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Opening up ‘Zero-Knowledge Proof’ technology

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Re: Opening up ‘Zero-Knowledge Proof’ technology

#211

Post by derangedHorse »

koalaman wrote: post #75
djoldman wrote: post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For kids with a guardian, the answer is enabling and empowering the guardian to control what the child can access. Somehow we've inappropriately shifted responsibility away from parents/guardians in some areas like internet access. In other areas, like letting your kid go outside by themselves, we've criminalized reasonable caregiver actions. It's a wild world.

Another way of looking at it, is that when you put the responsibility of protecting a child from harmful content on the parent, you're deciding to only protect the children with the right kind of parent.

Is the “right kind of parent” here synonymous with those that regulate what their children see online?

Re: Opening up ‘Zero-Knowledge Proof’ technology

#212

Post by derangedHorse »

MatteoFrigo wrote: post #178
ranger_danger wrote: post #153

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> the SE is in the phone, but could be a yubikey or something else Just like with passkeys or MFA, the "something else" could be purely software though, right? And hence automated? For example I can run Windows 11 in a virtual machine on Linux, using softu2f to emulate TPM 2.0, and Windows does not know the difference.

The problem that needs to be solved is, how can a government give you an identity document in a way that you cannot give the document to somebody else. Whether or not this problem needs to be solved is a political question, but it seems like the majority thinks that identity documents should be hard to forge, in the same way as dollar bills should be hard to forge. The only practical solution is to have some sort of…

It’s more about the device being tamper resistant than “hard to forge”. You don’t want people playing around with the device generating signatures. Algorithmically, there is nothing done on a secure element that can’t be done with software on a general chip. The defining difference is the physical separation of data and the mechanisms put in place to brick the device on detection of physical tampering.

Re: Opening up ‘Zero-Knowledge Proof’ technology

#213

Post by derangedHorse »

ChuckMcM wrote: post #91

This is great. It really pissed me off when David Chaum locked all the cool uses of ZKPs behind a patent wall. The DigiCash folks were peak dot com greed types, their business model was "We're going to get big chunk of change out of every transaction ever so we should be valued at 1% of the worlds GDP!" And the world responded with "Yeah, no." I really like Andy Birrells "micro-cents" which exploited the fact you cou…

Offline transfers don’t work without risk of double spending. The transactions eventually have to be finalized with a mint. The most one could hope for in the DigiCash model is the detection of a double spend once the cheated parties go back online[1].

If only the recipient doesn’t have access, a certain amount of trust can be delegated to the strength of the proof presented in the spend. In an ecash model, the proof would be in the form of a signature made by the mint (assuming the recipient was able to get the public keys the mint was using).

Active research is being done on the ecash model with the resurgence of the concept in the Cashu and Fedimint projects. Cashu takes the online sender, offline receiver approach[2].

[1] https://chaum.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Untraceable_Ele...

^See paragraph in the introduction ending with:

“But if Alice reuses a coin, the bank can trace it to her account and can prove that she has used it twice.”

[2] https://x.com/CashuBTC/status/1901240537866273252

Re: Opening up ‘Zero-Knowledge Proof’ technology

#216

Post by 0xOsprey »

cyberax wrote: post #112
0xOsprey wrote: post #95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We're building a purpose built self-custodial payment rail using zero knowledge cryptography that could be leveraged for this use case: https://x.com/0x_Osprey/status/1925299005191577921 https://paygo.wtf/ Current benchmarks for proving costs are 33k txns per dollar and we expect this to go down x10-x100 over the coming months/years.

Blockchain => trash A system that can be trusted needs to work in the real world, with credit card payments, bank accounts, VAT.

I use a blockchain wallet that lets me instantly switch between "USD in a Bank Account" to "self-custodial USDC on a blockchain" and so can you: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/fuse-solana-smart-wallet/id647...

I can also move the funds into a connected debit card so I can spend it in the real world.

This wallet is powered by Bridge.xyz which was acquired for $1B+ by Stripe in Fall 2024 - would encourage you to try the new stuff!

Re: Opening up ‘Zero-Knowledge Proof’ technology

#217

Post by ranger_danger »

MatteoFrigo wrote: post #180
ranger_danger wrote: post #149

> In layperson’s terms, ZKP makes it possible for people to prove that something about them is true without exchanging any other data. So, for example, a person visiting a website can verifiably prove he or she is over 18, without sharing anything else at all. But how does it prove that the request is actually made by a person and not a bot? Surely that part is technically impossible right now?

The government gives a signed document to natural persons, and the ZK system proves that the document is signed by the government. Bots don't have passports or driver's licenses. How does the government guarantee that the natural person is such? Various jurisdictions will decide what's good enough, but as a strawman proposal, you go in person to city hall once and upload a document to your phone.

That might prove the token itself is legit, but still doesn't prevent a bot from using it, right?
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