> I'm arguing that it hasn't prevented attacks to a degree that was worth the cost
Ok, but that’s not what you said before,
> (completely forfeiting ownership of personal computers by anyone that wants to participate in group chats with iphone users.)
This is false. There are many group chat programs, that people use cross platform and they are more popular than iMessage.
Nobody if ‘forfeiting ownership’ of anything anyway - that’s just an ideological tautology.
If you you want a platform that can do both iMessage, and install apps without review, then you can use a Mac.
So literally no part of your statement is true.
>Here you admit that significant classes of attack have been prevented.
> I don't think people care whether they lost things on their phone because of malware or because of a fake CA cert, the attack works pretty much the same way and has the same result.
They may not know or care about the technical details but they do care about the risk level, so this is a moot point.
>False. Once a scam has been detected, the developer account can be disabled, which adds cost to new attempts, unlike windows defender.
> You don't need a dev account to distribute malware in dylibs.
No, but you do to distribute it to App Store users.
>> Nope, lots of people knew it was happening for years before Apple actually stopped it and it happens with other libraries still.
>That doesn’t change anything.
> It means the App Store doesn't stop malware before it's able to exfiltrate data from large numbers of users for long periods of time. That's the justification for it.
False. It just means that some apps slip through the protections. It doesn’t say a thing about the ones which are stopped.
This is a repeat of the earlier fallacy: “if the protection doesn’t stop all attacks then we don’t need the protection”, which is obviously not true.