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Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

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Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#211
post #201

I think that the thing that most people don't realize about ethics is the meta-ethical problem that axioms are by definition arbitrary. When we really think about the fact that all of our ethical theories are based on arbitrary axioms, suddenly the teeth to ethics have a deep, serious problem. The only argument we have at that point is that the axioms "feel" correct, and I have no problem with this basis, I consider…

I think you’re confusing epistemic problems for metaphysical problems. It’s quite plausible that any axioms we come up with are merely ‘based on feel', but there can be a truth ‘based on feel’ ultimately inaccessible to us except ‘[by] feel’. That inaccessibility does not make the underlying truth arbitrary; it merely makes our attempts to work it out arbitrary.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#212
post #199

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> he only truths I can imagine that could meet those requirements would have to be really abstract, like 1+1=2 And that is not even universally or absolutely true, 1+1=2 is a set of symbols that need to be interpreted by someone for them to have meaning, it’s a concept made up by people Hence, 1+1=2 is just as relative as anything else we express through language

"1+1=2" as a string of symbols is open to interpretation, however, both you and I understand the idea that that string of symbols is conveying, and that idea is true objectively.

It’s just an agreement that has been pretty much forced on anyone that has a basic school education

I can choose to disagree and doesn’t matter what you do I can assign a different meaning to it

No ideas are objective truth, and objective truth is something that can’t even be tested

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#213
post #201

I think that the thing that most people don't realize about ethics is the meta-ethical problem that axioms are by definition arbitrary. When we really think about the fact that all of our ethical theories are based on arbitrary axioms, suddenly the teeth to ethics have a deep, serious problem. The only argument we have at that point is that the axioms "feel" correct, and I have no problem with this basis, I consider…

Some axioms are more useful than others, though. For example, Peano axioms can be used to formalize parts of math which we use to make models of physics which enable engineering that makes all sorts of technology. Many others can't get to that point.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#214

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>If you assert that 'moral relativism is true' that itself would be a relative claim Would it? If we define "moral absolutism" as "the position that there exist moral statements that are true independently of any observers" then we could define the position of "moral relativism" as its logical negation: "there don't exist moral statements that are true independently of any observers". Is that sentence itself a moral…

So for the first point about 'moral relativism is true' yes it's a meta-ethical statement, but at the same time, logically, you're affirming the set 'moral relativism'. And the second point, I would argue that 'universal moral values' arise from 'absolute moral values', whatever that might be, if it's even possible to know it. I also don't think that moral relativism is a logical negation of moral absolutism, more li…

But my point is that the existence of universal moral values do not prove the existence of absolute moral values, because universal moral values can also arise in the absence of absolute moral values (or it would have to be demonstrated that they can't). That every moral agent agrees that murder is wrong does not prove that murder is wrong independently of any point of view.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#215
post #199

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> he only truths I can imagine that could meet those requirements would have to be really abstract, like 1+1=2 And that is not even universally or absolutely true, 1+1=2 is a set of symbols that need to be interpreted by someone for them to have meaning, it’s a concept made up by people Hence, 1+1=2 is just as relative as anything else we express through language

> Hence, 1+1=2 is just as relative as anything else we express through language The symbols are relative, the semantics are not.

Well, I can disagree with that, so what can you do then?

If you can’t force everyone to agree on the same semantics, you can’t have absolute semantics

Of course you are free to believe whatever you want, including absolute semantics, but that is your own personal subjective opinion (even if popular or accepted in the mainstream)

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#216
post #201

I think that the thing that most people don't realize about ethics is the meta-ethical problem that axioms are by definition arbitrary. When we really think about the fact that all of our ethical theories are based on arbitrary axioms, suddenly the teeth to ethics have a deep, serious problem. The only argument we have at that point is that the axioms "feel" correct, and I have no problem with this basis, I consider…

> axioms are by definition arbitrary.

That is very reductive view of what constitutes most axioms.

Merriam-Websters has:[1]

>2: an established rule or principle or a self-evident truth

Etymonline has:[2]

>"statement of self-evident truth," late 15c., from French axiome, from Latin axioma, from Greek axioma "authority," literally "that which is thought worthy or fit,"...

So, no, not arbitrary at all. Which particular axioms do you find arbitrary? Is game theory arbitrary?

[1] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/axiom

[2] https://www.etymonline.com/word/axiom

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#217
post #164

It's weird to hear Foucault described as "amoral" when he himself claimed to be a moralist [1]. What is meant by moral relativism in this case I think is merely that morals do not come to us handed down by God or Nature as Chomsky claims, but are a constant choice made by people over a potentially infinite range. But to assert that the morals don't come from God is not to say that morals are not valuable or worth hav…

> What is meant by moral relativism in this case I think is merely that morals do not come to us handed down by God or Nature as Chomsky claims, but are a constant choice made by people over a potentially infinite range. I didn't get the sense he's saying morals are handed down by nature, rather that the potential range is not infinite. E.g., consider that research where the primate gets angry and starts rejecting it…

But what you are saying is just that the “range” of morality is handed down by nature. And the idea that this range is “naturally” limited is too often used, as it is in your comment, to make an argument from nature’s authority in favor of certain applications of power that may or may not be good for people. What I think relativism does is restore accountability to the individual and the society for moral decisions, rather than appealing to natural or theological authorities to absolve people and institutions of responsibility for their choices.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#218

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But that is also exactly where the moral relativism originates. You _do_ have physical laws, you _do not_ have moral laws. You can _test_ physical laws, you _can not test_ moral laws. First, this assumes a very specific kind of moral realism, but does not describe all forms of moral realism. Second, we do just fine testing mathematical laws by checking for consistency without any tests of the sort you're describing…

>Second, we do just fine testing mathematical laws by checking for consistency without any tests of the sort you're describing. So is there some axiomatic system that can elucidate moral truths, such as the wrongness of stealing, from first principles? >A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969) Quickly skimmed through it, but: awful, just awful. I challenge Bambrough to prove to me that I have two hands…

> So is there some axiomatic system that can elucidate moral truths, such as the wrongness of stealing, from first principles?

Read Kant.

> Quickly skimmed through it, but: awful, just awful. I challenge Bambrough to prove to me that I have two hands.

Clearly you missed the entire thrust of the argument, and Moore's before it.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#219

I disagree. Moral relativism is very much a thing. But it's just a muddled matter. To me, "moral relativism" just means the recognition that different societies had and have different moral ideas, and that even within a single society rules are murky and fluid, and often outright undefined. Pretty much any moral rule you can name has been proudly broken. Eg, torture? Take Abu Ghraib for instance. Not only was it done…

Recognizing that different cultures have different morals isn't moral relativism; that is simple observation. One must also believe that more than one set of morals can be right or that no one is right or wrong.

> One must also believe that more than one set of morals can be right or that no one is right or wrong.

Exactly. There is no universal right or wrong, it's all relative based on hierarchical system of values in every society.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#220

I’m not educated in philosophy, except my interest in natural philosophy, so I may be completely confused here. My sense is that morals are based on values that were instilled in humans in the evolutionary milieu. Half a million years of living as bands of Hunter gatherers. But these values are not completely consistent. For example, we think that stealing from others is wrong, but we also think that not sharing is w…

I don't believe morals have much to do with an inheritance of values, mostly because mankind, from civilization to civilization, has largely kept the same set of basic morality regardless of where they are or what religion they possess.

Sure, some things change, but theft, murder, lying, etc... they're pretty universally seen as wrong. And in the instances where they AREN'T seen as inherently wrong, it's usually a class-based stance that still sets them apart. Even if you steal from other groups, don't steal from OUR group.

Even if you wiped away all knowledge but the very basics on survival, these would come back in short order as societal hierarchies are redeveloped.

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