Earlier quoted context omitted.
Quite true, but the Dual_EC backdoor claim is serious. DJB's point that we should design curves with "nothing up my sleeve" is a nice touch.
See, this gets you into trouble, because Bernstein has actually a pretty batshit take on nothing-up-my-sleeve constructions (see the B4D455 paper) --- and that argument also hurts his position on Kyber, which does NUMS stuff!
NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
201–210 of 249 posts
Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
#202Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I hate that his more tinfoil hat stuff (which is not totally unjustified, mind you) overshadows his sober technical contributions in these discussions. Currently he argues that NSA is likely to be attacking the standards process to do some unspecified nefarious thing in PQ algorithms, and he's appealing to our memories of Dual_EC. That's not tinfoil hat stuff! It's a serious possibility that has happened before (Du…
NSA wrote Dual EC. A team of (mostly European) academic cryptographers wrote the CRYSTALS constructions. Moreover, the NOBUS mechanism in Dual EC is obvious, and it's not at all clear where you'd do anything like that in Kyber, which goes out of its way not to have the "weird constants" problem that the P-curves (which practitioners generally trust) ended up with.
Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
#203While it's true that six others unequivocally opposed adoption, we don't know how many of those oppose the chairs claiming they have consensus. This may be a normal ratio to move forward with adoption, you'd have to look at past IETF proceeding to get a sense for that. One other factor which comes in to play, some people can't stand his communication style. When disagreed with, he tends to dig in his heels and write…
The IESG though is completely mishandling it. They could discipline him if need be (posting bans for some amount of time) and still hear the appeal. Instead they're sticking their fingers in their ears. DJB might be childish and annoying, but how are they that much better?
Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
#204While it's true that six others unequivocally opposed adoption, we don't know how many of those oppose the chairs claiming they have consensus. This may be a normal ratio to move forward with adoption, you'd have to look at past IETF proceeding to get a sense for that. One other factor which comes in to play, some people can't stand his communication style. When disagreed with, he tends to dig in his heels and write…
> One other factor which comes in to play, some people can't stand his communication style. When disagreed with, he tends to dig in his heels and write lengthly responses that question people's motives, like in this blog post and others. I don't have context on this other than the linked page, but if what he's saying is accurate, it does seem pretty damning and corrupt, no? Why all the lies and distortions otherwise…
It's complicated. You'd have to know the rules and read the list archives, and make up your own mind. DJB might be overselling it, so you really do have to check it yourself. I think the WG chair had enough cover to make the call they made. What _I_ would have done is do a WG consensus call on the underlying controversial question once the controversy started, separate from the consensus call on adopting the work item. But I'm not the chair.
Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
#205Earlier quoted context omitted.
NSA wrote Dual EC. A team of (mostly European) academic cryptographers wrote the CRYSTALS constructions. Moreover, the NOBUS mechanism in Dual EC is obvious, and it's not at all clear where you'd do anything like that in Kyber, which goes out of its way not to have the "weird constants" problem that the P-curves (which practitioners generally trust) ended up with.
It took a couple of years to get the suspicion about Dual_EC out.
None of this applies to anything else besides Dual EC.
That aside: I don't know what this has to do with anything I just wrote. Did you mean to respond to some other comment?
Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
#206Earlier quoted context omitted.
This isn’t black and white. There’s a medium between: * Wait for 10 years of cryptanalysis (specific to the final algorithm) before using anything, which probably will be relatively meager because nobody is using it * Expect the standardization process itself to produce a blessed artifact, to be set on fire as a false god if it turns out to be imperfect (or more realistically, just cause everybody a bunch of pain for…
I don't know what you mean by "kick the tires". If by that you mean "perfect the implementation", we already get that! The MLKEM in Go is not the MLKEM in OpenSSL is not the MLKEM in AWS-LC. If instead you mean "figure out after some period of implementation whether the standard itself is good", I don't know how that's meant to be workable. It's the publication of the standard itself that is the forcing function for…
> If instead you mean "figure out after some period of implementation whether the standard itself is good", I don't know how that's meant to be workable.
The forcing function can potentially be: this final draft is the heir apparent. If nothing serious comes up in the next 6 months, it will be summarily finalized.
It’s possible this won’t get any of the implementers off their ass on a reasonable timeframe - this happens with web standards all the time. It’s also possible that this is very unlikely to uncover anything not already uncovered. Like I said, I’m not totally convinced that in this specific field it makes sense. But your arguments against it are fully general against this kind of phased process at all, and I think it has empirically improved recent W3C and IETF standards (including QUIC and HTTP2/3) a lot compared to the previous method.
Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
#207Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Accusing the chairs of corruption may have influenced how seriously his complaint was taken. If you alter your official treatment of somebody because they suggested you might be corrupt (in other words, because of personal animus), then you have just confirmed their suggestion.
So all someone who is being abusive has to do to force me to be stand there and be abused by them is to call me corrupt?
Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
#208Earlier quoted context omitted.
See, this gets you into trouble, because Bernstein has actually a pretty batshit take on nothing-up-my-sleeve constructions (see the B4D455 paper) --- and that argument also hurts his position on Kyber, which does NUMS stuff!
Link?
† as I remember it
Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
#209Earlier quoted context omitted.
To add to this: rough consensus is defined in BCP 25 / RFC 2418 ( https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2418#section-3.3 ): IETF consensus does not require that all participants agree although this is, of course, preferred. In general, the dominant view of the working group shall prevail. (However, it must be noted that "dominance" is not to be determined on the basis of volume or persistence, but rather a more ge…
And to add to that, the blurb you link notes explicitly that for IETF purposes, "rough consensus" is reached when the Chair determines is has been reached.
Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand
#210Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know what you mean by "kick the tires". If by that you mean "perfect the implementation", we already get that! The MLKEM in Go is not the MLKEM in OpenSSL is not the MLKEM in AWS-LC. If instead you mean "figure out after some period of implementation whether the standard itself is good", I don't know how that's meant to be workable. It's the publication of the standard itself that is the forcing function for…
I mean have a bunch of competent teams that (importantly) didn’t design the algorithm read the final draft and write their versions of it. Then they and others can perform practical analysis on each (empirically look for timing side channels on x86 and ARM, fuzz them, etc.). > If instead you mean "figure out after some period of implementation whether the standard itself is good", I don't know how that's meant to be…
Further, the people involved in the NIST PQ key establishment competition are a murderers row of serious cryptographers and cryptography engineers. All of them had the knowhow and incentive to write implementations of their constructions and, if it was going to showcase some glaring problem, of their competitors. What makes you think that we lacked implementation understanding during this process?