> ...attackers must not be able to predict tag values that the system will choose. We address this issue by frequently re-seeding the underlying pseudo-random generator used to select new tags. This point could use more explanation. The fundamental problem here is the low entropy of the tags (only 4 bits). An attacker who randomly guesses the tags has 1/16 chance of success. That is not fixed by reseeding the PRNG. S…
Four bits provide too few possibilities. Since memory allocations happen millions of times per minute, the chance of collisions grows very quickly, even with periodic reseeding.
It isn't great. Most users won't assume malice when an app crashes. And if they reopen it a few times your chance of succeeding goes up quickly. But this is also assuming that you need a single pointer tag to exploit something. If you need more you need to get even luckier.
So it definitely isn't perfect protection. But it isn't trivial to bypass.