>There has never, at any time, been any reasonable expectation of getting practical, commercial power from magnetic-confinement hot-neutron fusion.
Not true. The existence of privately-funded fusion efforts implies that some people think there is a reasonable expectation, and are willing to put money behind it. This costing study suggests that $2-6/W could be achievable for some fusion concepts[0]. Using some rough calculations, that would translate to $20-60/(MW*hr), which is competitive.
>Any practical fusion plant would have to absolutely huge -- an order of magnitude bigger than the biggest fission plant.
Not necessarily. Fission power plans with low power density have been operated, and may even be desirable from a safety standpoint. The current crop of small modular reactors for fission seems to target power densities in the range of 1-10MW/m^3, rather than the 50-100 MW/m^3 of PWR reactors. This suggests that reduced power density may pay off in terms of reducing the costs associated with risk mitigation (highly redundant systems, large containment structures, etc). Fusion reactors could probably get to the 1-10MW/m^3 range.
> "Break-even" is nowhere near enough to get practical power out
Yes, there's a distinction between 'scientific breakeven' of gain > 1, and 'engineering breakeven' of gain > 10 (ish) which is necessary to have net power output. But we gotta crawl before we can run. It's an important milestone along the way.
>Tokamak fusion research is, first, foremost, and always, a jobs program to maintain a population of high-neutron-flux physicists
Not really -- the high-energy-density plasma physics research (which is not tokamak-related at all) is more relevant in terms of producing people with the skills to work on weapons.
> They need enough billions poured into the project to make it politically self-sustaining, where no amount of failure can ever threaten its funding, because so much has already been sunk that it would be too embarrassing to admit failure.
I'll admit that I see aspects of this, particularly with the failure of NSTX-U & politcally-motivated decision to repair it. However, what I mostly see with the DOE has been trying to get the most of the 'sunk costs' by slowly ramping down the program (ie, not investing in new devices to replace old ones that are shuttered). I suspect that Synakowski's reasoning was: "if a breakthrough happens somewhere around the world, it's worth having a skeleton program in the US that can be ramped up to take advantage of it at that time." Now that Van Dam has taken over, I think we may be seeing more optimism & willingness to invest, particularly if that means partnering with industry (which is trending in Washington).
[0]https://woodruffscientific.com/pdf/ARPAE_Costing_Report_2017...