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The protester's guide to smartphone security

privacyguides.org

211–220 of 246 posts

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#211
Potentially this is where the likes of the PinePhone should thrive [1].

As well as the methods suggested, you could have full disk encryption and just have the phone switch off if it suspects any shenanigans. If you want, it could still boot into an OS, but it just denies knowing about the encrypted disk. Done right, the image itself could be difficult to discern from something like a corrupted video file.

> Your Risks at a Protest

In addition, your SIM (likely traceable to you, especially if you have it) will be auto-connecting to their temporary telecom system (i.e. Stingray [2]), where they can find out the following:

1. That you were nearby to the event.

2. A tonne of operations available via the modem [3].

3. If you speak to somebody locally (as part of the routing).

4. Shift your connection down to 2G/3G where it is easier to hack [4].

I think each person needs to consider their security model.

[1] https://pine64.org/devices/pinephone/

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stingray_phone_tracker

[3] https://www.electronicsforu.com/special/cool-stuff-misc/gsm-...

[4] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/your-phone-vulnerable-...

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#212

Th smartphone is the greatest mass surveillance device ever conceived, although AI monitored camera networks will probably exceed it very soon. There are basically no countermeasures. Which means freedom is truly at the discretion of the powerful, because once the government goes North Korea there is no going back. I actually think the biggest threat to humanity in the Great Filter sense is authoritarianism, more tha…

Weapons evolve, defenses evolve. There are ways of trivially defeating cell phone tracking, and there are ways of trivially defeating AI cameras (850 ways specifically). Some auth dipshit will probably come up with some other way of betraying the working class and the cycle will repeat itself.

This would be the same 'working class' that just re-elected Trump?

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#213

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Burner phones aren't safe. Security through obscurity worked with the 1990s cell network but not with today's vast logging/geolocation tagging.

The idea is that they can’t tie the phone to a person. You also have to make sure you don’t get the burner phone some place with cameras.

Sure the phone can't be tied to a person. But try getting phone service in the US without giving away your identity. Can't be done.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#214

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I was thinking along the lines of „the state wants to oppress the protestors and makes it illegal“, but if you just want to avoid surveillance at a legal protest, yeah, you’re right.

Going into a protest with illegal communication devices is almost a direct sabotage of the protest's intent. It gives law enforcement a legitimate reason to act, even if almost certainly ex post facto . And it paints the protest as wilfully illegal--you went in intending to break the law.

The state has every reason (for itself) to demand perfect law-abiding behavior. The abstract Protest’s intent does not.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#215
post #178

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Absolutely best idea is to make an encrypted PDA & play forensic scientist by recording everything. 1. Get a Google Pixel 9, 9 Pro, or 9 Pro XL smartphone (Cellebrite-proofn at time of writing). 2. Verify images & GOS. 3. Disable biometrics & wireless connections. 4. Memorize with Anki or your own head a new, NIST-compliant passphrase with ≥ 8+ words. 3. Get a cover for the smartphone. 4. Buy EMI tape and electricall…

If you‘re opening the cover, disconnecting antennas might be the way to go instead. Depending on the device, it‘s relatively painless and even reversible.

I believe they mean a cover as in a case that has a folding cover, not as in the external layer of the phone itself. So you effectively turn that otterbox-ish thing into a faraday cage that will enclose your phone.

I am not sure how I follow how that isn't completely negated as soon as you go to actually use the phone, though.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#216

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>If history is anything to go by, we’re only ever an election, or other political churn, away from your particular sets of beliefs / identifiers being persecuted, or at least your least favourite political prisoners being released and coming after you. it goes other way around too - you are only one election cycle away to be pardoned. And if the protest is succrssfull, you dont need a pardon anyway. Source -- been to…

Being pardoned doesn't help much if you're dead. A special law shields you? How does a law shield you from persecution? Over ten years later, I've never forgot this comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6033481

>A special law shields you? How does a law shield you from persecution?

We won, this is how.

>Being pardoned doesn't help much if you're dead.

There is an escalation ladder you need to climb to attain martyrdom. It takes effort and courage and not everybody can or should do it. It's okay to be on the part of the process that provides moral support to the more hardcore participants.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#217
post #211

Potentially this is where the likes of the PinePhone should thrive [1]. As well as the methods suggested, you could have full disk encryption and just have the phone switch off if it suspects any shenanigans. If you want, it could still boot into an OS, but it just denies knowing about the encrypted disk. Done right, the image itself could be difficult to discern from something like a corrupted video file. > Your Ris…

Regarding #2, I thought AT commands were something you could send to your modem from your attached device. I'm not aware that they could be sent to a modem by another remote modem over the network link. Is that also possible?

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#218
post #185

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It...depends. If you're not technical, signal is hands down the best solution. If you have a group that's going to something and you are willing to take some extra steps, something like matrix/briar/simplex/whatever setup with a self hosted instance provides you with the knowledge that all the infrastructure is under your control and that the feds just aren't going to have the time to sit down and figure out how this…

What are the bases of your claims about what government authorities do and don't do, what their capabilities and resources are, etc.? > the feds just aren't going to have the time to sit down and figure out how this shit works. They have resources many orders of magnitude larger than you. The NSA has tens of billions of dollars per year and five or six figures of personnel. It's you who don't have time.

:)

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Being pardoned doesn't help much if you're dead. A special law shields you? How does a law shield you from persecution? Over ten years later, I've never forgot this comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6033481

>A special law shields you? How does a law shield you from persecution? We won, this is how. >Being pardoned doesn't help much if you're dead. There is an escalation ladder you need to climb to attain martyrdom. It takes effort and courage and not everybody can or should do it. It's okay to be on the part of the process that provides moral support to the more hardcore participants.

It’s not clear to me what you’re getting at here.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#220

Earlier quoted context omitted.

These are some pretty obscene claims to make with absolutely no proof or citation.

While they were exaggerating by saying, "a lot of protests", certainly there have been some protests that have been organized by Russian agitators https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/russian-troll-...

Specifically, on that point they claimed "a lot of protests that turned violent," implying that Russian agitators were responsible for escalation. Unless the Russian agitators are members of the police, that seems very unlikely.
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