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A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

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Re: A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

#21
post #3

I read the PDFs of #39132 and #51179, and first, these are very clear and well written vulnerability reports. Props to the author for that, many times these reports can be extremely hard to follow and these are shining examples to the contrary. I found them easy to follow, enough details to reproduce, and quite valid issues. Second, I'll put my neck out here a bit and say, I find myself agreeing with the author's sta…

Well, they did say "no, we need more time, please don't disclose this" on the iOS auth bug. The author's response was to wait 90 days and then disclose it without waiting for the go-ahead. Is this SOP in security circles? It's certainly unusual in non-security interactions.

Re: A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

#22
post #3

I read the PDFs of #39132 and #51179, and first, these are very clear and well written vulnerability reports. Props to the author for that, many times these reports can be extremely hard to follow and these are shining examples to the contrary. I found them easy to follow, enough details to reproduce, and quite valid issues. Second, I'll put my neck out here a bit and say, I find myself agreeing with the author's sta…

I was banned from reporting any bugs to the Slack Bug Bounty program on the HackerOne platform after reporting the 3rd bug. What's worse is that I wasn't even notified of this? Even HackerOne didn't think it was necessary to do that.

What a wonderful reward for your service.

Re: A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

#23
post #3

I read the PDFs of #39132 and #51179, and first, these are very clear and well written vulnerability reports. Props to the author for that, many times these reports can be extremely hard to follow and these are shining examples to the contrary. I found them easy to follow, enough details to reproduce, and quite valid issues. Second, I'll put my neck out here a bit and say, I find myself agreeing with the author's sta…

I was banned from reporting any bugs to the Slack Bug Bounty program on the HackerOne platform after reporting the 3rd bug. What's worse is that I wasn't even notified of this? Even HackerOne didn't think it was necessary to do that.

Does this mean you should do immediate public disclosure when you find bugs now?

Re: A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

#24
post #3

I read the PDFs of #39132 and #51179, and first, these are very clear and well written vulnerability reports. Props to the author for that, many times these reports can be extremely hard to follow and these are shining examples to the contrary. I found them easy to follow, enough details to reproduce, and quite valid issues. Second, I'll put my neck out here a bit and say, I find myself agreeing with the author's sta…

I was banned from reporting any bugs to the Slack Bug Bounty program on the HackerOne platform after reporting the 3rd bug. What's worse is that I wasn't even notified of this? Even HackerOne didn't think it was necessary to do that.

I guess that means that you will be forced to publicly disclose any more vulnerabilities that you find... /s

Re: A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

#25
post #21
post #3

I read the PDFs of #39132 and #51179, and first, these are very clear and well written vulnerability reports. Props to the author for that, many times these reports can be extremely hard to follow and these are shining examples to the contrary. I found them easy to follow, enough details to reproduce, and quite valid issues. Second, I'll put my neck out here a bit and say, I find myself agreeing with the author's sta…

Well, they did say "no, we need more time, please don't disclose this" on the iOS auth bug. The author's response was to wait 90 days and then disclose it without waiting for the go-ahead. Is this SOP in security circles? It's certainly unusual in non-security interactions.

"Disclosure deadlines have long been an industry standard practice. They improve end-user security by getting security patches to users faster." http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/02/feedback-and-d...

"Vulnerabilities reported to the CERT/CC will be disclosed to the public 45 days after the initial report, regardless of the existence or availability of patches or workarounds from affected vendors. " https://www.cert.org/vulnerability-analysis/vul-disclosure.c...

Re: A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

#26
post #21
post #3

I read the PDFs of #39132 and #51179, and first, these are very clear and well written vulnerability reports. Props to the author for that, many times these reports can be extremely hard to follow and these are shining examples to the contrary. I found them easy to follow, enough details to reproduce, and quite valid issues. Second, I'll put my neck out here a bit and say, I find myself agreeing with the author's sta…

Well, they did say "no, we need more time, please don't disclose this" on the iOS auth bug. The author's response was to wait 90 days and then disclose it without waiting for the go-ahead. Is this SOP in security circles? It's certainly unusual in non-security interactions.

No, the author's response was to contact them again to get a status, get no response, then disclose after 90 days, all while informing them multiple times of the imminent disclosure.

It's great that they said they needed more time, but they completely dropped the ball on that communication chain, and got more than enough chances to ask him to wait.

Re: A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

#27

I'm currently in charge of answering reporters on a HackerOne program and I can tell that the way Slack is managing its own is completely unacceptable. Those reports were really high quality ones, whenever I receive a report like that I cry of joy. If you run a bounty program you should: - Be ready to answer every single report on a short timeframe - Be fair and provide feedback to the reporter - Be nice, be thankful…

Good stuff. The general guidance we put in front of folks at bugcrowd:

Its important to note up front that Bugcrowd programs differentiate between technical validity and rewardability, in order to maintain fairness to researchers and organizations alike. This means our customers only pay for issues with impact to them and researchers get solid technical feedback about their submissions.

We’ve found it is not uncommon to have a submission that is technically an issue, but lacks the impact necessary to reward it. In other words, it’s an ‘acceptable risk’ to the organization. Conversely, we’ve handled situations where features were ‘as ­designed’, but turned out to be major security flaws that were fixed. This process has helped our customers determine what to do in those cases. If you’re thinking about starting a program, we’d encourage you to differentiate between these concepts as well.

The Golden Rule(s): If you touch code or configuration because of the submission, reward the researcher. Here’s the detailed process:

1. Does the submission adhere to the terms and conditions? If not, mark as invalid and explain.

2. Was the submission communicated as an exception in the program brief? If so, mark as invalid and explain.

3. Has the submission, or its root cause been reported previously? Duplicates can and should be traced back to the code or configuration change that would resolve the issue. If that change has already been made, is in the queue to be made, or has been accepted as a risk, mark the issue as a duplicate and explain.

4. Is the submission technically reproducible? If not, mark as invalid and ask for clarification if you think it has technical merit. If so, it should be communicated as valid and you can move to determining the reward.

5. Will it cause you to make a code or configuration change now, or in the future? If so, it’s rewardable within the terms specified in your bounty brief. Issues with more impact should be rewarded at a higher level. Additionally, if it’s noted in the focus areas for the bounty, it’s worth more. If it does NOT cause you to make a code or configuration change, then provide reasoning to the submitter, and to the extent possible, push it to the brief as an exclusion for future testers.

It’s very important to consider the work of the researcher in step 5... If you think of other areas in the target that are impacted, or your security posture has been improved by discussion from the submission, we encourage you to reward it. If you’re on the fence, push the submission back to the researcher and ask for more information or how they view the impact. Remember, the researcher put effort into finding it for you, and it’s in your benefit to work closely with them and encourage them to go further.

The Golden Rule, transparency about your choices, and proactive communication should guide your judgement at all times.

Re: A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

#28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I was banned from reporting any bugs to the Slack Bug Bounty program on the HackerOne platform after reporting the 3rd bug. What's worse is that I wasn't even notified of this? Even HackerOne didn't think it was necessary to do that.

I guess that means that you will be forced to publicly disclose any more vulnerabilities that you find... /s

Why the sarcasm? That's exactly what this means.

Re: A little note about Slack’s Bug Bounty program

#29
I was awarded for a big bounty for finding a big hole last summer (and it is a BIG one). I had a pleasant experience. Maybe the folks who were managing the program are gone. But it is sad to see that some people had negative experience.

In general, Slack is full of security holes, if you look at the number of bounty awarded. On the other hand it's great they do pay people for finding security bugs. I just hope they can tighten up the code and run more security checks before deploying to production...

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