printer-based hack in an npm package.
I think I'm the last living engineer based on this conversation. Installers have worked this way for decades.
Npm is not some generic software package manager, it's for node. No other tool does this.
Re: A GitHub Issue Title Compromised 4k Developer Machines
#215Re: A GitHub Issue Title Compromised 4k Developer Machines
#216Earlier quoted context omitted.
There was a great AI CTF 2 years ago that Microsoft hosted. You had to exfil data through an email agent, clearly testing Outlook Copilot and several of Microsofts Azure Guardrails. Our agent took 8th place, successfully completing half of the challenges entirely autonomously.
That's really cool. Do you have any write-ups I can checkout? I'm still new to this area of offensive sec so would love to learn from folks who've been in the thick of it.