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A plastic card for easy to remember strong passwords

qwertycards.com

21–30 of 110 posts

Re: A plastic card for easy to remember strong passwords

#21
post #18

Except it's not going to work, because of the bank who doesn't allow '(' as a special character, or the ticket website that requires at least 3 digits, or the financial firm who only allows 8 character passwords. As soon as you have a few sites with 'rogue' password policies, the system breaks down.

There are ways around it: using the code for the key directly north-west of the problematic character, and if that's a bad character go further, maybe wrap around, or try to follow through the problem character (a/& -> &/| -> |/f, thus f would be the code for a) etc.

As for remembering which sites have what restrictions, I can keep that stuff in my head (looking at you Microsoft), but I guess you may have more accounts than me. Then again, when a password fails, then all you'd have to do is retry with a safer version (and maybe only have two password kinds, for convenience - full-blown char support, and minimalistic lowercase-letters only, so you'd only have to retry a single time after the first failed login).

Personally, my biggest problem with this card is that it doesn't provide enough value.

Re: A plastic card for easy to remember strong passwords

#22
post #7

This is a substitution cipher and it's not very secure. Consider what we can do if we compromise the Amazon password that's given as an example on the website: sh(/J3HqAfQsu..u.rqf Since the password came from Amazon, we know that the last 6 characters are "Amazon," which tells us that: . = A u = M r = Z q = O f = N Now we can start attacking the codeword, which are the characters between the 8-character "space bar c…

This sort of objection is raised whenever basically any mechanism for remembering strong passwords is presented. Much like many results in computational complexity, worst-case results are not necessarily indicative of real-world utility. To wit, in the scenario you outlined the attacker must a) know beforehand that the target was using this device; b) know beforehand that the inserted middle portion was vulnerable to…

[deleted]

Re: A plastic card for easy to remember strong passwords

#27
Some of us have even made do with variations on the "Old School Tabula recta": http://lifehacker.com/5715794/how-to-write-down-and-encrypt-...

"If I'm logging into Amazon I'll find the intersection of column M and row A (the second and third letters of Amazon) and then read off diagonally 16 characters."

Re: A plastic card for easy to remember strong passwords

#28
Sadly this is still a fail - I have found numerous sites whose fatuous restrictions on what are or are not legal entries include banning punctuation, never ending in a letter and more.

This seems an amusing and useful idea to making passwords - it's usability seems longer lived than my previous (personal) attempts (md5 hashing passwords and domain names).

In the end I need a trustable approach to storing encrypted data on my iphone - I suspect i have missed one. Any ideas?

Re: A plastic card for easy to remember strong passwords

#29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just use random words. Memorable passwords don’t have to be weak. Five random common english words are already very strong. Just make sure you don’t pick the words by hand.

https://github.com/resonantcore/lib/blob/master/js/diceware/... https://github.com/resonantcore/lib/blob/master/demo/dicewar... Run this locally, e.g. dw = new Diceware(); dw.load("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/resonantcore/lib/master/js/diceware/diceware.wordlist.asc", function() { console.log("Diceware loaded!"); }); console.log(dw.getWords(8).join(' '));

If you're on linux you can usually just do:

    shuf -n 5 /usr/share/dict/words
On Mac OS X you need coreutils for shuf, which you can get from brew (it's called gshuf once installed).

Re: A plastic card for easy to remember strong passwords

#30
post #7

This is a substitution cipher and it's not very secure. Consider what we can do if we compromise the Amazon password that's given as an example on the website: sh(/J3HqAfQsu..u.rqf Since the password came from Amazon, we know that the last 6 characters are "Amazon," which tells us that: . = A u = M r = Z q = O f = N Now we can start attacking the codeword, which are the characters between the 8-character "space bar c…

This sort of objection is raised whenever basically any mechanism for remembering strong passwords is presented. Much like many results in computational complexity, worst-case results are not necessarily indicative of real-world utility. To wit, in the scenario you outlined the attacker must a) know beforehand that the target was using this device; b) know beforehand that the inserted middle portion was vulnerable to…

> This sort of objection is raised whenever basically any mechanism for remembering strong passwords is presented.

Yes, because we've basically realized that memorizing passwords isn't a workable solution. We should be recommending password managers that generate/store strong passwords and MFA for any account that needs to be secure. That these password generators themselves can now be unlocked using both memorized information and biometrics (TouchID and such) makes them all the more secure.

Moreover, this is the only solution that's capable of dealing with all the asinine password requirements that get imposed on users...solutions like this card fail hard when the password requirements prohibit certain characters and/or other characteristics of these passwords (repeated characters, length, etc.) Until the world gets together and standardizes what constitutes a secure password, memorized passwords will always be a flawed solution.

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