Earlier quoted context omitted.
Buddy, 1000+ people got their iPhones cracked by pegasus, at least 1 person was killed and bezos had his noods leaked. Yeah google does a better job.
I'm not worried about being targeted by Pegasus, but I am worried about getting targeted for adshit by Google, or them selling all my info to databrokers, or having them disable all my accounts for arbitrary reasons. I think we have different threat models. Maybe you're special enough to be worth targeting for bespoke surveillance, I'm worried about avoiding ordinary mass-market adtech surveillance.
GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
211–220 of 228 posts
Re: GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
#212Earlier quoted context omitted.
Try disabling rerouting for Geolocation requests to GrapheneOS, because I personally found the gps provider integrated in it to be almost unusable, since it doesn't implement Bluetooth/wifi scanning at all. Yes that means google will get your location, but it's still better than going back to stock which is also better than any other third party skin in terms of privacy/security.
We're going to provide other network location providers including local ones. The existing ones aren't up to our standards which is why we didn't simply bundle them. In theory, we could also support toggling on the less privacy SUPL mode which leaks your location to the SUPL server but can get location without GNSS satellite reception.
Re: GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
#213Earlier quoted context omitted.
They have already fixed nearly all the crashes in the base OS. The issues we face are almost entirely regressions in new versions. They fix them consistently but they aren't stopping the regressions getting into releases because they don't use MTE in production.
Regressions from whom?
Re: GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
#214Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's based on communication with them. We've had it directly communicated to us. There are also multiple Google security engineers/researchers who liked/retweeted our posts. Google has stated the Pixel 8 is the first platform with MTE available in production devices, so it's not a large jump to the hardened alternate OS available for it being the first to deploy it in production. We have ~250k users on Pixels, and th…
I feel like you're complaining, but it seems like Google has made historic advancements simply by pushing this technology to the point it's available and fixed most of not all crashes it finds. Stopping short of the goal by not enabling it on prod is likely a well reasoned choice. Google is highly committed to the underlying technology. It doesn't seem like the door to having it enabled in prod is forever closed and…
Re: GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
#215Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's based on communication with them. We've had it directly communicated to us. There are also multiple Google security engineers/researchers who liked/retweeted our posts. Google has stated the Pixel 8 is the first platform with MTE available in production devices, so it's not a large jump to the hardened alternate OS available for it being the first to deploy it in production. We have ~250k users on Pixels, and th…
I feel like you're complaining, but it seems like Google has made historic advancements simply by pushing this technology to the point it's available and fixed most of not all crashes it finds. Stopping short of the goal by not enabling it on prod is likely a well reasoned choice. Google is highly committed to the underlying technology. It doesn't seem like the door to having it enabled in prod is forever closed and…
Most of the crashes were fixed via HWAsan before MTE existed in hardware. Their security people want MTE enabled in production. These issues were fixed before MTE and would have been fixed whether or not MTE was available in the standard ARMv9 cores/cache used by Pixels. MTE would likely already be enabled in production for the base OS (not user installed apps) if there weren't performance concerns. They clearly integrated it with that intention. We're more than capable of reading the commit messages and talking to engineers who worked on it along with other contacts there. They aren't keeping it a secret that there's a clear goal to enable MTE in production.
ARM provided MTE in their standard ARMv9 Cortex core designs. That's why MTE is available on the Pixel 8 and Pixel 8 Pro, because Tensor currently uses the standard core/cache designs. That's why MTE is not available for Snapdragon, and it's why it is theoretically available for MediaTek and Exynos.
The current availability of a high performance MTE implementation doesn't mean Google is highly committed to it. Pixels will be moving from standard Cortex core designs to their own core designs. There's an open question about whether MTE will be supported in the same way it is now. You're assuming that they're heavily committed to it and going to keep providing an extremely low overhead implementation. We have concrete reasons to be concerned.
Re: GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
#216Earlier quoted context omitted.
How do you have privacy without security? If it's less secure it enables more attacks where your private data could be compromised.
Security isn't something you have or not. There's nuances. CalyxOS makes a few trade-offs which I'm happy to accept in order to be able to use several banking apps, Google pay, wallet etc.
GrapheneOS provides much better privacy than CalyxOS including features like Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, per-app Sensors toggle, Network toggle instead of the leaky LineageOS approach, per-connection MAC randomization, fixes for many data leaks and much more.
GrapheneOS provides much broader app compatibility than CalyxOS via sandboxed Google Play. Apps forbidding using an alternate OS via the Play Integrity API is an issue for any alternate operating system and it's known that spoofing the device integrity check for Google certification is not a sustainable approach that will keep working. It already doesn't work consistently.
CalyxOS is not a hardened OS. It greatly reduces security vs. AOSP via added attack surface, rolled back security and slow patches.
Compatibility with Android apps on GrapheneOS is also much different. GrapheneOS provides our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer:
https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play
Can run the vast majority of Play Store apps on GrapheneOS, but not CalyxOS with the problematic microG approach.
https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm is a third party comparison between different alternate mobile operating systems. It could include many more privacy/security features but it's a good starting point.
https://privsec.dev/posts/android/choosing-your-android-base... is an article with more long form comparisons between OSes.
Re: GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
#217Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not exaxtly grapheneOS but close enough CalyxOs has started supporting Fairphone 5 and it has replaceable batteries AFAIK: https://calyxos.org/news/2024/03/05/fp5/
CalyxOS is a great alternative to GrapheneOS. The way I see it is that CalyxOS is much better for privacy but not as good for security, whereas on GrapheneOS security is always the main priority, whilst privacy and usability are second thoughts.
GrapheneOS provides much better privacy than CalyxOS including features like Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, per-app Sensors toggle, Network toggle instead of the leaky LineageOS approach, per-connection MAC randomization, fixes for many data leaks and much more.
GrapheneOS provides much broader app compatibility than CalyxOS via sandboxed Google Play. Apps forbidding using an alternate OS via the Play Integrity API is an issue for any alternate operating system and it's known that spoofing the device integrity check for Google certification is not a sustainable approach that will keep working. It already doesn't work consistently.
CalyxOS is not a hardened OS. It greatly reduces security vs. AOSP via added attack surface, rolled back security and slow patches.
Compatibility with Android apps on GrapheneOS is also much different. GrapheneOS provides our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer:
https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play
Can run the vast majority of Play Store apps on GrapheneOS, but not CalyxOS with the problematic microG approach.
https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm is a third party comparison between different alternate mobile operating systems. It could include many more privacy/security features but it's a good starting point.
https://privsec.dev/posts/android/choosing-your-android-base... is an article with more long form comparisons between OSes.
Re: GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
#218Earlier quoted context omitted.
CalyxOS is a great alternative to GrapheneOS. The way I see it is that CalyxOS is much better for privacy but not as good for security, whereas on GrapheneOS security is always the main priority, whilst privacy and usability are second thoughts.
How do you have privacy without security? If it's less secure it enables more attacks where your private data could be compromised.
GrapheneOS provides much better privacy than CalyxOS including features like Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, per-app Sensors toggle, Network toggle instead of the leaky LineageOS approach, per-connection MAC randomization, fixes for many data leaks and much more.
GrapheneOS provides much broader app compatibility than CalyxOS via sandboxed Google Play. Apps forbidding using an alternate OS via the Play Integrity API is an issue for any alternate operating system and it's known that spoofing the device integrity check for Google certification is not a sustainable approach that will keep working. It already doesn't work consistently.
CalyxOS is not a hardened OS. It greatly reduces security vs. AOSP via added attack surface, rolled back security and slow patches.
Compatibility with Android apps on GrapheneOS is also much different. GrapheneOS provides our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer:
https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play
Can run the vast majority of Play Store apps on GrapheneOS, but not CalyxOS with the problematic microG approach.
https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm is a third party comparison between different alternate mobile operating systems. It could include many more privacy/security features but it's a good starting point.
https://privsec.dev/posts/android/choosing-your-android-base... is an article with more long form comparisons between OSes.
Re: GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
#219Earlier quoted context omitted.
Just a point of clarity, GrapheneOS has the same support window that Google does, so they're not dropping support earlier than the vendor. The reason they drop support is because the burden of supporting an EOL device is way, way higher, especially for a security-oriented OS.
Though the pixel 4 still gets updates from GrapheneOS, which didn't receive updates since October 2022 from Google. So they support it even a bit longer than google officially does.
Re: GrapheneOS finds Bluetooth memory corruption via ARM MTE
#220Earlier quoted context omitted.
They can have up-to-date AOSP but a significant portion of the OS consists of the driver, HALs, non-GKI kernel tree, etc. Android security patch level is meant to cover all of that. They're using it in a way that's not permitted for Android OEMs by redefining it to mean AOSP patch level for the parts of AOSP they build. Some things get built from AOSP for vendor executables and that are built into vendor executables.…
Once again, thank you for this perspective. I had no idea that a library was presented by the bootloader (AVB). Interesting reading. https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/