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Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

sandervenema.ch

201–210 of 350 posts

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#201

Redphone component. I don't know why it's closed source. It's been suggested elsewhere in this thread that it was potentially IP issues they kept it closed for. Is it possible loose US CALEA law interpretation influences the reasoning? Or a gag? I honestly don't know why they chose to do that but I wanted to comment in to see if a lawyer or someone from the project could hint at the reasoning.

https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/tree/master...

This is the client component. The blog post and your parent were referring to the server component.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#202
post #146

funny enough, I was going to try out Signal today but stopped right after seeing the permissions they request: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CwhFsLzXcAIDcMH.jpg:large

Well, everything is there for a good reason. (Though it escapes me right now why it needs permission to access the calendar.) How are you going to call someone over Signal if Signal can't use the microphone? If in doubt you can always check the source code – it's open source for exactly that reason.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#203

I highly recommend Conversations (disclaimer: I've worked on it in the past, although I'm not a project "member" per say): https://conversations.im/ It's open source, uses a federated, open protocol, and can do multiple types of encryption including OTR and OMEMO (an XMPP wire format that uses the Axolotl ratched devised for signal). It does not do VoIP, so it would just be for chat (although there is a large bounty…

I think Conversations is probably getting a lot right, but you also mention its biggest flaw:

> do multiple types of encryption including OTR and OMEMO

Oh and it can also do something else: no encryption at all. That's the problem with XMPP: The user is faced with three different encryption modes, none of them is the default.

There shouldn't be multiple types of optional encryption. There should be one that works and is enabled by default.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#204
post #115
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree overwhelmingly with what you wrote, except that I want to point out that this isn't "crypto-puritanism". It's just hipsterism. The author isn't a cryptographer, and if you asked a panel of 10 cryptographic engineers what messaging system they'd recommend, 9 of them would say "Signal". The 10th wants you to use something else because they're working on an attack for that "something else", and want their paper…

Plus the complaint about giphy seems to completely miss the point that the more 'random messaging users' Signal attracts the better from a POV of deniability/etc.

Although the masking effect may be useful, my immediate thought was how much extra code and buffer overflows had been added to the client. Android doesn't have any sandbox mechanism like pnacl to contain such code.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#205
From the post:

"The Google Cloud Messaging service basically handles message handling from/to the user’s devices to the Signal servers. The GCM service then handles all the aspects of queueing all messages and delivery from/to users."

This is not true. Messages are delivered via Signal's own servers only. GCM messages are empty; their only purpose is to wake up your device. [1]

"The phone component of Signal is called RedPhone. The server component of this is unfortunately not open source [...] this is also probably the reason why secure encrypted phone calls don’t work in e.g. LibreSignal"

No. The reason for that is that the signaling for RedPhone calls is currently still done via GCM and not via Signal's own message transport.

Regarding microg: I've never heard of the need to re-compile kernels for that. I think most people use it with Xposed (admittedly, a giant hack, but it works).

[1] https://whispersystems.org/blog/goodbye-encrypted-sms/

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#206

From the post: " The Google Cloud Messaging service basically handles message handling from/to the user’s devices to the Signal servers. The GCM service then handles all the aspects of queueing all messages and delivery from/to users. " This is not true. Messages are delivered via Signal's own servers only. GCM messages are empty; their only purpose is to wake up your device. [1] " The phone component of Signal is ca…

Hmm. You seem to be right. Article corrected there to reflect that Signal is using empty GCM messages. I must have still had the old situation of TextSecure in my head when I wrote that. Nice to know re the reason Redphone doesn't work, thanks for that insight!

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#207

If they are only using GCM as a queue (and the messages are themselves encrypted) I don't understand what the problem is. They could use anyone for that functionality. Even if the messages are given to an "adversary" what can they really get from that? Your phone app contacted the signal servers. That's really it.

They're not even using it as a queue, they're queueing and delivering the messages themselves. GCM messages are empty and are only used to wake up your device.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#208

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not a cryptographer. I .. am reasonably sure that no one would take me for a hipster. But two issues - or call it 'differences in opinion' - in that article are relevant for me: The inability to use the service without a mobile number and federation. I understand the rationale behind the former ("It's easier"), but I don't understand why it is mandatory. I could've been 1283783127356128531312 on Signal and option…

Signal and Telegram are not the same thing. Telegram has, according to Reuters, been actively compromised by people working for oppressive regimes (Iran, in particular). If you're just using a secure messenger on general principles, it doesn't matter much which one you use. Probably WhatsApp is your best choice. But if you actually need secure messaging, you should be using the safest secure messenger. Since we don't…

> Telegram has, according to Reuters, been actively compromised by people working for oppressive regimes (Iran, in particular).

I just wanted to add some details: someone checked the Iranian phone numbers range at Telegram servers and learned which of them are registred with Telegram. Message contents or contact lists were not obtained.

I guess this attack could be done with other apps that use phone numbers and phone contact lists for identification.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#209
post #48

Hmm... he mentions the Giphy thing at the beginning of the article, then never again. The Giphy mention seemed really dangerous to me. Now I don't use Signal but I imagine it's 1) optional and 2) requests are proxified/anonimised through an intermediary (the Signal servers in this case). And why is this dangerous? Because this "don't build cool stuff on this serious app" is what makes people not use the app. It's cre…

Hi there! The Giphy thing is what set me off writing the blog post in the first place. Maybe I should've expanded a bit more on that in the article. As far as I can tell, the idea is that requests to the Giphy API gets proxied through Signal. I don't see anything in moxie's blog post about whether this is optional. If it isn't and it's sending everything you type to the Giphy API then we have a whole new problem. In…

I promise that nobody is going to force you to use the GIF search. For a demo on how this feature works, check out the short video embedded into the blog post. [1]

I second the parent poster's question: "why is this dangerous?"

[1] https://whispersystems.org/blog/images/giphy.webm

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