201–210 of 304 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is already a warrantless search that’s effectively controlled by the government. Obviously there’s enough chaff in the air to prevent that from being legally useful in any way.
Nope. It’s not controlled by the government, and it’s not warrantless, since it is opt-in.
My take on this is that the system is by and large useless. It won't catch anything but the dumbest of dumb criminals, because those who care about CSAM can surely figure out a better way to share images, or find a way to obfuscate their images enough to bypass the system (the lower the false positive rate, the easier it must be to trick the system). So what's left when all the criminals this is supposed to catch hav…
> It won't catch anything but the dumbest of dumb criminals, because those who care about CSAM can surely figure out a better way to share images, or find a way to obfuscate their images enough to bypass the system (the lower the false positive rate, the easier it must be to trick the system). Given the reported numbers of illegal images detected by similar systems within Facebook and Google, I think it is very clear…
My take on this is that the system is by and large useless. It won't catch anything but the dumbest of dumb criminals, because those who care about CSAM can surely figure out a better way to share images, or find a way to obfuscate their images enough to bypass the system (the lower the false positive rate, the easier it must be to trick the system). So what's left when all the criminals this is supposed to catch hav…
My take on this is that the system is by and large useless. It won't catch anything but the dumbest of dumb criminals, because those who care about CSAM can surely figure out a better way to share images, or find a way to obfuscate their images enough to bypass the system (the lower the false positive rate, the easier it must be to trick the system). So what's left when all the criminals this is supposed to catch hav…
Perceptual hashes are only used to reduce the search space for human review. Apple doesn’t have images in the CSAM database to do a comparison, but if it’s just a picture of a door their going to reject it. Also, because human review is an expense Apple’s incentives are to minimize the number of times it happens, thus the requirement for multiple collisions.
Trolls will be able to easily use tools slightly modify ambiguous adult porn to collide with a "known CP hash".
A human reviewer will see a blurry grayscale derivative of adult pornographic content and hit "report" every time.
My take on this is that the system is by and large useless. It won't catch anything but the dumbest of dumb criminals, because those who care about CSAM can surely figure out a better way to share images, or find a way to obfuscate their images enough to bypass the system (the lower the false positive rate, the easier it must be to trick the system). So what's left when all the criminals this is supposed to catch hav…
Yes, because the point is not to protect children. It's to get everyone used to the idea that their content is being monitored. Once that is accomplished, other forms of monitoring can and will be added.
A very relevant point on this entire discourse about Apple’s on-device CSAM scanning: According to the U.S. law, key snippets of which are quoted on the Stratechery blog (by Ben Thompson), Apple isn’t obligated to scan for CSAM. It’s only obligated to act on CSAM if it finds them. While it’s good for Apple to scan on its systems (iCloud) like Facebook, Google and other companies do on their servers, it’s inappropriat…
They say only if they find 30 matching images, they'd act. So if they find 20 or 29 and don't report them, they are actually breaking the law!! I am wondering why they chose that magical number!
Why are exact collisions interesting? They are not intended to be compared exactly. This algorithm doesn't even give exact matches for the same image on different hardware. https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX Note: Neural hash generated here might be a few bits off from one generated on an iOS device. This is expected since different iOS devices generate slightly different hashes anyway. The reason…
Per ATP: Apple will compare hashes of local photos with a national registry of child pornography photos. Once a certain (unknown) threshold is reached, let's say 20 hits, some kind of escalation occurs, with some kind of manual (human) review steps. Accidental Tech Podcast - A Storm of Asterisks https://atp.fm/443 I haven't listened to the follow up episode yet. I still have zero opinion on this photo scanning kerfuf…
At any rate, IANAL, but I'm pretty sure you can't be convicted based on a hash alone. If you get busted for possession of a picture of a nematode and you can show the jury it's just a picture of an axe that has the same value when run through this algorithm, you'll be fine. And there's a decent chance prosecutors won't chase down individuals who will just have a single collision in their photo library with this tech in the first place - people who have dozens or hundreds will be much more interesting.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Presumably, it’s done this way so they can say computers other than your personal device do not scan photos and “look” at decrypted and potentially innocent photos. And technically the original image is never decrypted in iCloud by Apple - if 30 images are flagged they are then able to decrypt the CSAM scan meta data which contains resized thumbnails, for confirmation. In summary, I’m guessing they tried to invent a…
calling resized thumbnails metadata is a bit of a stretch imo. Surely that's just the data, but resized?
A very relevant point on this entire discourse about Apple’s on-device CSAM scanning: According to the U.S. law, key snippets of which are quoted on the Stratechery blog (by Ben Thompson), Apple isn’t obligated to scan for CSAM. It’s only obligated to act on CSAM if it finds them. While it’s good for Apple to scan on its systems (iCloud) like Facebook, Google and other companies do on their servers, it’s inappropriat…
"While it’s good for Apple to scan on its systems (iCloud) like Facebook, Google and other companies do on their servers, it’s inappropriate to do it on individual devices" I would even challenge the justification to do this on servers, unless the data is public. If it's behind a personal login, you might as well consider it personal property/data. I find the distinction of where data is stored not very meaningful. A…
Our major privacy blunder was accepting scanning of private data in any context. The fight should be for the absolute privacy of personal data. Where the scanning happens is mostly irrelevant.