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Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

belenios.org

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Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#211
post #120

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why do you think it's harder to count votes? I'm not sure what belenios uses, but in the process I envision a ballot is a publicly accessible encrypted ledger, where the votes exist publicly.

> Why do you think it's harder to count votes? I assumed this from the parent post >> Something being hard does not mean that it should not be tried. As opposed to paper voting, which does not have the issues raised by Tom Scott. If that is not what you meant, don't you agree that a more high-tech solution, complete with unspecified but granted methods that mitigate the security problems, requires more expertise and…

> don't you agree that a more high-tech solution, ... requires more expertise and makes the process of voting as a whole more difficult than the low tech one

Sure, it takes more expertise to run a ballot, but not more expertise to cast a ballot. And that's where the democratic process fails in most of the western world at the moment. Entire demographics are not interested in voting due to the higher bar of going through the motions of going to a ballot booth and casting a paper ballot.

In a world where it's possible to vote from your personal mobile device there doesn't need to be a whole circus and the entire country needs to stop in its tracks for the election day. It can be just another day, another weekend, or another week. You can vote for the smallest things that are interesting for you. Local issues need not to be left to the latitude of mayors or councils, but you could now vote on them from the comfort of your own home.

Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#212

Earlier quoted context omitted.

OK, fair. I meant it in the sense of the younger generation has more exposure to concepts like encrypted communication and peer to peer communication and encrypted ledgers, etc. They might not know how exactly they work, but they know they exist and have an inkling of their attributes as they pertain to data secrecy, auditability, etc...

I'm far more familiar with cryptography concepts than the average person but I wouldn't trust myself to audit a crypto system or implementation.

Do you feel the need to audit the ballot process when casting a vote? Do you wait until the station is closed and watch the people count the votes? Do you know what to look for in regards to ballot tampering? Do you know who is allowed to count the votes?

I think that the details of the vote will indeed be opaque to most voters, but I think that's the case right now for most of us. As a voter you must have some trust in the process and in the fact that the correct auditors have vetted it. Hopefully it's going to get there for electronic voting some day.

Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#213
post #128
post #118

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> paper ballots that are securely physically transported to a central location (all of them) and counted by people surrounded by observers (all in one sitting). That is unnecessary complexity already. Ballots can be counted directly in the voting stations, by the local citizens. If you want to check your vote is counted correctly, stay to witness the counting. After the results have been counted, they can be communic…

This would be more realistic, and everyone can still understand it, so it is another good example. The point was to provide an extreme system to highlight the value of simplicity in the dynamics of trust in a voting system.

No no, I got that. I wanted to highlight that part of the paper voting system in support of your argument, as I think democracy is a people business, and the paper system works by involving people at every step. If citizens are responsible for counting the ballots and watching the process, they also share responsibility for the trustworthiness of the system. By involving as many of them as possible, large-scale manipulation becomes nigh impossible.

Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#214

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think that stamp and paper ballots are actually hampering the democratic process. There are many downsides of physical ballots: the need to physically be at one location, having to set aside a day to vote, lack of interest for younger demographics... all of these could go away with a good electronic ballot. The more people can vote, the better the democratic process will be. Making it easier for _everyone_ to vote…

Convenience over security. I don't like that. The #1 goal of a voting system should be to prevent a hostile state from secretly hijacking your elections. How convenient voting is can make a difference between 57% voter turnout versus 62% voter turnout. That's largely irrelevant.

I think you are severely overestimating the turnover for ballots. Yes, presidential elections might get ~50%, but anything else does not. The capability of having ballots cast from your own device would allow for more in depth participation into issues which currently are mostly ignored: local politics and even exercising the democratic process at national legislature level. When everyone can vote easily, they hardly need a bunch of corrupt old men in parliament to vote for them.

Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#215

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Please forget about showing up physically because conflating l caring* with your ability to do things physically is ableist as fuck, and not all disabilities are visible and/or certifiable. Please forget about showing up physically because setting up a polling station in a place where there's effectively no public transportation cuts off poor people from voting. Please forget about showing up physically because mail…

> paper ballots are already anonymous and verifiable I don't understand this part. What stops people responsible for giving out those ballots, from taking some of them and mail under someone's else name (for example, homeless person, drug addict etc)? You often need just several hundreds or thousands votes to win in a swinging state.

>What stops people responsible for giving out those ballots, from taking some of them and mail under someone's else name (for example, homeless person, drug addict etc)?

A requirement to keep a record of which paper ballot envelopes were mailed out to whom, and to which address.

Ballot blanks are all identical, but the outer envelopes go through the USPS and have identifying numbers on them.

When the ballots are counted, the envelopes can be examined by all interested parties separately from the ballots. The ballots are taken one by one out of the outer envelopes, and put into a bin (they're folded in blank inner envelopes, so nobody can see anyone's vote at that stage).

Presence of an envelope that was received, but not mailed out is evidence of fraud.

Conversely, once put into the mail, the USPS can track each such envelope, and anyone other than the intended recipient tampering with that mail is committing a federal crime (regardless of what they do with it).

Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#216
post #119

One important thing about any voting system – digital or not – is that it has to be good at producing agreeable consent . That means bitter, betrayed and hurt (but reasonable/democratic!) losing parties need to be able to say: yeah we accept the result because we are confident in the outcome of the election. This is something all digital systems are really bad at, even if everything is readable and verifiable, unless…

It’s a simple trust problem. No one is counting all ballots in the entire country, they trust others to do so, and do so in a truthful manner. Same for machines, they’ll have to trust that some people did their job and checked these machines. Not saying this will happen any time soon though ;)

No, that's wrong. Democracy is a process involving the entire population of a country. A vote must be a process carried out by individual citizens to be trustworthy; if we delegate that to machines maintained by the government—because nobody else would be able to do so both trustable and professional—we'd create an incentive for the government to manipulate the system to stay in power.

If, in turn, elections are organised as distributed, local, and highly public countings, that get aggregated up to the final tally, citizens stay in control of their votes. Poll workers in a county may not count the votes of another county themselves, but they know there will be other volunteers all over the country doing so. It is extremely hard to manipulate a large-scale movement of politically inclined volunteers, and they can rely on that.

We cannot hand control over the vote to the government we possibly want to vote out. By reducing the massively distributed trust to a handful of computer wizards, we remove transparency from voting, turning it into a sham event that can be orchestrated by those in power to their liking.

Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#217

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Convenience over security. I don't like that. The #1 goal of a voting system should be to prevent a hostile state from secretly hijacking your elections. How convenient voting is can make a difference between 57% voter turnout versus 62% voter turnout. That's largely irrelevant.

I think you are severely overestimating the turnover for ballots. Yes, presidential elections might get ~50%, but anything else does not. The capability of having ballots cast from your own device would allow for more in depth participation into issues which currently are mostly ignored: local politics and even exercising the democratic process at national legislature level. When everyone can vote easily, they hardly…

My point is that a small bump in voter turnout is not worth sacrificing the integrity of the voting scheme. That point applies just as well with a 50% turnout as it does with a 30% turnout. For example, a bump from 30% to 35% is largely irrelevant.

If everyone can conveniently vote and then no-one's votes are counted because Putin makes up tally numbers, that sucks.

Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#218

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Please forget about showing up physically because conflating l caring* with your ability to do things physically is ableist as fuck, and not all disabilities are visible and/or certifiable. Please forget about showing up physically because setting up a polling station in a place where there's effectively no public transportation cuts off poor people from voting. Please forget about showing up physically because mail…

The in person secret paper ballot voting system on voting day appears to be a system with some of the least drawbacks, which is likely why it has been so popular. Mail-in systems work too, with their own set of benefits and drawbacks, and is used in combination with the above in some countries.

>in person voting appears to have least drawbacks

Citation needed.

Specifically, what are the drawbacks of mail-in voting compared to in-person voting?

>Mail-in system is used in some countries

The US is one of those some countries.

And in the US, with a long history of voter disenfranchisement and an abysmally low voter turnouts, where the election day is always a workday, mail-in voting is absolutely the best system currently in use, by a long shot.

Its benefit of being actually available and removing many of the artificial barriers to voting that exist across the US far outweighs any disadvantages it may have over in-person voting.

These barriers include:

-people having difficulty to vote on a workday

-difficulty getting to the polls

-lack of polling places in "undesirable" neighborhoods (and super long lines as a result)

-varied ID laws

-etc

Not coincidentally, the party that openly aims to decrease voter turnout for their benefit also opposes mail-in voting.

Nobody says that in-person voting should not be available. But it absolutely should not (and rarely is) the only option.

Unfortunately, its availability across the US is limited through the efforts of the aforementioned political party.

Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#219
post #127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

since you have to be alone in the voting booth and your vote is anonymous it can't be bought. You can say that you voted for X, but vote for Y and noone will ever be able to tell.

In France vote choice are made by placing a predefined paper in an envelope. You enter the place, present an ID, take and envelope plus zero/one/several/all papers, go in the alone room to fill the envelope with the paper of your choice. You can take zero papers because some organiser will send them prior by post but it’s not always the case. How does it work in Italie? I can picture easely how someone in the paper r…

All choices for a given question (we have bicameral elections and usually when we have referenda we have multiple at the same time) are on the same piece of paper.

Also they always give you all ballots, I don't recall ever being asked which ones I wanted. Plus at all points you are always in front of multiple people, I believe each candidate / party in an election gets to appoint someone to keep an eye on the proceedings

(Also the original claim about 20/30% seems like abject fantasy to me, unless we take the entirely different meaning of "20-30% vote for a candidate that organized crime is happy with, which is entirely unrelated to electoral interference)

Re: Belenios: Verifiable online voting system

#220
post #119

One important thing about any voting system – digital or not – is that it has to be good at producing agreeable consent . That means bitter, betrayed and hurt (but reasonable/democratic!) losing parties need to be able to say: yeah we accept the result because we are confident in the outcome of the election. This is something all digital systems are really bad at, even if everything is readable and verifiable, unless…

Disagree. It's enough for the average voter to trust that some other people - independent experts - are able to verify the vote. Not everyone needs to be an expert at anything. I wrote more about this trust aspect in the appendix of my thesis on voting: https://attejuvonen.fi/thesis

I think in your thesis you make some interesting points on how E-Voting systems differ. But I have critizism. Let me paraphrase your points:

1. Paper ballots are in some ways more ambigous, because there are many ways to scribble a sign into a circle, a fraction of which will not result in the intended outcome

2. Understanding these handwritten symbols is harder than understanding the electronic system, because of that ambiguity

3. People understand the paper ballot system, but there are some statistical checks and security measures that they don't understand or know of, so their knowledge of the paper system is superficial

4. Trust in voting systems does not primarily arise from understandability but from trust in other people. To quote: your grandmum doesn’t have to become an expert cryptographer in order to trust a system like X. She just has to believe that cryptography experts exist and at least one of them would speak out if this transparent voting system was not as secure as the election officials claim

I don't want to question your thesis here, but I teach electronics and programming at a University level and points 1 and 2 are ridiculous and maybe even disingenuous. Sure, I understand that for a certain type of mind a digital/electronic system feels less ambigous and more clear. But most people are not like that – not even among academics – not even among academics that involve themselves with technology.

Point 3 is a rethorical trick that – if applied equally to E-Voting would be a strong argument against it. Yeah sure people don't understand X completely so lets do Y which is one-thousand magnitudes more complex is not an argument in favour of Y even if phrased in such a way.

Point 4 is the actual thought we disagree about, but given the unscientific nature of the 3 arguments before I can't simply trust you that you did research here (there are no sources cited that strengthen your point either). So as it is you just stated the opinion, as I stated the opposite. Sure, paper ballot elections are not dead simple, but any living being with basic understanding of object permanence could veryify a ballot isn't manipulated by just standing next to it. Meanwhile with computers you have to delegate that trust. And as computers can be reprogrammed, potentially remotely, even your experts can't be sure – especially in elections where powerful nation state actors seek to destroy the public trust in your election. This is a problem – just claiming that it isn't doesn't cut it. And people who claim that it isn't should not be the ones designing such systems.

The important thing to understand about agreeable consent is that a person's willingness to subject themselves to the will of a democratically elected majority is directly linked to their trust into the process. Your voting system has to produce that trust even if voters don't want to trust the process. The surest way to do that is to get a part of them involved into the process – ideally not always the same people. If then a single poll watcher claims a thing and 400 others that have been present plus three trusted NGOs can claim otherwise the election is not in question. Someone will have to convince me this works for E-Voting with a bit more than rethorical tricks.

Note that I am not against E-Voting per se. I just don't think the highest stake elections which have the potential to shift political powers should be electronic/computerized.

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