Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can use unique password stored in the protected system storage (like OS X Keychain) so at least user is protected from non-root users.
shouldn't that protection already exist just in the file permissions of the cookie storage? this doesn't really protect much from other users since other users don't have access to the file in the first place, and doesn't protect from the user that owns the browser process. which is probably why the bug still exists, adding a randomly generated key only adds another easily passable obstacle
Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
21–30 of 59 posts
Re: Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
#22This is misleading. If you follow the links to the Chromium bug tracker, you'll note that Chrome integrates with the GNOME and KDE encrypted password managers when they're available. If they're not, it falls back to storing passwords itself with obfuscation, which is the best it can do. (On Windows and OS X, it uses CryptProtectData and the Keychain API, respectively.) https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxPas…
Here's a question: why isn't there a de facto desktop independent password/key/secret manager for Linux? The Linux kernel has userland crypto apis built-in, why aren't we using them? At most, only the manager/permissions UI should be desktop dependent.
Re: Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
Here's a question: why isn't there a de facto desktop independent password/key/secret manager for Linux? The Linux kernel has userland crypto apis built-in, why aren't we using them? At most, only the manager/permissions UI should be desktop dependent.
There is- it's called libsecret, and it's used as a cross-platform backend for both the Gnome & KDE secret managers, which are 'just' guis for it. I don't actually know if it uses the Linux kernel's apis, but it's supposed to do a pretty good job.
Re: Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
#24This is misleading. If you follow the links to the Chromium bug tracker, you'll note that Chrome integrates with the GNOME and KDE encrypted password managers when they're available. If they're not, it falls back to storing passwords itself with obfuscation, which is the best it can do. (On Windows and OS X, it uses CryptProtectData and the Keychain API, respectively.) https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxPas…
Here's a question: why isn't there a de facto desktop independent password/key/secret manager for Linux? The Linux kernel has userland crypto apis built-in, why aren't we using them? At most, only the manager/permissions UI should be desktop dependent.
There's so many blurry lines there. I agree that a secret store is best done as a system level service, but it's so hard to standardize on one api, and yet so easy for a shitty one to become de facto (I.e. X.org).
Re: Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
#25This is misleading. If you follow the links to the Chromium bug tracker, you'll note that Chrome integrates with the GNOME and KDE encrypted password managers when they're available. If they're not, it falls back to storing passwords itself with obfuscation, which is the best it can do. (On Windows and OS X, it uses CryptProtectData and the Keychain API, respectively.) https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxPas…
But yeah, it pretty much looks for any sort of secure credential manager and falls back to the fixed key only when nothing is available.
Re: Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
There is- it's called libsecret, and it's used as a cross-platform backend for both the Gnome & KDE secret managers, which are 'just' guis for it. I don't actually know if it uses the Linux kernel's apis, but it's supposed to do a pretty good job.
KWallet in KDE4 doesn't seem to be using libsecret. Is this a KDE 5.x thing?
Re: Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
#27Re: Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
#28I guess a lot of others are also wondering, "What's the point?" If an attacker can read the file the cookies are stored in, you have already lost. It even mentions "obfuscation" - which might be a slight obstacle if this was closed-source - but Chromium is open-source.
Re: Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
#29This is misleading. If you follow the links to the Chromium bug tracker, you'll note that Chrome integrates with the GNOME and KDE encrypted password managers when they're available. If they're not, it falls back to storing passwords itself with obfuscation, which is the best it can do. (On Windows and OS X, it uses CryptProtectData and the Keychain API, respectively.) https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxPas…
Here's a question: why isn't there a de facto desktop independent password/key/secret manager for Linux? The Linux kernel has userland crypto apis built-in, why aren't we using them? At most, only the manager/permissions UI should be desktop dependent.
Re: Key for chromium's encrypted cookies store in Linux is “peanuts”
#30This is misleading. If you follow the links to the Chromium bug tracker, you'll note that Chrome integrates with the GNOME and KDE encrypted password managers when they're available. If they're not, it falls back to storing passwords itself with obfuscation, which is the best it can do. (On Windows and OS X, it uses CryptProtectData and the Keychain API, respectively.) https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxPas…
I wonder how many people are using KDE or Gnome these days. I'm pretty sure I'm using something other than KDE and Gnome on my Linux installs.
Just over half of those participating have installed Gnome/KDE/Cinnamon
https://qa.debian.org/popcon-graph.php?packages=gnome-shell%...
And it looks as if about a quarter totally are using Gnome/KDE/Cinnamon regularity (rest could be switched off of course!)
https://qa.debian.org/popcon-graph.php?packages=gnome-shell%...
Popcon statistics are notoriously hard to interpret though so a large pinch of salt needed.