Legislative fixes aren't going to buy you a lot, though they'll buy you something. The fundamental problem is structural: there are a lot of things the NSA is totally allowed to do, especially when it acts as an agency of the executive outside of the U.S. Technologists tend to ignore national and jurisdictional borders because networks cross those borders, but the powers of the NSA are defined in terms of those borders. Not just statutorily, but as an agency of the executive, Constitutionally.
For example, Mike Hearn says: "Bypassing that system is illegal for a good reason." Illegal under whose law? Obvious things like the Wiretap Act simply don't apply outside the U.S. And this is by design: Congress and the courts are primarily domestic institutions. The executive, by design, has primacy when it comes to activities outside the U.S. Maybe this design made a lot more sense back in the day before the advent of trans-national corporations, but it's the design we have, and we're talking Constitutional-amendment level fixes to change that design.
Internally, you might see fixes without a Constitutional amendment. E.g. the Supreme Court might at some point weaken the third party doctrine, which is what makes a lot of the NSA's data collection not a violation of the 4th amendment. But they won't touch the activities of the NSA internationally.