201–210 of 261 posts
What is the economic value of all these AI chat logs? I can see it useful for developing advertising profile. But I wonder if it's also just sold as training data for people try to build their own models?
Do we know for how much that type of content sells? Not that I'm interested in entering the market, but the economics of that kind of thing are always fascinating. How much are buyers willing to pay for AI conversations? I would expect the value to be pretty low
Think: is my brand getting mentioned more in AI chats? Are people associating positive or negative feelings towards it? Are more people asking about this topic lately?
The company behind this appears to be "real" and incorporated in Delaware. > Urban Cyber Security INC https://opencorporates.com/companies/us_de/5136044 https://www.urbancybersec.com/about-us/ I found two addresses: > 1007 North Orange Street 4th floor Wilmington, DE 19801 US > 510 5th Ave 3rd floor New York, NY 10036 United States and even a phone number: +1 917-690-8380 https://www.manhattan-nyc.com/businesses/urba…
> Urban VPN is operated by Urban Cyber Security Inc., which is affiliated with BiScience (B.I Science (2009) Ltd.), a data broker company. > This company has been on researchers' radar before. Security researchers Wladimir Palant and John Tuckner at Secure Annex have previously documented BiScience's data collection practices. Their research established that: > BiScience collects clickstream data (browsing history) f…
> A free VPN promising privacy and security. If you are not paying for the product, you are the product.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
For the same reason you trust your ISP? It handles all your internet traffic; and depending on where you live, probably has government-mandated back doors, or is willing to cooperate with arbitrary requests from law-enforcement agencies. That's why TLS exists, after all. All Internet traffic is wiretapped.
I'd be significantly more suspicious by default of ISPs that charge no money. > That's why TLS exists, after all. That protects you if you're using standard methods to connect. Installed software gets to bypass it.
Maybe some
I stick to extensions that Mozilla has manually vetted as part of the Firefox recommended extensions program. > Firefox is committed to helping protect you against third-party software that may inadvertently compromise your data – or worse – breach your privacy with malicious intent. Before an extension receives Recommended status, it undergoes rigorous technical review by staff security experts. https://support.mozi…
The problem is most codebase are huge - millions of lines when you include all the libraries etc. Often they're compiled with typescript etc making manual review almost impossible. And if you demand the developer send in the raw uncompiled stuff you have the difficulty of Google/Mozilla having to figure out how to compile an arbitrary project which could use custom compilers or compilation steps. Remember that someon…
I=c=>c.map?c[0]?c.reduce((a,b)=>a[b=I(b)]||a(b),self):c[1]:c
(How it works is an exercise to the reader)
The actual code to run can be delivered as an innocuous looking JavaScript array from some server, and potentially only delivered to one high value target.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problem is most codebase are huge - millions of lines when you include all the libraries etc. Often they're compiled with typescript etc making manual review almost impossible. And if you demand the developer send in the raw uncompiled stuff you have the difficulty of Google/Mozilla having to figure out how to compile an arbitrary project which could use custom compilers or compilation steps. Remember that someon…
For example, the following hidden anywhere in the codebase allows arbitrary code execution even under the most stringent JavaScript security policy (no eval etc): I=c=>c.map?c[0]?c.reduce((a,b)=>a[b=I(b)]||a(b),self):c[1]:c (How it works is an exercise to the reader) The actual code to run can be delivered as an innocuous looking JavaScript array from some server, and potentially only delivered to one high value targ…
I stick to extensions that Mozilla has manually vetted as part of the Firefox recommended extensions program. > Firefox is committed to helping protect you against third-party software that may inadvertently compromise your data – or worse – breach your privacy with malicious intent. Before an extension receives Recommended status, it undergoes rigorous technical review by staff security experts. https://support.mozi…
The problem is most codebase are huge - millions of lines when you include all the libraries etc. Often they're compiled with typescript etc making manual review almost impossible. And if you demand the developer send in the raw uncompiled stuff you have the difficulty of Google/Mozilla having to figure out how to compile an arbitrary project which could use custom compilers or compilation steps. Remember that someon…
In JS this can be much harder to find anything suspicious when the code can be minified.
But back to Firefox: My house, my rules. So let external developers set some more strict rules that discourage the bad actors a little.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problem is most codebase are huge - millions of lines when you include all the libraries etc. Often they're compiled with typescript etc making manual review almost impossible. And if you demand the developer send in the raw uncompiled stuff you have the difficulty of Google/Mozilla having to figure out how to compile an arbitrary project which could use custom compilers or compilation steps. Remember that someon…
Probably off topic: I once tried to find bad code in a WordPress theme. And it was hidden so deep and inconspicuously. The only thing that really helped was to do a diff. In JS this can be much harder to find anything suspicious when the code can be minified. But back to Firefox: My house, my rules. So let external developers set some more strict rules that discourage the bad actors a little.
When a survey was conducted on the misuse of finances and powers, it was found that managers who did not sign the code (because they had to study it and then "forgot" to do so) were more likely to cheat than those who actually signed the documents.