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The knowledge argument

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21–30 of 55 posts

Re: The knowledge argument

#21
What grounds are there for excluding "how the knowing subject that is an emergent property of the matter of the brain experiences colour" from "all knowledge about colour"?

fenomas correctly points out the argument is begging the question based on the I've raised here, but the argument is even more deeply flawed than that because it assumes that "knowledge" is a thing rather than an activity of a knowing subject.

If you take the epistemology of a knowing subject seriously then knowing is an activity of the subject, with the ontology of an action rather than a thing. Activities are not conserved in the way things are. It is easy to slip past what "know everything there is to know" means when we assume (incorrectly) that knowledge is thing-like: we can image books full of sentences that exhaustively list laws and properties. One might say that if Mary knows Maxwell's equations and a long list of information about matter she might "know everything", but considered as an action, to "know everything" means "to be able to have any thought that anyone might be able to have about the thing", or something similar.

From this, we can immediately draw an important inference: Mary is not a human being, so this is not an argument about human beings. Not even in the wildest philosopher's imagination could any human being be able to have every thought about light that could be had. There are no-doubt "single thoughts" of such enormous length and complexity that they could not be fit into a human lifetime. And because the actions of the mind are serial (mostly) rather than parallel, the absurdity of the proposition that we can "know everything there is to know" is revealed. Human life is simply too finite for it.

Any expert will attest to this: no matter how much we learn, with ongoing experience there is always more.

So like all imaginary arguments, the primary purpose of this one is to mislead us about the subject. It isn't about human beings or human knowledge. It is about some other kind of being, unrelated to humanity. Which I guess might be interesting if you're in to that kind of thing, but personally I'd rather spend my time focused on the world that exists, not the world of some philosopher's imagination.

If the argument were honestly stated it becomes a tautology:

"Imagine a knowing subject that is capable of thinking every thought about a given subject, which necessarily includes all the thoughts a knowing subject might have when it physically interacts with the material reality the subject describes (otherwise it wouldn't be able to think every thought about the subject). Is such a knowing subject capable of knowing the thoughts a knowing subject might have when it physically interacts with the material reality the subject describes?"

Re: The knowledge argument

#22
post #15

I don't understand how the thought experiment isn't simply begging the question. It states in its premises that (A) Mary already has all physical knowledge and (B) she later gains new knowledge. If the conclusion (that not all knowledge is physical) wasn't true, the premises could not be consistent. Am I missing something obvious? Why should we accept that the conclusion is true, rather than discarding one of the pre…

This seems to be more about a limitation of language than a problem with the logic. Using "knowledge" in both premises looks clumsy. But looking at it purely conceptually, where Mary would intellectually understand the complete theory in the B&W room, and then gain new experiential insight when leaving the room, it seems to at least prove that experiential knowledge is inherently different than theoretical knowledge.

That's more what confuses me about the structure of this argument, though - I would take the experiential insight to be more "physical". So I still don't understand what they mean by physicalism.

Re: The knowledge argument

#23
post #15

I don't understand how the thought experiment isn't simply begging the question. It states in its premises that (A) Mary already has all physical knowledge and (B) she later gains new knowledge. If the conclusion (that not all knowledge is physical) wasn't true, the premises could not be consistent. Am I missing something obvious? Why should we accept that the conclusion is true, rather than discarding one of the pre…

That's exactly the point - she has all physical information. If you could show that some piece of information fits the definition of "physical information", then it's assumed that Mary has it, and someone defending the knowledge argument would have to agree.

The point is that even IF you give Mary all that information, she's still missing some information. Then, that information must not be physical information. More to the point, there's a difference between the points you presented: In (A), you say Mary has all _physical_ knowledge (Jackson uses the word information, but the difference is unimportant). In (B), you note that she gets new _knowledge_. It follows that this knowledge must be non-physical, since we assumed that she had all physical knowledge, and yet, she didn't have this new knowledge.

Re: The knowledge argument

#24
To everyone insisting that the argument is silly: while in this particular case I do disagree with the conclusion, I'd encourage you to pause for a moment before dismissing it. I often find that when I approach philosophical theories with too critical a mindset, I dismiss it too quickly, and, if I spend the time afterwrd, find the issue more complicated than it appeared at first. It's something like being posed a coding problem, going "Oh, that's simple!", and then discovering later that the problem, is, in fact, quite complex.

On the topic of philosophy, in general, though, Bertrand Russell says it better than I can: "Two things are to be remembered: that a man whose opinions and theories are worth studying may be presumed to have had some intelligence, but that no man is likely to have arrived at complete and final truth on any subject whatever. When an intelligent man expresses a view which seems to us obviously absurd, we should not attempt to prove that it is somehow true, but we should try to understand how it ever came to seem true. This exercise of historical and psychological imagination at once enlarges the scope of our thinking, and helps us to realize how foolish many of our own cherished prejudices will seem to an age which has a different temper of mind."

Re: The knowledge argument

#25
post #15

I don't understand how the thought experiment isn't simply begging the question. It states in its premises that (A) Mary already has all physical knowledge and (B) she later gains new knowledge. If the conclusion (that not all knowledge is physical) wasn't true, the premises could not be consistent. Am I missing something obvious? Why should we accept that the conclusion is true, rather than discarding one of the pre…

That's exactly the point - she has all physical information. If you could show that some piece of information fits the definition of "physical information", then it's assumed that Mary has it, and someone defending the knowledge argument would have to agree. The point is that even IF you give Mary all that information, she's still missing some information. Then, that information must not be physical information. More…

But this looks identical to the "immovable object vs. unstoppable object" paradox. It presupposes something that doesn't actually exist.

Experience is information. It doesn't make sense to imagine a situation in which she has all the information about a thing, except experience. Either she has all of the information about it, or she doesn't.

Re: The knowledge argument

#26
Mary's Room is a thought experiment that attempts to establish that there are non-physical properties and attainable knowledge that can be discovered only through conscious experience.

From the beginning the argument pre-supposes there is objective knowledge that can learnt. As we know from relativity and quantum theory, there is no objective truth. The location of every atom, cell or neuron is unique to every observer.

Reading the RGB encoding of a photo, one number at a time, compared to seeing the photo with your own eyes, are different experiences. Imagine if each of our senses are different dimensions of perception, different ways of learning knowledge (reading about color through a book vs experiencing color with eyes) are orthogonal to each other. You can only connect those experiences and imagine colours after you've experienced it with your own eyes - your brain can "fake" perceptions, but only after having experienced the same kind of perception previously.

This blind man regained vision at 68:

When he went to the corner store with his sister, he handed the cashier a $10 bill when he really should have handed a $5 bill...The idea of remembering things visually is hard as well, and he still resorts to touching and feeling the world around him to store those memories. Of course while blind he'd been able to differentiate between $5 and a $10, but once he's regained his vision the touch-knowledge isn't connected to his vision-knowledge immediately. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2382619/Canadian-man...

Knowing how neurone in our brains work is different to having those neurons interacting with each other.

I argue "knowledge", if exists, can be interpreted only through the filter of qualia. No human knows anything without experience. Even reading a page of C code can only be done through our eyes and our mind and compared through previous experience in reading the same. Our minds are qualia, period.

As this was a philosophical argument I'll post a poem from a philosopher.

    Thus Something and Nothing produce each other; 
    The difficult and the easy complement each other; 
    The long and the short off-set each other; 
    The high and the low incline towards each other; 
    Note and sound harmonize with each other; 
    Before and after follow each other.
http://wengu.tartarie.com/wg/wengu.php?m=NOzh&l=Daodejing&no...

With your babel fish you listen to an alien recording "A tall being and a short being once stood here". You wonder, having never met or seen any sign of aliens besides this audio recording, how tall and how short were those beings?

Re: The knowledge argument

#27
post #15

I don't understand how the thought experiment isn't simply begging the question. It states in its premises that (A) Mary already has all physical knowledge and (B) she later gains new knowledge. If the conclusion (that not all knowledge is physical) wasn't true, the premises could not be consistent. Am I missing something obvious? Why should we accept that the conclusion is true, rather than discarding one of the pre…

This seems to be more about a limitation of language than a problem with the logic. Using "knowledge" in both premises looks clumsy. But looking at it purely conceptually, where Mary would intellectually understand the complete theory in the B&W room, and then gain new experiential insight when leaving the room, it seems to at least prove that experiential knowledge is inherently different than theoretical knowledge.…

If Mary only knows about colours "intellectually" then she might be a SHRDLU for colour, knowing the calculations of blocks symbolically but not knowing blocks and gravity, having never experienced it. http://hci.stanford.edu/winograd/shrdlu/

Re: The knowledge argument

#28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's exactly the point - she has all physical information. If you could show that some piece of information fits the definition of "physical information", then it's assumed that Mary has it, and someone defending the knowledge argument would have to agree. The point is that even IF you give Mary all that information, she's still missing some information. Then, that information must not be physical information. More…

But this looks identical to the "immovable object vs. unstoppable object" paradox. It presupposes something that doesn't actually exist. Experience is information. It doesn't make sense to imagine a situation in which she has all the information about a thing, except experience. Either she has all of the information about it, or she doesn't.

Let's take the claim "experience is information" to be true (I've yet to find a reasonable definition of "information", so I agree).

Jackson's point here is specifically to show that there are at least two kinds of information: physical information, and information that is not physical. Bearing that in mind, what do you mean by: > "Either she has all of the information about it, or she doesn't."

Re: The knowledge argument

#29
Can someone explain why the whole thing isn't simply the abuse of the universal quantifier? It SOUNDS like there are two "alls" here - ALL[0] is a proper subset of ALL[1].

If set theory is an obscene tool for this subject, I promise to rend my garment and heap ashes on my head. But only in an aphysical manner...

Re: The knowledge argument

#30
post #15

I don't understand how the thought experiment isn't simply begging the question. It states in its premises that (A) Mary already has all physical knowledge and (B) she later gains new knowledge. If the conclusion (that not all knowledge is physical) wasn't true, the premises could not be consistent. Am I missing something obvious? Why should we accept that the conclusion is true, rather than discarding one of the pre…

If Mary is never allowed to actually see the colour of objects in her room, she is being deprived of a physical fact regarding colour vision, and premise 1 doesn't stand. Put another way, how is Mary's later epiphany to be induced in her but by physical means? She must physically experience (photons in eyeballs) colour.
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