Live data from Hacker News

How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

bitcointalk.org

201–210 of 251 posts

Re: How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

#201
post #5

I'm not doubting Bitcoin's potential to become a true currency, but unless this type of smash-and-grab situation can be traced/avoided/insured (whatever the right mechanism is) it is going to be extremely hard to make ordinary businesses and people use it. People don't place value in the currency itself, but the system that provides certain security around it.

> but unless this type of smash-and-grab situation can be traced/avoided/insured

Why can't it be insured? Mt. gox or any other exchange could easily charge a premium for ensuring your bitcoins. If people wanted traceable currency they'd use a traceable currency.

Re: How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

#202

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a shame you'be been downvoted even while being correct - I gave you one upvote at least. Decompile is irrelevant here, the only difference is 'str1' might have been named something different in the original code. This is java code, so "string" != "string" will usually return true always, as you are checking if the objects are equal and not whether the contents are equal. Depending on the JRE this code runs on, i…

I believe String literals are guaranteed to be == in the same source file by the spec, although it's been some years since I could quote chapter and verse for that.

[deleted]

Re: How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

#203

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I believe String literals are guaranteed to be == in the same source file by the spec, although it's been some years since I could quote chapter and verse for that.

You are correct (albeit substituting "class" for "source file" since runtime Java has no concept of source files), although the guarantee is stronger than that. Any two identical literals will refer to the same object, since literals are interned, regardless of what classes "own" them. Chapter and verse: JLS §3.10.5, http://docs.oracle.com/javase/specs/jls/se7/html/jls-3.html#...

Caveat: This will yield different results whether you initialize the string as

> String a = "foo";

vs.

> String a = new String("foo");

Re: How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

#205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I would be surprised if MtGox decides to refund you I agree that MtGox shouldn't be doing any kind of refunding in this case. > what happened is your own fault entirely You're blaming the victim. If I'm walking down a dark alley and someone pulls a gun on me and takes my wallet, is it my fault because I decided to walk down a dark alley? Not at all. The only person at fault here is the cracker who perpetrated the s…

+-------------------------------------------------------+ | SECURITY WARNING! | | You are attempting to walk down a dark alley, | | which could be dangerous. Only walk down | | dark alleys you are familiar with and trust. | | By walking down this alley you assume responsibility | | for the attendant risks. | | | | Do you still wish to walk down the dark alley? | | [x] Yes [ ] Cancel | +-------------------------------…

[deleted]

Re: How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

#206
Man, I'm getting tired of repeating these basic security issues:

Stop storing your wallet online. And if not that, stop letting flash/java autoload/run. Both Chrome and Firefox have "click-to-enable". Not only is it more secure, it also prevents auto-video-playing, background audio you can't find and shit like this from happening.

Re: How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

#207
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This wasn't someone hacking MtGox. This was someone on a vulnerable OS, running without malware protection, with Java active in the browser, visiting an unknown link, and possibly giving an application permission to run. (Although maybe it didn't need permission to run?) To get to that point the person needed to ignore several well established security principles.

Oh come on, how hard is it for MtGox to implement TOTP and tell users to download Google Authenticator? It's not really that much hassle to enter a code each time you want to make a transaction, and these things wouldn't happen. Sure, the user was being stupid here, but MtGox didn't do them any favors either.

Not only is there TOTP, they also sent free Yubikeys to anyone who requested one last year.

Re: How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

#208
post #76

Isn't this exactly what Bitcoin was created for - to allow unregulated access to currency? I guess people don't really realize what unregulated actually means - and nor do they realize why you really do want regulated currency. This kind of thing happens all the time with real banks, but with real banks, all transactions can be traced and reversed. Law enforcement can follow the required documentation to find the own…

We don't need sympathy or regulation. A simple market solution like voluntary bitcoin insurance would do the trick.

Insurance companies are not dumb enough to enter a market where fraud is rampant and they have no legal leverage against bad actors.

Re: How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

#209
post #76

Isn't this exactly what Bitcoin was created for - to allow unregulated access to currency? I guess people don't really realize what unregulated actually means - and nor do they realize why you really do want regulated currency. This kind of thing happens all the time with real banks, but with real banks, all transactions can be traced and reversed. Law enforcement can follow the required documentation to find the own…

We don't need sympathy or regulation. A simple market solution like voluntary bitcoin insurance would do the trick.

How do you propose to defend against insurance fraud? With mixing services available, there would seem to be very little risk in robbing one's own account.

Re: How I got robbed of 34 btc on Mt.Gox today

#210

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think thats done to fool AV software. - AV software will probably flag up any string which equals "AdobeUpdate-Setup1.exe"

All AV software is about that dumb as far as I know. Anyone who is depending on AV software to protect things like actual money is in serious trouble.

You can't really expect it to do much more in this case, you can make the computation which results in ".exe" arbitrarily complex, and detection needs to be cheap. Ultimately the problem is that AV software is in the business of enumerating badness. You need to do whitelisting, for example of who gets to execute arbitrary code, which is the problem here.
Post reply on HN