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Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

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Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#201

Post by davidmurdoch »

khaki54 wrote: post #181

Hahaha I can just imagine finally getting in front of the Google security team in the office, then realize that you don't have a sim ejector. You try a few things like a mechanical pencil, dental pick, jumbo paperclip, etc. that don't quite work. Then asking around, no one has one but someone fortunately has a sewing kit. Meanwhile, the Google engineers, who were skeptical to begin with, show some signs of impatience…

Please publish a blog full of these based-on-a-true-story behind-the scenes tech-drama fiction stories!

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#202

Post by mmun »

khaki54 wrote: post #181

Hahaha I can just imagine finally getting in front of the Google security team in the office, then realize that you don't have a sim ejector. You try a few things like a mechanical pencil, dental pick, jumbo paperclip, etc. that don't quite work. Then asking around, no one has one but someone fortunately has a sewing kit. Meanwhile, the Google engineers, who were skeptical to begin with, show some signs of impatience…

This is the exact vibe I got reading that part.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#203

Post by [deleted] »

wtk wrote: post #199

When chosing a phone there should be a security metric reflecting how much time and money has been spent on security, researches and bug bounty programs. This error looks so trivial! As a long time Google Pixel user, I honestly don't feel the company did a good work protecting me.

[deleted]

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#204

Post by [deleted] »

khaki54 wrote: post #181

Hahaha I can just imagine finally getting in front of the Google security team in the office, then realize that you don't have a sim ejector. You try a few things like a mechanical pencil, dental pick, jumbo paperclip, etc. that don't quite work. Then asking around, no one has one but someone fortunately has a sewing kit. Meanwhile, the Google engineers, who were skeptical to begin with, show some signs of impatience…

[deleted]

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#205

Post by Dylan16807 »

gambiting wrote: post #110
biglearner1day wrote: post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I smell a fair hint of victim blaming here. Why is that a bad thing? You should absolutely blame and hold the victim responsible and accountable for their part.

So let me rephrase my question - what part of the blame should be assigned to the victim here, if their "fault" was buying a phone made and marketed by one of the largest and most well known software developers on the planet? Also, this is an interesting discussion in general. If someone forgets to lock their door and a thief gets in and robs them, do you think it's fair to "blame" the person who forgot to lock their…

I agree that there's not any significantly better phone options, but no I would not place 100% of the blame on the robber. When we're talking about possessions, theft is a reasonably foreseeable consequence and not an outrageous action, so the owner can get a small slice of blame.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#206

Post by erwincoumans »

lrvick wrote: post #135
erwincoumans wrote: post #124

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That sounds like a security issue. Why are disk encryption keys not evicted in sleep mode? Seems like no apps should be running in sleep mode?

It is a major security issue, and one of the reasons people running around with production access on laptops is insane. It is hard to fix this too, because almost no background desktop processes behave well when they are suddenly unable to write to the disk. Even if you solved that, your password manager has keys in memory, your browser has cookies in memory, etc etc.

Mac seems mote secure in sleep:

"If your Mac has the T2 Security Chip (recent Intel-based Macs) or uses an Apple silicon chip (M1 family and future), security is significantly improved. The Secure Enclave in both systems uses encrypted memory, and has exclusive control over FileVault keys. The Intel CPU or the Application processor (M1) never sees the keys, and they are never stored in regular (unencrypted) RAM. Due to this, an attacker would only be able to extract encrypted keys (which can't be decrypted), and only if the system failed to prevent the DMA attack in the first place. These protections make it a lot safer to leave your Mac asleep."

From https://discussions.apple.com/thread/253568420

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#207

Post by onychomys »

noasaservice wrote: post #81

Good reason to not disclose to Google. Instead, you should sell the exploit on the exploit dealers sites. This is easily worth $300-500k But not now. And you have the 'privilege' of being dicked around with people googling you.

Maybe having morals is worth $230k to the author.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#208

Post by Dylan16807 »

endisneigh wrote: post #46
mschuster91 wrote: post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> This was a serious feature deficit viz a viz the relevant iPhone at the time. IIRC, the iPhone uses not just a photo from the selfie cam, but adds infrared to construct a sort-of-3d-ish depth map of your face as well - that is what defeats a simple attempt at unlocking with photos. Now, the really interesting thing to research is if a silicone molded face mask could be used to fool the iPhone into unlocking. Photos…

Won’t work - https://9to5mac.com/2019/12/16/3d-mask/amp/ Muscle movement is also now necessary so it’s pretty difficult to circumvent

That just sounds like you need a proper mask that can be worn. And it doesn't sound like it even needs to fit.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#210

Post by SamBam »

albertzeyer wrote: post #176
kaimalcolm wrote: post #24

Appalling handling on Google’s end here. The duplicate issue part I can understand, but why should it take two reports of a critical vulnerability to take action? Surely when the first one comes through it’s something you jump on, fix and push out ASAP, not give delay to the point where a second user can come along, find the bug, and report it. The refactor that’s mentioned towards the end of the article is great, bu…

You can read in the conversation that Google was not able to reproduce it the first time the bug was submitted: > The same issue was submitted to our program earlier this year, but we were not able to reproduce the vulnerability. When you submitted your report, we were able to identify and reproduce the issue and began developing a fix. I wonder if it really was the same bug or what they did wrong to reproduce it. Or…

Agreed. If the first bug was

> I did something weird after putting in a new PIN, and I was able to access my home screen without my password, but I'm not sure of the exact steps I did

then that's not really a duplicate. If the original bug report doesn't have enough information to recreate the steps, the second one is the only real bug report.

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