Kurt Got Got
201–210 of 256 posts
Re: Kurt Got Got
#202Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's far too common for websites to redirect to some separate domain for sign in which isn't the one originally used to sign up, getting users used to "oh gotta copy the password again" as a totally normal thing that happens
I keep hearing people say this, but I haven’t found it so: in over a decade, I think I’ve only seen it twice . Looking through my password safe which I’ve been using for about twelve years with over 200 entries, I have nine cases with multiple origin URLs, and most of them I’m confident I added manually because I didn’t like the URL it recorded automatically (e.g. it’s on a different domain from the main site, and th…
You'll identify on id.me
People have just gotten used to this sort of thing unfortunately
Re: Kurt Got Got
#203When we did annual pen testing audits for my last company, the security audit company always offered to do phishing or social engineering attacks, but advised against it because they said it worked every single time. One of the most memorable things they shared is they'd throw USB sticks in the parking lot of the company they were pentesting and somebody would always put the thing into a workstation to see what as on…
They have no import/export so you are stuck in the iOS/Android ecosystem or have to do the passkey setup for all pages all over again
Re: Kurt Got Got
#204Is there an anti-phishing extension that detects whether the domain is close to, but not exactly the popular legitimate domain? Would probably need to use a local LLM for the detection. If not I might look into making one.
Re: Kurt Got Got
#205... could we get webauthn / yubikeys prioritized for fly? afaik (don't want to disable 2fa to find out), it only supports totp. For everyone reading though, you should try fly. Unaffiliated except for being a happy customer. 50 lines of toml is so so much better than 1k+ lines of cloudformation.
We don't like TOTP, at all, for reasons even more obvious now, but our standard answer for advanced MFA has been OIDC, which is what most people should do rather than setting up bespoke U2F/FIDO2/Passkeys. We will get to this though. https://fly.io/blog/tokenized-tokens/
> Fly.io supports Google and GitHub as Identity Providers[1]
How about you just support SAML like a real enterprise vendor, so IdP-specific support isn't your problem anymore? I get it, SAML is hard, but it's really the One True Path when it comes to this stuff.
Re: Kurt Got Got
#206> This is, in fact, how all of our infrastructure is secured at Fly.io; specifically, we get everything behind an IdP (in our case: Google’s) and have it require phishing-proof MFA. Every system is only as secure as its weakest link. If the company's CEO is idiotic enough to pull credentials from 1Password and manually copy-past them on a random website whose domain does not match the service that issued it, what is…
Re: Kurt Got Got
#207Earlier quoted context omitted.
I keep hearing people say this, but I haven’t found it so: in over a decade, I think I’ve only seen it twice . Looking through my password safe which I’ve been using for about twelve years with over 200 entries, I have nine cases with multiple origin URLs, and most of them I’m confident I added manually because I didn’t like the URL it recorded automatically (e.g. it’s on a different domain from the main site, and th…
go to tax.gov You'll identify on id.me People have just gotten used to this sort of thing unfortunately
For password safe users, auth being handled entirely on a different origin is completely fine, so long as the credentials are bound to (only used on, including initial registration) that origin. The hazard is only when login occurs via multiple domains—which in this case would mean if you had elements on both tax.gov and id.me taking the same username and password, which I don’t believe you do. Your password safe won’t care if you started at https://tax.gov, the origin you created the credentials on was https://id.me, and so that’s the origin it will autofill for.
Re: Kurt Got Got
#208> ...
> If you were inclined to take us up on an “airdrop” to “claim a share” of the “token” powering Fly.io, the site is still up. You can connect your wallet it [sic] it! You’ll lose all your money. But if we’d actually done an ICO, you’d have lost all your money anyways.
> Somebody involved in pulling this attack off had to come up with “own a piece of the sky!”, and I think that’s punishment enough for them.
I was amused by all of this, but I still feel like they should care more about how impactful this was for anyone who got crypto-scammed at the link. I mean, yes, those are people who would believe the story and also click a link like that. But what if fly.io were found to share liability?
Re: Kurt Got Got
#209Earlier quoted context omitted.
TBH this is probably the best argument for actually conducting phishing pentests. It shuts up the technical users who think they're too smart to need the handrails and safety nets that the IT department set up for the rest of the average plebs who work there. (Speaking as one of the technical users here. Of course, it wouldn't happen to ME! :P )
if you've got email filters set up that sort emails by (dkim-verified) sender into folders, phishing becomes immediate obvious as you start to wonder why it isn't sorted into the right folder.
Re: Kurt Got Got
#210When we did annual pen testing audits for my last company, the security audit company always offered to do phishing or social engineering attacks, but advised against it because they said it worked every single time. One of the most memorable things they shared is they'd throw USB sticks in the parking lot of the company they were pentesting and somebody would always put the thing into a workstation to see what as on…
When I see these sophisticated phishing messages I like to click through and check out how well-made the phishing site itself is, sometimes I fill their form with bogus info to waste their time. So I opened the link in a sandboxed window, looked around, entered nothing into any forms.
It turns out the email was from a pen testing firm my employer had hired, and it had a code baked into the url linked to me. So they reported that I had been successfully phished, even though I never input any data, let alone anything sensitive.
If that's the bar pen testing firms use to say that they've succeeded in phishing, then it's not very useful.