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Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

dmarcchecker.app

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Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

#201
post #163
post #59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You should read the blog post Prof. Green linked to. All of your questions are addressed there.

Yes, I've now read it and it answered those questions. But it also stumbled upon an easier possible solution without realizing it: if you wish to pretend you didn't send some emails, you can still claim that someone stole your password. Whether this claim will be believed or not, is independent of DKIM. Spoofing is a better excuse than a stolen password only in the case of a single email. If there's a conversation sp…

If someone lies that their password was stolen to hide them being the originator of a single email, who are they telling the lie? Is it a court? In many cases the person would be caught through behavioral analysis. They didn't change their password, so it wasn't really stolen. No other emails were improperly authored, so it wasn't really stolen. They never reported it to the email server owner, so it wasn't really stolen.

Lying isn't a stronger defense to perform abuse than weak keys are for stopping abuse.

Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

#202
post #200
post #6

Could someone help me understand why we're not dramatically ramping up key sizes across the board on all encryption? Not as a solution, but as a buy-some-time measure. Compute is rapidly increasing, there is continuous chatter about quantum and yet everyone seems to be just staring at their belly buttons. Obviously bigger keys are more expensive in compute, but we've got more too...why only use it on the cracking sid…

Linear bit size increases require exponential compute increases to break. RSA with 1024 bits is still beyond any practical capability to break. The current practical limit is considered to be around 800-something bits. Still the recommendation is to use at least 3000 bits nowadays, to defend against possible mathematical advances.

This is incorrect. Factoring algorithms like GNFS are super-polynomial but sub-exponential. RSA-1024 is likely breakable at practical-but-very-expensive costs.

Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

#203
post #43

I think the cynic in me says "so what" mostly because dkim as an ancient technology is hardly secure. I don't think we're any less prone to email fakery and spam. I'd be interested to see a possible new solution or a revamping of email as a protocol but that's unlikely. We're more likely to keep it like snail mail as we prioritise different forms of communication. Unfortunately nothing has beat the universal email ad…

Email-style user@host.domain addressing is also used in SIP.

At one point in time you could reach me on email, XMPP, and SIP all using the same identifier. We dropped XMPP about a decade ago when all the major service providers stopped federating with it, but if you know my work email address you can also call my desk phone using the same identifier.

Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

#205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is there a compelling reason to use 3072 instead of 4096? If you're going to kick the can down the road you might as well put some effort into it. The difference in memory use/compute time has to be marginal at this point. It's not like the old days when jumping from 512 to 4096 made the encryption unusably slow.

There's no good reason at all, which is why RSA-3072 is the rarely seen "oddball".

> There's no good reason at all

Operations per second?

* https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/PublicK...

Running MacPorts-installed `openssl speed rsa` on an Apple M4 (non-Pro):

    version: 3.4.0
    built on: Tue Dec  3 14:33:57 2024 UTC
    options: bn(64,64)
    compiler: /usr/bin/clang -fPIC -arch arm64 -pipe -Os -isysroot/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/SDKs/MacOSX15.sdk -arch arm64 -isysroot /Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/SDKs/MacOSX15.sdk -DL_ENDIAN -DOPENSSL_PIC -D_REENTRANT -DOPENSSL_BUILDING_OPENSSL -DZLIB -DNDEBUG -I/opt/local/include -isysroot/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/SDKs/MacOSX15.sdk
    CPUINFO: OPENSSL_armcap=0x87d
                       sign    verify    encrypt   decrypt   sign/s verify/s  encr./s  decr./s
    rsa   512 bits 0.000012s 0.000001s 0.000001s 0.000016s  80317.8 973378.4 842915.2  64470.9
    rsa  1024 bits 0.000056s 0.000003s 0.000003s 0.000060s  17752.4 381404.1 352224.8  16594.4
    rsa  2048 bits 0.000334s 0.000008s 0.000009s 0.000343s   2994.9 117811.8 113258.1   2915.6
    rsa  3072 bits 0.000982s 0.000018s 0.000019s 0.000989s   1018.4  54451.6  53334.8   1011.3
    rsa  4096 bits 0.002122s 0.000031s 0.000032s 0.002129s    471.3  31800.6  31598.7    469.8
    rsa  7680 bits 0.016932s 0.000104s 0.000107s 0.017048s     59.1   9585.7   9368.4     58.7
    rsa 15360 bits 0.089821s 0.000424s 0.000425s 0.090631s     11.1   2357.4   2355.5     11.0
(Assuming you have to stick with RSA and not go over to EC.)

Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

#206

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's no good reason at all, which is why RSA-3072 is the rarely seen "oddball".

> There's no good reason at all Operations per second? * https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/PublicK... Running MacPorts-installed `openssl speed rsa` on an Apple M4 (non-Pro): version: 3.4.0 built on: Tue Dec 3 14:33:57 2024 UTC options: bn(64,64) compiler: /usr/bin/clang -fPIC -arch arm64 -pipe -Os -isysroot/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/SDKs/MacOSX15.sdk -arch arm64 -isysroot /Library/Develop…

It's roughly half as fast as 4096, which sounds bad until you realize that 3072 is already 20% as fast as 2048, 3% as fast as 1024, and 1% as fast as 512. In terms of performance tradeoff it's downright mild compared to the other steps up.

Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

#207

Slight change of title. The leading "How" was dropped. Original: "How We Cracked a 512-Bit DKIM Key for Less Than $8 in the Cloud"

Dropping the How is part of Hackernews guidelines

There’s no such guideline. It’s just part of the default title normalization. The submitter can adjust it afterwards.

Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

#208

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Larger keys won't make the algorithms quantum-safe either.

Which is why post-quantum algos were invented.

> Which is why post-quantum algos were invented.

Yup. And I don't even think quantum resistance was the goal of some of the algos that, yet, happen to be believed to be quantum resistant. Take "Lamport signatures" for example: that's from the late seventies. Did anyone even talk about quantum computers back then? I just checked and the word "quantum" doesn't even appear in Lamport's paper.

Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

#209
post #96
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

RSA 2048 isn't broken, but experts consider it a matter of time. How long I don't know, but since the attacks are known (prime numbers) someone (read not me) can make an estimate with error bars that are concerning enough to consider it as good as broken.

What expert considers it a matter of time before 2048 is broken? 2048 is 112-bit-equivalent security.

https://www.keylength.com/en/4/ NIST says 2048 bit RSA is good until 2030. I'm not sure what that means, perhaps that it will be broken considering advances, perhaps just that someone (read governments) who cares to spend 5 years on the problem will break your key.

Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud

#210

Me writing over 14 years ago: https://blog.jgc.org/2010/06/facebooks-dkim-rsa-key-should-b... This was doable 14 years ago for 512-bit keys.

Your blog got a mention in the comments of http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/10/dkim-vulnerability-...
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