Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If two thing cannot possibly be observed to be different then they are the same. I think that suffers the same flaw as logical positivism: if my axioms can't find a difference, there isn't one, no way my assumptions are wrong. (Namely, my axiom is that external observations capture the entirety of reality, there is nothing subjective.) If two people laugh at a joke, one faking and one actually finding it funny, wha…
The fake laugh can be observed to be different by the person faking it.
Consciousness is not computation
211–220 of 767 posts
Re: Consciousness is not computation
#212Earlier quoted context omitted.
(Author here.) This is a false dichotomy. Saying that consciousness is not fundamentally a computational process does not mean that it then has to be magic. We could say the same thing about life. Life is not a computational phenomenon. But it is also not magic. It is, fundamentally, a particular kind of chemical process. Perhaps the same is true of consciousness, or maybe it is some other kind of physical process. I…
I would absolutely argue that life is a particular category of computation as well, and that is actually closer to my area of expertise (biochemistry) than consciousness / neuro. For clarity: when I say "computation", I refer to any physical process ("physics") which involves information.
For instance, sorting a list is a computational process. It doesn't matter what kind of computer I run a sorting algorithm on, if I follow the algorithm, I end up with a sorted list. If I use quicksort, it takes me on average O(n log n) steps. It doesn't matter if I'm doing this on a Lego computer or if I'm simulating a Lego computer on a virtual computer. I always end up with a sorted list in an average of O(n log n) steps.
By contrast, if I construct a collection of chemicals that matches the positions of those of a real bacterium, I have created a new bacterium. However, if I simulate the activity of those chemicals on a computer, I have not created a bacterium. I have just created a simulation of a bacterium. I haven't created a living thing.
My argument is that the same is true of consciousness. If you create a perfect simulation of a brain in a computer, you have not created a new consciousness. You just have a simulation of a brain.
None of this to say that a computational paradigm cannot sometimes be useful in understanding what is going on in life or consciousness. Just that it is not fundamentally a computational process, it's a physical process.
Re: Consciousness is not computation
#213Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If you wanted to go about proving (even to yourself) that you are not, say, an extremely advanced ML algorithm running on a system that provided synthetic inputs in the form of your senses, how would you go about it? Well, since an extremely advanced ML algorithm wouldn't want to go about proving to itself that it is not what it is, that would be prima facie evidence against, no? I mean it's always possible that yo…
> Well, since an extremely advanced ML algorithm wouldn't want to go about proving to itself that it is not what it is, that would be prima facie evidence against, no? This seems like begging the question. Who says an extremely advanced ML algorithm can't 'want' to do this? What even is wanting? > I mean in practice we don't find this too hard right now if the other person is reasonable—a 15-minute conversation usual…
I believe this is the real question about consciousness. If a being were to be conscious but it had no desires, no wishes, not even a will to keep itself alive... it wouldn't bother to do anything... i.e. it would behave exactly like a rock, or anything non-conscious.
Having desires, wishes, and should I say, emotions... is absolutely required for what we think of as consciousness to materialize. But we know that emotions are chemical processes which perhaps cannot occur outside a biological being. Maybe it can, but it's hard to think of a reasonable way this could work.
Re: Consciousness is not computation
#214People with memory loss seem to struggle to pass the bar of consciousness
Re: Consciousness is not computation
#215> This means that one of these observers will, by chance, happen to observe that the states of the atoms correspond exactly to the bits of a Turing machine computing I did not understand this argument. Yes, through careful labeling you can map the states of the atoms of the iron rod to the state of a Turing machine. But that mapping will only be correct for one instance. The very next moment the atoms' magnetic momen…
Extending the iron bar argument, you could have 1 second of varying internal state by the iron bar, and then create many different interpretations that interpret that internal state in many different ways. One of those interpretations will show that the iron bar transitioned through the exact same internal states as the conscious computation, and did so in a deterministic, casually linked way. What then is the different between that iron bar and the conscious computer?
Re: Consciousness is not computation
#216Earlier quoted context omitted.
Until you start dreaming.
It's when you're anaesthesized for surgery that your consciousness goes away. No dreams, nothing. You don't exist during those hours. You cannot account for them later; they are deleted.
Re: Consciousness is not computation
#217If we still find it difficult to copy and paste data into Excel, I can't see how we can blithely state we're already or very nearly at some state of demonstrating AGI.
Re: Consciousness is not computation
#218I find this argument completely unconvincing. The mapping in a case like the iron bar is entirely ephemeral, pertaining only for an instant. For this argument to be valid you’d have to be able to persistently map the iron bar, or waterfall, to all ongoing transformations of states in the running program, using one single consistent mapping. Otherwise all you have is a snapshot of state, not an ongoing process. To ach…
Another problem is that it assumes as an axiom that “Consciousness does not require an external observer to exist.” I agree that sounds very likely, but that doesn’t mean you can just assume it! It sounds a bit like the opposite of Mach’s principle in physics, which I think many physicists take seriously even though it seems very unlikely at first glance.
Re: Consciousness is not computation
#219Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is a little bit of an emotional take I think. The burden of proof is on the claim that you can get there through computation, not otherwise. We do not understand the fundamental reality of consciousness, this does not mean that consciousness is magic. The assertion that you cannot get there from computation implies there is a currently non understood yet essential piece of physics(I assume, but I do not know) wh…
I disagree about where the burden of proof lies. If we start off firstly with the assumption that humans have consciousness, and secondly the decently supported claim that animals exhibit what to us appears to be consciousness on a spectrum, and thirdly that we don't exactly know how or why consciousness exists, then the conclusion that seems obvious to me is that we cannot rule out that it could emerge in a network…
Not being able to rule out consciousness through computation is a far more cautious claim than 'consciousness is computation'.
Re: Consciousness is not computation
#220> So if we accept that qualia exists (which, after all, seems intuitively sensible), we are burdened with the apparently impossible task of explaining how consciousness can be generated by physical processes. No, you don't get to just gloss over that. I don't think it's "intuitively sensible" that "qualia" exist. I don't think think it's intuitively sensible that they don't exist either: the question is ill-defined u…