Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

nytimes.com

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

201–210 of 280 posts

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#201

Post by munchbunny »

krzrak wrote: post #181
01100011 wrote: post #176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your comment makes it sound like you believe there was a single person with nefarious intentions or criminal negligence who chose to put lives at stake in exchange for profits. That is almost certainly not what happened. It is more likely a system of procedures and policies which failed. The company should take the hit, but unless an investigation reveals otherwise, I see no reason a single individual should take the…

> That is almost certainly not what happened. It is more likely a system of procedures and policies which failed. The company should take the hit, but unless an investigation reveals otherwise, I see no reason a single individual should take the blame for all of this. Aren't the insane compensations of executives justified by their "great responsibility"? So I think it makes them eventually responsible for what their…

I heard someone say this and I can't remember who, but it seems very appropriate. One of the key responsibilities of the CEO (and by extension upper management) is to acknowledge reality. When the company is given permission to act on what it already knows, then employees have the right incentives to do the right things and not just the things that won't get them fired.

In that sense, it absolutely is the fault of Boeing management for not acknowledging reality.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#202

Post by 781 »

sirsuki wrote: post #190
tomglynch wrote: post #148

I posted this as a comment the other day in another Boeing and MCAS discussion. In my research into the topic the saddest bit of information I've seen is the image of the black box data for the flight (the first crash): https://i.imgur.com/WJuhjlO.png You can see from the graph that in the final minutes and seconds, the pilot put insane amounts of force on the control column (aka the yoke) to try to pull the plane ou…

If the pilots were putting that much force on the yoke it is pretty apparent that the pilots really truly wanted the plan to do what they asked of it. I am curious what scenarios the designers of the plan drove then to not trust that the human in the seat really has no idea what they are doing. Was the ignoring the wishes of the pilot and attempt to prevent a crazed irresponsible and unlicensed idiot from doing somet…

If it only were that simple. Airbus in particular has a lot of systems which PREVENT the human from doing things.

One plane actually crashed because the prevention system disabled itself and the pilots believed it was still there to protect them from bad actions on their part:

> caused the autopilot to disconnect, after which the crew reacted incorrectly and ultimately caused the aircraft to enter an aerodynamic stall, from which it did not recover

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#203

Post by sorisos »

sirsuki wrote: post #190
tomglynch wrote: post #148

I posted this as a comment the other day in another Boeing and MCAS discussion. In my research into the topic the saddest bit of information I've seen is the image of the black box data for the flight (the first crash): https://i.imgur.com/WJuhjlO.png You can see from the graph that in the final minutes and seconds, the pilot put insane amounts of force on the control column (aka the yoke) to try to pull the plane ou…

If the pilots were putting that much force on the yoke it is pretty apparent that the pilots really truly wanted the plan to do what they asked of it. I am curious what scenarios the designers of the plan drove then to not trust that the human in the seat really has no idea what they are doing. Was the ignoring the wishes of the pilot and attempt to prevent a crazed irresponsible and unlicensed idiot from doing somet…

Perhaps related crash[0] where the autopilot was disabled because it was listening to user input, in this case a child.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593#Accident

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#204

Post by FabHK »

sk5t wrote: post #88
djsumdog wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The sad thing is that we'll probably see this plane fly again by the end of the year, because the millions of dollars in retrofits will still be cheaper than having to scrap all existing planes. We have no idea what other potentially lethal corners have been cut. What if they go back into service, after several months of retrofitting all of them at Boeing maintenance hangers, and then the following year there are two…

In what world is scrapping the airframes due to a (serious) software fault the best and most sensible solution? Do you believe there could be undiagnosed problems with the wings, fuselage, tail, hydraulics, electrics, fueling system, gear, etc.?

I think a better alternative would be to deny it a shared type certification with the prior 737 and requiring recertification (and pilot retraining), thus removing the incentive to use shortcuts.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#205

Post by csours »

keiru wrote: post #128
KaoruAoiShiho wrote: post #105

How would you design your bureaucracy so that this kind of thing can't happen? I see this type of failure all the time in organizations big and small. Sometimes things are just too complex to have an auteur that can understand the entire system and when every department strives to optimize for its specific goal shit can really hit the fan.

Eventually, artificial intelligence. Maybe not in the near future, but as technology progresses and every manufacturer strives to optimize their designs with the latest features, it will become an unsourmountable task to oversee every aspect of it (efficiently). I'm not talking about actively designing, but rather for warning/flagging for potential error. In very complex enterprises like global transport or building…

AI is only as good as its training data and goals/success conditions.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#206

Post by isatty »

obituary_latte wrote: post #194
tomglynch wrote: post #148

I posted this as a comment the other day in another Boeing and MCAS discussion. In my research into the topic the saddest bit of information I've seen is the image of the black box data for the flight (the first crash): https://i.imgur.com/WJuhjlO.png You can see from the graph that in the final minutes and seconds, the pilot put insane amounts of force on the control column (aka the yoke) to try to pull the plane ou…

Direct link to image bypassing imgur’s awful interface: https://i.imgur.com/WJuhjlO_d.jpg?maxwidth=1640&shape=thumb&...

Thank you, forcing everyone onto a landing and wasting loads of data just rendering the garbage page is the worst UX on the planet.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#207

Post by dillonmckay »

sorisos wrote: post #203
sirsuki wrote: post #190

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the pilots were putting that much force on the yoke it is pretty apparent that the pilots really truly wanted the plan to do what they asked of it. I am curious what scenarios the designers of the plan drove then to not trust that the human in the seat really has no idea what they are doing. Was the ignoring the wishes of the pilot and attempt to prevent a crazed irresponsible and unlicensed idiot from doing somet…

Perhaps related crash[0] where the autopilot was disabled because it was listening to user input, in this case a child. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593#Accident

That was interesting and horrific.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#208

Post by mnw21cam »

burfog wrote: post #169
2Ccltvcm wrote: post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can a near-stall condition be detected solely with some combination of GPS, accelerometer, and barometer?

You'll need the air speed and direction. Normally, speed is from a tube aimed into the air. Normally, direction is from a little fin that can spin. There are lots of alternatives: Direction can be via multiple tubes aimed into the air, each with slightly different direction. Speed can be from a hot wire. Weather stations sometimes use this. You can get both via lidar. You just need to make it sensitive enough to pick…

Yay, yet another way to accidentally fry people on the ground if you accidentally switch on the wrong system. Radar already provides a way to do that.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#209

Post by mcny »

chris_wot wrote: post #136
rjzzleep wrote: post #131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Given all the environments I've worked in, including midsize construction projects I'm willing to bet my hand on the fact that some engineers or third party planning bureaus actually did spot these flaws and reported them and then were turned down and ignored, but not before having been told that it's not their decision/problem. That's always the moment when I'm happy to have documented the decisions.

It’s what happened at NASA...

Just to be clear, are you referring to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linda_Ham ?

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#210

Post by sago »

781 wrote: post #202
sirsuki wrote: post #190

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the pilots were putting that much force on the yoke it is pretty apparent that the pilots really truly wanted the plan to do what they asked of it. I am curious what scenarios the designers of the plan drove then to not trust that the human in the seat really has no idea what they are doing. Was the ignoring the wishes of the pilot and attempt to prevent a crazed irresponsible and unlicensed idiot from doing somet…

If it only were that simple. Airbus in particular has a lot of systems which PREVENT the human from doing things. One plane actually crashed because the prevention system disabled itself and the pilots believed it was still there to protect them from bad actions on their part: > caused the autopilot to disconnect, after which the crew reacted incorrectly and ultimately caused the aircraft to enter an aerodynamic stal…

It seems a bit rough that you're getting downvotes. [Edit: The parent was grey when I wrote this].

AF447 seems like a pretty important case study for figuring out where to put the balance of trust. Along with the very final stage of Aeroflot 593 (after the child had left the seat), also mentioned.

There's a few more: Colgan Air 3407, AirAsia 8501, Korean 501, etc, where flight crew ignored or overrode systems. Which is not to deny that in the majority of cases the flight crew are the best judge of what is needed, just that one surely has to look critically and honestly at counter examples.

There is of course also Germanwings 9525, though as the GP implies, systems protecting against malicious piloting will probably be counter-productive.

Post reply on HN