I sent an email with a unique link in it to my @Outlook.com account 6hrs ago, and there have been no visits to the link. The email is in my inbox (though I have not opened it).
Does this only happen on opening the email (in the Outlook web ui)?
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I sent an email with a unique link in it to my @Outlook.com account 6hrs ago, and there have been no visits to the link. The email is in my inbox (though I have not opened it).
Does this only happen on opening the email (in the Outlook web ui)?
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This is a common misconception about robots.txt. It tells bots what they should do while directly crawling your site. But if a search engine gets to a URL some other way—for example if it follows a link from somewhere outside your site—it will still index that page. Robots.txt is not a reliable way to exclude pages from search engine indexes. That is not what it is for. It is for controlling crawler behavior. The onl…
> It tells bots what they should do while directly crawling your site. But if a search engine gets to a URL some other way—for example if it follows a link from somewhere outside your site—it will still index that page. I must confess I've been sceptial of robots.txt for a very long time (if I want to stop bots I serve them HTTP 403 Forbidden using .htaccess or similar). Be that as it may, it appears I'm also confuse…
If the crawler does then visit your site, it will see your robots.txt and (if well-behaved) obey it and not crawl the contents of the page at that URL. But this does not mean it will remove the URL itself from its index.
Again: robots.txt is intended to control crawler behavior, not search index visibility.
Google's page is a pretty good overview of this distinction:
https://developers.google.com/search/docs/advanced/robots/in...
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It's not though. Loading the page twice creates two different outcomes. Idempotent endpoints can't. !Idempotent != Reversal of changes
What are the two different outcomes? 1. You open the link once = your account is verified 2. You open the link twice = your account is still verified ???
1. You open the link once = you're logged in
2. You open the link twice = you're presented with an error that the magic link has already been used.
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HTTP GET requests are supposed to be idempotent, meaning that when you call an URL twice it should not lead to any different result compared to calling it once. This is part of the HTTP standard. So while I think what Outlook does here is wrong, what these webpages do is simply a bug that should be fixed and shows a lack of understanding of HTTP.
It's idempotent. Your account won't get un-verified if you open the verification link twice. Idempotent != side-effect free
Request methods are considered "safe" if their defined semantics are essentially read-only; i.e., the client does not request, and does not expect, any state change on the origin server as a result of applying a safe method to a target resource. (RFC 7231, § 4.2.1)
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Wouldn't it be trivial to keep the list of malicious pages locally and not send any data?
If I were designing a system like this, I would not trust clients to perform legitimate analysis nor report legitimate results.
Outlook will only send GET requests, which are idempotent unless you're ignoring the spec. A message saying "this code has already been used" after sending a GET request is a bug. I don't see the problem here, all services need to do is add a page that's says "welcome back, $Username, click here to log in!" that sends a POST request to do any serious confirmation without breaking any specifications. Microsoft claims…
That's a bit of a narrow view on this problem. When sending a link to someone, you expect that someone to view the link. Not some random mail service. Who gave the mail server permission to access the page? What if it contains copyrighted material? What if it's one of the millions of pages which don't follow the HTTP design philosophy to the letter? This is a can of worms.
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“Private links” should be covered by robots.txt. The only case I see this happening is for those “anyone with link” shares and those are easy to cover.
AFAIK, most of those "private" links are actually just "unlisted" but they're still public. I'm sure Bing is indexing those too...
Microsoft does this because they're security scanning / checking all links in every Outlook email for known phishing and malware attacks. If Bing has not seen the web page before and it's not in the Bing dangerous web page index it first needs to check it to make a determination of if it's a phishing/malware page by scanning/indexing it before returning that outcome back to Outlook to flag the email as dangerous.
It is common for corporate email security appliances as well. URLs should not be used for authentication neither should email. I really want to pick brains of people that work on these types of systems to see why they don't think so.
The password only makes this autentication less secure and it's not needed.
I've had to deal with this with e-mail verification links and Auth0. The user clicked the link after getting it in their mailbox but then Auth0 throws up an error page because the e-mail address has already been verified (by Outlook scanning). The problem becomes worse if for some reason the mail ends up in the junk mail folder so the user thinks they've never received the mail but when you check it looks like the e-…
Links like this are stupid regardless of Outlook's behaviour because they require a perfectly reliable client and network and user in a perfectly undisturbed flow. If I can't F5, if I double-click, if my mouse is wonky, my wifi is bad, my power goes out, my computer hangs, my DSL dies just after a click, if I accidentally close the tab.. there are any of a thousand reasons why abusing GET for a one-time-use page or r…
This... was impossible to do, because by long-pressing on iOS to get the Copy prompt, iOS also goes ahead and opens a preview of the link next to it
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I believe the recommended practice is to hover over the URL before clicking the link. If you do so, in Outlook, there will be a pop that shows "Original URL: XXX". This allows users to make a determination for themselves whether the link is safe or not.
We got some security courses about that too. Unfortunately, outlook replaces all of them with some safelink url rewriting, so the only way left to find out if a link is scammy is clicking it.