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NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

blog.cr.yp.to

201–210 of 249 posts

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#201

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Quite true, but the Dual_EC backdoor claim is serious. DJB's point that we should design curves with "nothing up my sleeve" is a nice touch.

See, this gets you into trouble, because Bernstein has actually a pretty batshit take on nothing-up-my-sleeve constructions (see the B4D455 paper) --- and that argument also hurts his position on Kyber, which does NUMS stuff!

Link?

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#202

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I hate that his more tinfoil hat stuff (which is not totally unjustified, mind you) overshadows his sober technical contributions in these discussions. Currently he argues that NSA is likely to be attacking the standards process to do some unspecified nefarious thing in PQ algorithms, and he's appealing to our memories of Dual_EC. That's not tinfoil hat stuff! It's a serious possibility that has happened before (Du…

NSA wrote Dual EC. A team of (mostly European) academic cryptographers wrote the CRYSTALS constructions. Moreover, the NOBUS mechanism in Dual EC is obvious, and it's not at all clear where you'd do anything like that in Kyber, which goes out of its way not to have the "weird constants" problem that the P-curves (which practitioners generally trust) ended up with.

It took a couple of years to get the suspicion about Dual_EC out.

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#203

While it's true that six others unequivocally opposed adoption, we don't know how many of those oppose the chairs claiming they have consensus. This may be a normal ratio to move forward with adoption, you'd have to look at past IETF proceeding to get a sense for that. One other factor which comes in to play, some people can't stand his communication style. When disagreed with, he tends to dig in his heels and write…

> One other factor which comes in to play, some people can't stand his communication style. When disagreed with, he tends to dig in his heels and write lengthly responses that question people's motives, like in this blog post and others. Accusing the chairs of corruption may have influenced how seriously his complaint was taken.

The IESG though is completely mishandling it. They could discipline him if need be (posting bans for some amount of time) and still hear the appeal. Instead they're sticking their fingers in their ears. DJB might be childish and annoying, but how are they that much better?

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#204

While it's true that six others unequivocally opposed adoption, we don't know how many of those oppose the chairs claiming they have consensus. This may be a normal ratio to move forward with adoption, you'd have to look at past IETF proceeding to get a sense for that. One other factor which comes in to play, some people can't stand his communication style. When disagreed with, he tends to dig in his heels and write…

> One other factor which comes in to play, some people can't stand his communication style. When disagreed with, he tends to dig in his heels and write lengthly responses that question people's motives, like in this blog post and others. I don't have context on this other than the linked page, but if what he's saying is accurate, it does seem pretty damning and corrupt, no? Why all the lies and distortions otherwise…

> I don't have context on this other than the linked page, but if what he's saying is accurate, it does seem pretty damning and corrupt, no?

It's complicated. You'd have to know the rules and read the list archives, and make up your own mind. DJB might be overselling it, so you really do have to check it yourself. I think the WG chair had enough cover to make the call they made. What _I_ would have done is do a WG consensus call on the underlying controversial question once the controversy started, separate from the consensus call on adopting the work item. But I'm not the chair.

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

NSA wrote Dual EC. A team of (mostly European) academic cryptographers wrote the CRYSTALS constructions. Moreover, the NOBUS mechanism in Dual EC is obvious, and it's not at all clear where you'd do anything like that in Kyber, which goes out of its way not to have the "weird constants" problem that the P-curves (which practitioners generally trust) ended up with.

It took a couple of years to get the suspicion about Dual_EC out.

No it didn't. The problem with Dual EC was published in a rump session at the next CRYPTO after NIST published it. The widespread assumption was that nobody was actually using it, which was enabled by the fact that the important "target" implementations (most importantly RSA BSAFE, which I think a lot of people also assumed wasn't in common use, but I may just be saying that because it's what I myself assumed) were deeply closed-source.

None of this applies to anything else besides Dual EC.

That aside: I don't know what this has to do with anything I just wrote. Did you mean to respond to some other comment?

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#206

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This isn’t black and white. There’s a medium between: * Wait for 10 years of cryptanalysis (specific to the final algorithm) before using anything, which probably will be relatively meager because nobody is using it * Expect the standardization process itself to produce a blessed artifact, to be set on fire as a false god if it turns out to be imperfect (or more realistically, just cause everybody a bunch of pain for…

I don't know what you mean by "kick the tires". If by that you mean "perfect the implementation", we already get that! The MLKEM in Go is not the MLKEM in OpenSSL is not the MLKEM in AWS-LC. If instead you mean "figure out after some period of implementation whether the standard itself is good", I don't know how that's meant to be workable. It's the publication of the standard itself that is the forcing function for…

I mean have a bunch of competent teams that (importantly) didn’t design the algorithm read the final draft and write their versions of it. Then they and others can perform practical analysis on each (empirically look for timing side channels on x86 and ARM, fuzz them, etc.).

> If instead you mean "figure out after some period of implementation whether the standard itself is good", I don't know how that's meant to be workable.

The forcing function can potentially be: this final draft is the heir apparent. If nothing serious comes up in the next 6 months, it will be summarily finalized.

It’s possible this won’t get any of the implementers off their ass on a reasonable timeframe - this happens with web standards all the time. It’s also possible that this is very unlikely to uncover anything not already uncovered. Like I said, I’m not totally convinced that in this specific field it makes sense. But your arguments against it are fully general against this kind of phased process at all, and I think it has empirically improved recent W3C and IETF standards (including QUIC and HTTP2/3) a lot compared to the previous method.

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#207
post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Accusing the chairs of corruption may have influenced how seriously his complaint was taken. If you alter your official treatment of somebody because they suggested you might be corrupt (in other words, because of personal animus), then you have just confirmed their suggestion.

So all someone who is being abusive has to do to force me to be stand there and be abused by them is to call me corrupt?

No, because in this hypothetical you have some authority to discipline that someone. That's what's going on here: DJB is calling out people in the IETF leadership -- people who can dole out posting privileges bans and what not. DJB is most likely going to skirt the line and not go over it, which is what's really tricky here, but the IESG could say they've had enough and discipline him. The trouble is that the underlying controversy does need to be addressed, so the IESG doesn't have completely free hand -- they can end up with a PR problem on their hands.

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#208

Earlier quoted context omitted.

See, this gets you into trouble, because Bernstein has actually a pretty batshit take on nothing-up-my-sleeve constructions (see the B4D455 paper) --- and that argument also hurts his position on Kyber, which does NUMS stuff!

Link?

I tried a couple searches and I forget which calculator-speak version of "BADASS" Bernstein actually used, but the concept of the paper† is that all the NUMS-style curves are suspect because you can make combinations of mathematical constants say whatever you want them to say (in combination), and so instead you should pick curve constants based purely on engineering excellence, which nobody could ever disagree about or (looks around the room) start huge conspiracy theories over.

as I remember it

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#209
post #159
post #145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To add to this: rough consensus is defined in BCP 25 / RFC 2418 ( https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2418#section-3.3 ): IETF consensus does not require that all participants agree although this is, of course, preferred. In general, the dominant view of the working group shall prevail. (However, it must be noted that "dominance" is not to be determined on the basis of volume or persistence, but rather a more ge…

And to add to that, the blurb you link notes explicitly that for IETF purposes, "rough consensus" is reached when the Chair determines is has been reached.

Yes, but WG chairs are supposed to help. One way to help would have been to do a consensus call on the underlying controversy. Still, I think the chair is in the clear as far as the rules go.

Re: NSA and IETF, part 3: Dodging the issues at hand

#210

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know what you mean by "kick the tires". If by that you mean "perfect the implementation", we already get that! The MLKEM in Go is not the MLKEM in OpenSSL is not the MLKEM in AWS-LC. If instead you mean "figure out after some period of implementation whether the standard itself is good", I don't know how that's meant to be workable. It's the publication of the standard itself that is the forcing function for…

I mean have a bunch of competent teams that (importantly) didn’t design the algorithm read the final draft and write their versions of it. Then they and others can perform practical analysis on each (empirically look for timing side channels on x86 and ARM, fuzz them, etc.). > If instead you mean "figure out after some period of implementation whether the standard itself is good", I don't know how that's meant to be…

Again: that has now happened. What have we learned from it that we needed to know 3 years ago when NIST chose Kyber? That's an important question, because this is a whole giant thread about Bernstein's allegation that the IETF is in the pocket of the NSA (see "part 4" of this series for that charming claim).

Further, the people involved in the NIST PQ key establishment competition are a murderers row of serious cryptographers and cryptography engineers. All of them had the knowhow and incentive to write implementations of their constructions and, if it was going to showcase some glaring problem, of their competitors. What makes you think that we lacked implementation understanding during this process?

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