Earlier quoted context omitted.
No, this is not the point of bug bounties. The point of a bug bounty is to find and fix bugs. That's why they're called "bug bounties". This person took a bug bounty and ran it as a penetration test. Facebook fixed the one bug he found and paid him for it.
Why wouldn't it be considered a bug that accessing one low-permission S3 bucket allowed him to access all the other buckets, including user data and keys?
Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
211–220 of 562 posts
Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
#212The initial bug in Ruby/Rails is striking in its stupidity.[1] You can send something to Ruby/Rails in a session cookie which, when unmarshalled, stores into any named global variable in the namespace of the responding program . It's not a buffer overflow or a bug like that. It's deliberately designed to work that way . It's like doing "eval" on untrusted input. This was on YC years ago.[2] Why was anything so idioti…
Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
#213Earlier quoted context omitted.
So the bits where you lost the ssl keys, auth cookie keys, app signing keys, push notification keys - and had to ask him (via his employer) about what data he'd accessed are all true? Implying you have no records of who else might have done this and acquired those keys? Boggle!
That's one interpretation: the other is that you're placing faith in them being honest, and you'll get a list of what he'd got without the time of doing forensics of the systems, and hence being able to change the keys sooner.
Doesn't pass the sniff test from here.
(Admittedly there's no doubt an iceberg-sized bit of this whole drama that neither side are admitting exists.)
Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
#214Earlier quoted context omitted.
>If you give us reasonable time to respond to your report before making any information public, AND MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO AVOID PRIVACY VIOLATIONS, destruction of data, and interruption or degradation of our service during your research, we will not bring any lawsuit against you or ask law enforcement to investigate you.
Whose privacy did Wes violate? Do webservers have data personal to them?
Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
#215Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm more questioning the flow of researcher reports vulnerability, company awards bounty, researcher disputes bounty value, CSO of company contacts CEO of researcher's company. Is that normal escalation procedure?
Wait, you just made something up. Even the researcher doesn't claim that Alex contacted the CEO of Synack because of a dispute over the bounty. Rather, it's the other way around: the researcher disputed the bounty, and did so by revealing that he'd retained AWS credentials from Instagram long after they'd closed the vulnerability that he used to get them. Alex contacted the CEO of Synack to ensure the credentials wer…
I'm not saying this researcher was 100% in the right, but this is the CSO ass covering. "Don't pay attention to the obvious operational deficits, the problem is the researcher overreaching."
A simple phone call directly to the researcher that cut through the bullshit would have made everything better. But he had to make sure it didn't get out and the only way he could do that was by using the only leverage he had: The researcher's employer.
Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
#216Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
#217Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...
edit: Alex, how about the "shit, we really fucked up; I apologise to our users, yadda yadda" blog post?
Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
#218As a security researcher and engineer, I'd like to point out the following, without taking sides: 1. Facebook is not going ballistic because this is a RCE report. They have received high and critical severity reports many times before and acted peaceably, up to and including a prior RCE reported in 2013 by Reginaldo Silva (who now works there!). 2. The researcher used the vulnerability to dump data. This is well know…
Running a bug bounty is not a suicide pact. A team had to convince a finance group that it was valuable to give money away to people who might be assholes. Bounty hunters are not a community- but if you are a bounty hunter, you should understand that many of your peers are total assholes. The company that wants to pay you a reward has to figure out if you are going to make them regret offering you a reward. There are…
Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
#219Earlier quoted context omitted.
What possible motivation did Facebook have for contacting the company with whom this person had a contract employee relationship with, other than to implicitly threaten problems for both? There was no implication that he was doing this other than on his own, and he had cleared it with his employer. Presumably he didn't email Facebook with a corporate email account, and presumably his employer wasn't in a position whe…
To ensure that this person deleted the credentials they had taken from the server they popped with the RCE, obviously. Again: read the timeline. He submitted a finding with AWS creds taken from the server he popped on October 22 --- on December 1, more than a month after Facebook shut the server down . He took AWS creds from a Facebook server and saved them on his laptop for more than a month. WHY?
And that means rotating all your credentials the very same day you learn about that happening. Why does it make a difference then if he still has stale credentials?
Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug
#220As a security researcher and engineer, I'd like to point out the following, without taking sides: 1. Facebook is not going ballistic because this is a RCE report. They have received high and critical severity reports many times before and acted peaceably, up to and including a prior RCE reported in 2013 by Reginaldo Silva (who now works there!). 2. The researcher used the vulnerability to dump data. This is well know…
The problem is that on the one side you have security professionals who do this full time. They build up a background of implicit knowledge through extensive interaction with other security professionals, via training, mentoring, team activities, etc.
On the other side you have folks like the guy who found this vulnerability -- don't specialize in security, basically moonlighting / hobby, not necessarily connected to other security professionals or even other hobbyists. They won't have the same kind of implicit knowledge.
When someone from the first category communicates with someone from the second category, the communication can break down. That's what happened here.
Offering a million dollar bounty makes this kind of communication problem more likely -- a potential million-dollar payout catches the interest of people who have spare time and encourage them to pick this as the thing they do on the side. And further, encourages them to try anything and everything you don't explicitly forbid in by giving them hope that if they just try hard enough, they'll be able to turn what initially looks like a ho-hum two-year-old Ruby exploit into a million-dollar payday.