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Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

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Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#201

Post by scoofy »

I think that the thing that most people don't realize about ethics is the meta-ethical problem that axioms are by definition arbitrary.

When we really think about the fact that all of our ethical theories are based on arbitrary axioms, suddenly the teeth to ethics have a deep, serious problem.

The only argument we have at that point is that the axioms "feel" correct, and I have no problem with this basis, I consider myself someone with strong ethical viewpoints. However, when the foundation of ethics is based on feel, then there are serious problems, because it stands to reason that folks who have a different feel are entirely justified in their ethical standards (assuming good-faith and good reasoning).

At that point, we have the problem that almost every ethical theory (I would argue the concept of ethics), must be universalizable. That is, if something is wrong for me, it should be wrong for someone else in my position (not necessarily everyone). This is completely impossible when ethics are ultimately based on feel.

Now, Chompsky here is basically saying, come on, we have innate instinctual ethical views. I generally agree with him, but it ultimately doesn't matter. If ethical theory is simply instinctual, the same meta-ethical problem exists, it's just that the founding axiom that most folks will have is that the "normal" ethical view is the "correct" view... it's a fine axiom, we needn't argue about it, but it's still arbitrary, and effectively amounts to might makes right.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#202

Post by naasking »

voxl wrote: post #188
speak_plainly wrote: post #173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a logical contradiction in a simple way: If you assert that 'moral relativism is true' that itself would be a relative claim which would undermine the assertion as a universal position. Further, you end up in a position of equivalence of all claims and generate major contradictions. I will go out on a limb on the universal moral values claim and I think again it's pretty simple: The existence of even the most ba…

Yes, there are physical facts, most moral relativists are physical realists. But that is also exactly where the moral relativism originates. You _do_ have physical laws, you _do not_ have moral laws. You can _test_ physical laws, you _can not test_ moral laws. Once you axiomatically ordain some set of rules as "moral truths" or some measure of "moral truth" then the physical apparatus comes in, and you get to use it.…

> But that is also exactly where the moral relativism originates. You _do_ have physical laws, you _do not_ have moral laws. You can _test_ physical laws, you _can not test_ moral laws.

First, this assumes a very specific kind of moral realism, but does not describe all forms of moral realism. Second, we do just fine testing mathematical laws by checking for consistency without any tests of the sort you're describing.

Finally, these sorts of arguments against moral realism have been discussed for decades, so I'll simply leave this here for people to assess:

A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969), https://www.dropbox.com/s/p9v7qt23p21gfci/Proof%20of%20the%2...

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#203

Post by fluoridation »

nico wrote: post #199
fluoridation wrote: post #186

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>If you assert that 'moral relativism is true' that itself would be a relative claim Would it? If we define "moral absolutism" as "the position that there exist moral statements that are true independently of any observers" then we could define the position of "moral relativism" as its logical negation: "there don't exist moral statements that are true independently of any observers". Is that sentence itself a moral…

> he only truths I can imagine that could meet those requirements would have to be really abstract, like 1+1=2 And that is not even universally or absolutely true, 1+1=2 is a set of symbols that need to be interpreted by someone for them to have meaning, it’s a concept made up by people Hence, 1+1=2 is just as relative as anything else we express through language

"1+1=2" as a string of symbols is open to interpretation, however, both you and I understand the idea that that string of symbols is conveying, and that idea is true objectively.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#204

Post by thsksbd »

lsy wrote: post #164

It's weird to hear Foucault described as "amoral" when he himself claimed to be a moralist [1]. What is meant by moral relativism in this case I think is merely that morals do not come to us handed down by God or Nature as Chomsky claims, but are a constant choice made by people over a potentially infinite range. But to assert that the morals don't come from God is not to say that morals are not valuable or worth hav…

Well, after raping countless boys in N. Africa and helping introduce HIV in the continent, I'd say he's IMmoral.

EDIT Add citation: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/4/16/reckoning-with-...

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#205

Post by ars »

LindeBuzoGray wrote: post #110
jebarker wrote: post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think it's obvious that those traits, e.g. not stealing, are universal or part of some fundamental moral grammar. It just means they're common and widespread.

Not stealing, but as I said, stealing from one's friends. Most cultures frown on that.

I can easily imagine a culture where it's only OK to steal from friends. Because a friend would "obviously" be happy for you to have it, but it's not OK to steal from anyone else.

Like how it's OK to prank a friend, but not a stranger - but the friend doesn't actually want to be pranked (i.e. the friend does not want to be stolen from).

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#206

Post by speak_plainly »

fluoridation wrote: post #186
speak_plainly wrote: post #173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a logical contradiction in a simple way: If you assert that 'moral relativism is true' that itself would be a relative claim which would undermine the assertion as a universal position. Further, you end up in a position of equivalence of all claims and generate major contradictions. I will go out on a limb on the universal moral values claim and I think again it's pretty simple: The existence of even the most ba…

>If you assert that 'moral relativism is true' that itself would be a relative claim Would it? If we define "moral absolutism" as "the position that there exist moral statements that are true independently of any observers" then we could define the position of "moral relativism" as its logical negation: "there don't exist moral statements that are true independently of any observers". Is that sentence itself a moral…

So for the first point about 'moral relativism is true' yes it's a meta-ethical statement, but at the same time, logically, you're affirming the set 'moral relativism'.

And the second point, I would argue that 'universal moral values' arise from 'absolute moral values', whatever that might be, if it's even possible to know it.

I also don't think that moral relativism is a logical negation of moral absolutism, more like an opposing view.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#207

Post by [deleted] »

ajuc wrote: post #158
chromoblob wrote: post #106

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hunger is pretty objective if your body isn't malfunctioning (and it never is logically, "malfunctioning" body isn't yours). If your body works correctly, you are not free to choose whether to consider yourself hungry, and this is what I understand as objectivity.

What I consider hunger someone else can consider the norm or vice versa. If you define something that depends on the person as objective - then subjective loses meaning.

[deleted]

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#208

Post by jancsika »

lsy wrote: post #164

It's weird to hear Foucault described as "amoral" when he himself claimed to be a moralist [1]. What is meant by moral relativism in this case I think is merely that morals do not come to us handed down by God or Nature as Chomsky claims, but are a constant choice made by people over a potentially infinite range. But to assert that the morals don't come from God is not to say that morals are not valuable or worth hav…

> What is meant by moral relativism in this case I think is merely that morals do not come to us handed down by God or Nature as Chomsky claims, but are a constant choice made by people over a potentially infinite range.

I didn't get the sense he's saying morals are handed down by nature, rather that the potential range is not infinite.

E.g., consider that research where the primate gets angry and starts rejecting its boring food pellets-- and in fact throwing them at its handler (!)-- because the other primate is consistently receiving all the delicious grapes. We humans surely share and exhibit some similar social behavior. That truth doesn't determine exactly how a culture will conceptualize and enforce a sense of morality. But it does mean some theoretical moral systems just won't work in practice. E.g., history hasn't left us with examples of well-fed kings with no king's guards during famines.

So if you're a radical whose theories rely on humans asblank slates on which infinite moral systems may be applied (after the revolution, probably), you're going to have a bad time in the real world.

Digression: I have no idea how this truism fits in with Chomsky's political ideas about anarcho-syndicalism.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#209

Post by fluoridation »

naasking wrote: post #202
voxl wrote: post #188

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, there are physical facts, most moral relativists are physical realists. But that is also exactly where the moral relativism originates. You _do_ have physical laws, you _do not_ have moral laws. You can _test_ physical laws, you _can not test_ moral laws. Once you axiomatically ordain some set of rules as "moral truths" or some measure of "moral truth" then the physical apparatus comes in, and you get to use it.…

> But that is also exactly where the moral relativism originates. You _do_ have physical laws, you _do not_ have moral laws. You can _test_ physical laws, you _can not test_ moral laws. First, this assumes a very specific kind of moral realism, but does not describe all forms of moral realism. Second, we do just fine testing mathematical laws by checking for consistency without any tests of the sort you're describing…

>Second, we do just fine testing mathematical laws by checking for consistency without any tests of the sort you're describing.

So is there some axiomatic system that can elucidate moral truths, such as the wrongness of stealing, from first principles?

>A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969)

Quickly skimmed through it, but: awful, just awful. I challenge Bambrough to prove to me that I have two hands.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#210

Post by naasking »

nico wrote: post #199
fluoridation wrote: post #186

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>If you assert that 'moral relativism is true' that itself would be a relative claim Would it? If we define "moral absolutism" as "the position that there exist moral statements that are true independently of any observers" then we could define the position of "moral relativism" as its logical negation: "there don't exist moral statements that are true independently of any observers". Is that sentence itself a moral…

> he only truths I can imagine that could meet those requirements would have to be really abstract, like 1+1=2 And that is not even universally or absolutely true, 1+1=2 is a set of symbols that need to be interpreted by someone for them to have meaning, it’s a concept made up by people Hence, 1+1=2 is just as relative as anything else we express through language

> Hence, 1+1=2 is just as relative as anything else we express through language

The symbols are relative, the semantics are not.

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