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DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

micahflee.com

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Re: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

#201
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From the Wired article: "The archive server is programmed in Java and is built using Spring Boot, an open source framework for creating Java applications. Spring Boot includes a set of features called Actuator that helps developers monitor and debug their applications. One of these features is the heap dump endpoint," So the heapdumps being available is a Spring Boot feature so it does not appear to be malicious.

This feature must be explicitly enabled, it is not on by default nor by accident.

Based on [1] it seems like one `management.endpoints.web.exposure.include=*` is enough to expose everything including the heapdump endpoint on the public HTTP API without authentication. It's even there in the docs as an example.

Looks like there is a change [2] coming to the `management.endpoint.heapdump.access` default value that would make this harder to expose by accident.

Let's look for `env` next...

[1] https://docs.spring.io/spring-boot/reference/actuator/endpoi...

[2] https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-boot/pull/45624

Re: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

#202
post #175

However bad their Signal fork was, at least it was legal. What's crazy is that this very company was also selling a cracked WhatsApp, which is a whole different kettle of fish... and people were buying it! real corporations and governments were buying this crap - it's insane https://smarsh.my.salesforce.com/sfc/p/#30000001FgxH/a/Pb000...

Why would that be illegal? In the Beeper case, the DOJ has not been sympathetic to companies attempting to ban third-party messaging clients of proprietary protocols [0] — is WhatsApp different? The WhatsApp archiver, from what I can tell, seems to install a patch on the user's WhatsApp installation. Probably a security nightmare, sure, but I don't think it would be illegal. https://techcrunch.com/2024/03/21/doj-call…

They are actually distributing a rebuilt client binary, complete with the Meta branding. That’s a clear breach of both the licensing of the software (I’m pretty sure it’s not open source) as well as the trademarks of Meta

It’s not the same thing as providing a compatible app with their own branding

Re: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

#203

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is why Signal is so opposed to third-party apps (or forks) that connect to their service. If you want to keep the branding of Signal being the secure app, you need to make sure that all Signal users are actually using a secure version of Signal. If an insecure fork (like this one) becomes too popular, most groups will have at least one member using it, and then the security is gone.

That was Apple's same reasoning for shutting down that iMessage client app. These leaks seem to justify their concerns.

Hm, my understanding is that TeleMessage archival works with iMessage in the same way it does with Signal.

The third-party federation problem is real, but the vulnerability caused by TeleMessage isn't solved by removing federation.

Re: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

#204

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This feature of docker compose is insane.

Right!? I learned with a colleague: Didn’t you restrict everything to the Tailnet? Yes, feel free to check UFW. Hmm, then why does nmap show all this stuff when scanning from the lan? Wtf??

Similar here, UFW setup to only enable access via Caddy to our http services - wait, why can I connect directly to our redis instance?

Took a while to workout that for some reason docker-compose is messing directly with iptables to shoot holes in the firewall we'd configured. Figured out you have to write your compose in some super special way to disable that functionality. Compose should never ever open network ports, ever in my book - to do so without a warning or anything though is like I said, insane!

Re: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

#205

It's been weeks since the initial TeleMessage revelation... has the Signal Foundation responded in any way to the news? They condemn open source third-party clients and threaten trademark litigation when people use the "Signal" name in interop projects. Meanwhile, total silence when a defense contractor does the same thing.

I recall Whittaker talking about it in an interview, mainly complaining about how mainstream media kept referring to Signal as an "insecure messenger" when that was not at all the issue. Can't seem to find that interview now, though.

Probably not much they could do, because I'm sure that's why TeleMessage didn't call their app "Signal", but "SGNL".

Re: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

#206

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> They’re also not saying how much actual message content they have because the 410GB of heap dumps makes for a bigger headline number. That's very important to say. I went through one of these massive data dumps recently and it was literally all cached operating system package updates and routine logs. Nothing at all of interest. It's easy to cut the size on a heap dump. When it's not done it seems sketchy. But it c…

Most of the the heap dump will be filled with stuff like java.util.String!blahjava.util.ArrayList! Though the heap dump would have messages in flight at the time. It's obviously not as useful if you are just trying to grab messages for a specific person. Frankly the most useful part might be any in-memory secret keys, which could be useful for breaking deeper into the system.

[deleted]

Re: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

#207

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> They’re also not saying how much actual message content they have because the 410GB of heap dumps makes for a bigger headline number. That's very important to say. I went through one of these massive data dumps recently and it was literally all cached operating system package updates and routine logs. Nothing at all of interest. It's easy to cut the size on a heap dump. When it's not done it seems sketchy. But it c…

Most of the the heap dump will be filled with stuff like java.util.String!blahjava.util.ArrayList! Though the heap dump would have messages in flight at the time. It's obviously not as useful if you are just trying to grab messages for a specific person. Frankly the most useful part might be any in-memory secret keys, which could be useful for breaking deeper into the system.

Plenty of info from a live heap dump if you know what you are doing.

But these guys are only interested in "journalists" not people who spent decades digging into ad server heap dumps

Re: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

#208
post #44
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's not a great generalisation for the whole country. How many ex Mossad people interested in doing actual implementation in tech companies do you think there are? It's like "aren't those US software companies all supposed to be top notch, ex NSA yadda yadda?"

The CEO/Founder of TeleMessage Guy Levit was the head of the Planning and Development Department of an elite technical unit in the Intelligence Corps of the IDF according to bio.

I guess we could say that in many ways, he never left

Re: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage

#209
post #160
post #2

So one of their servers had a /heapdump endpoint that publicly served a heap dump of the server? This whole saga is out of control. This group didn’t really “publish” anything, though. They’re offering access to journalists through a request form. They’re also not saying how much actual message content they have because the 410GB of heap dumps makes for a bigger headline number.

TeleMessage is most likely an intelligence asset, and a burned one now that Trump's people stopped using it. A fake hack is the safest way for the agency responsible to leak the messages collected.

and provide a plausible reason for the shutdown
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