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Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

nbcboston.com

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Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#211
As someone who works specifically in this subgenera of computer security (ir) I can say a few things that might add to conversation in a meaningful way.

1.) There is a cottage industry in this space that sells kits for these randomware compromises. Everything provided is off the shelf, this is why you’re seeing such an emergence in this space. It’s not that the barrier to exit from a ransomware attack cost decreased (cryptocurrency). The barrier to entry lowered, any jerk can pay a small amount of funds to buy a software kit and instructions on how to do it.

Furthermore this is also why you’re seeing so many public defacement go politically neutral (ironic given the times). It’s simply a relatively lucrative, with a low amount of risk, and only requires the technical aptitude of someone capable of using BitTorrent/Tor/Warez.

2.) Hiring / Managing security teams - unless you’re in technology or selling security as a part of a product you can’t afford a quality team/tools. Most business are trying to optimize their cost centers to maximize their profits. As such most of the time that means it’s a race to the bottom to get them to be “insurable”. Salary + Software is expensive. 500k minimum investment for an meat processing company or whatever is not the easiest pill to swallow.

3.) companies that pay this are not good judges of security talent. They don’t know if the herjavec group really is an effective detection company. They judge almost entirely on feeling. Same with that one fast talking hoodie wearing self proclaimed hacker talking out of their ass.

Not understanding what you’re hiring for also creates friction, since any deviation from the fantasy security hire they imagined will be met with extreme resistance. “I thought they were going to sure up our servers, why do we have to log in on our email every 8 hours now”. Often times when an executive leader does not understand why security trade offs are made they just make the decision themselves (pro tip they’ll accept the risk) and you’ve failed regardless as an employer and employee.

4.) the industry does very little in a practical sense in preparing people for these job functions (with a few exceptions). Security engineers often have technical skills in spades.However, if they don’t understand anything outside of security they are going to fail. Civil Communication/ debate, the ability to navigate political issues, understanding the business etc are actually super important. The biggest tragedy was that someone internally probably saw this coming but couldn’t actually get the messaging across.

When you combine all of these elements you have a confluence of shit. It’s once again getting less expensive to perform a wide attack with little know how intersecting an industry that has yet to course correct.

Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#212
post #173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Paying ransoms can be illegal if it is happening with a sanctioned entity. We need to start holding companies criminally liable having security vulnerabilities that get breached. It is true that there will always be exploits but the issues are usually much more wildly irresponsible security practices and not “didn’t know about the latest 0day” There needs to be a statutory liability to customers and required insuranc…

Curious, how do you know that you are paying ransom to a sanctioned entity? Do they publish lists of bitcoin addresses of sanctioned entities that you can check? If not, how do you check the identity of the payee?

You can create a Bitcoin address simply with random data, and since you can transfer Bitcoin without an intermediary it’s trivial to bypass any list of suspect addresses.

Further, you don’t throw a party with a list of people not invited. It’s super ineffective to try to globally block an infinite list of bad.

Fungibility of a currency is actually important for it to be effective as a store of value. If my 1 USD is somehow worth more at the supermarket because it previously was owned by Elon Musk.

That said it’s not entirely impossible to track the source of origin of a Bitcoin transaction. It’s just computationally very expensive. Since you can programmatically create wallets and transactions that can obfuscate the origin of transactions. So by the time the funds reach any exchange the money has changed hands too many times for them to reasonably be able know if the origins of digital coin came from illegal activity. Then, by the time they do know it was stolen the funds are gone.

Here’s the punchline though, since most exchanges do in fact keep records and the blockchain is an immutable list it’s only a matter of time till the software/computing resources adapt.

Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#213

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Another issue I don't see discussed much is how cryptocurrencies basically enable the business of ransomware. It's not like we're less secure than we were 20 years ago, the difference is now hackers can actually get paid.

This level of corporate hacking existed prior to cryptocurrencies, the difference is that it was used for stock market manipulation and profiting on short or long positions. It appears that this is even more profitable than ransomware, in the hundreds of millions or possibly even billions of dollars. [1][2] [1] https://www.wired.com/2010/03/manipulated-stock-prices/ [2] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybercyberse…

From my memory the profits from such attacks were remarkably low. In particular it's very striking that the hackers who compromised JP Morgan couldn't find anything more profitable to do with that access than send basic scam emails to their client lists.

Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#214

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Would this result in not paying or them hiring consultants who pay on their behalf and just invoice them for "resolution services"?

I wonder where this pop-understanding of the law that seems prevalent on HN comes from. Loopholes exist, but in general the government is not terrible at figuring out basic schemes like this and adapt administration of the law.

It comes from watching Law & Order, and from decades of (elected) prosecutors painting important constitutional protections as trivial loopholes.

Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#215

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The initial foothold exploits - where application whitelisting would help the most - generally are not "critical systems", they are the daily workstations of random employees. By the time the attackers reach your critical systems, they most likely can attack them with stolen credentials without running any exploits that whitelisting would prevent. To protect your company, application whitelisting needs enough usabili…

What makes app whitelisting hard to use on an employee's corporate issue laptop? They shouldn't install anything that doesn't have a business purpose, and these days there are hardly any native apps people want to install anyway.

Nothing, in theory. There is a lot of clerical office work, or fixed flow work (like CNC machining) that doesn't need new programs. But there is also a fair amount of IT work that is hampered enough by whitelisting that IT is the one that does not want to do the whitelisting.

Some of this can be blamed on Windows IT admins finding it normal to download random binaries and run them for diagnostic information or configuration management, but that is not an easy problem to solve.

Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#216

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This mentality of "there will always be new exploits" bothers me. Yes, there will always be exploits, but we can do a hell of a lot better at preventing them than we are. We know how to design systems that are really hard to get into – we just don't do that. Blaming a lack of IT funding is misguided in my opinion too.

Sure, there are ways that would pretty much nuke most of the ransomware business. For example application whitelisting. I wish it was more popular.

But then who whitelist the whitelister?

Solarwind was fun for that. They provide safe update of signed binaries . But their build system is corrupt, builds tampered stuffs and sign them.

I’m a just a user of those things: it seams that cryptography is not what is breaking the chain of trust. It’s the usage? But go fix phishing.

Maybe gov agencies should opt in for some tightly manage environments?

Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#217
post #166

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just a couple years ago, the largest botnet in history infected IOT devices using default passwords in order to DDOS Minecraft servers, so perhaps these strides haven't been so massive.

IOT isn't datacenter server technology. IOT is basically in the state of software security from 20 years ago. Often running crappy proprietary stuff. Your average server running a recent Linux kernel is Fort Knox comparatively. There have been massive strides in many places in software security but IOT and embedded security in general is very lacking unless your talking things going into space or military.

The S in IOT stands for security, after all.

Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#218
post #164

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Another issue I don't see discussed much is how cryptocurrencies basically enable the business of ransomware. It's not like we're less secure than we were 20 years ago, the difference is now hackers can actually get paid.

But the genie is out of the bottle now. It's not going back in.

I always wondered if it’s was possible. Without looking. Now, I know?

Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#219
post #91

I'd really like to see/hear/read a breakdown of some of related issues from some experts. Even on HN it's the same knee-jerk reactions every time one of these stories hit. This is one of the most pressing technology issues of this moment and the discourse just sucks. * Does banning ransom payments do anything? Good idea/bad idea? Historical analogues? * Do we need to pay rewards to cyber privateers to take down cyber…

The answer to your (somewhat leading) questions is just no. War analogies are inapplicable, privateer analogies are inapplicable. Create the incentives, organizational and software structure required to stop this or it will continue. Holding single companies accountable shifts the burden without solving the problem. Have standards, standards bodies, defensive organizations.

Exactly. Nothing some good old boring gouvernering to raise the bar of standards.

Like for foods, hostels, stuffs on the roads. There is some analogies.

Re: Massachusetts Steamship Authority hit by ransomware attack; ferries delayed

#220
post #173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Curious, how do you know that you are paying ransom to a sanctioned entity? Do they publish lists of bitcoin addresses of sanctioned entities that you can check? If not, how do you check the identity of the payee?

You can create a Bitcoin address simply with random data, and since you can transfer Bitcoin without an intermediary it’s trivial to bypass any list of suspect addresses. Further, you don’t throw a party with a list of people not invited. It’s super ineffective to try to globally block an infinite list of bad. Fungibility of a currency is actually important for it to be effective as a store of value. If my 1 USD is s…

> That said it’s not entirely impossible to track the source of origin of a Bitcoin transaction

We're asking how to tell if the destination of a bitcoin payment is on the restricted list, not the source origin. You are not going to be able to fine/sue someone for making a bitcoin payment to an anymous address by claiming the address is on a sactions list. This is my point. Thus any such laws banning the payment of ransom to restricted entities are unenforceable.

This is true even if, after the payment is made, it is discovered who the wallet belongs to, as the person making the payment under US jurisdiction didn't know who they were paying.

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