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TXT Record XSS

who.is

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Re: TXT Record XSS

#21
post #3

Clever. I didn't get it at first. Never trust user input. Edit: See http://www.dnswatch.info/dns/dnslookup?la=en&host=jamiehanki... for the actual code.

> Never trust user input. Never trust any input. I think this is a case where people assume that is isn't pure user input because is would have already been parsed/checked/verified. "Oh, its in the DNS system so it must be safe" is worse then "well, it came from our database so it should be fine". Don't even trust something coming out of your own database. You never know what various input checking bugs might have ac…

This is only too true! At work we do CRUD projects, which means user input gets stored in the database. I almost always break other people's work by adding HTML tags to the inputs, navigating back to the page, and seeing markup that shouldn't be there. Even database output needs to be sanitized

Re: TXT Record XSS

#24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Never trust user input. Never trust any input. I think this is a case where people assume that is isn't pure user input because is would have already been parsed/checked/verified. "Oh, its in the DNS system so it must be safe" is worse then "well, it came from our database so it should be fine". Don't even trust something coming out of your own database. You never know what various input checking bugs might have ac…

This is only too true! At work we do CRUD projects, which means user input gets stored in the database. I almost always break other people's work by adding HTML tags to the inputs, navigating back to the page, and seeing markup that shouldn't be there. Even database output needs to be sanitized

Database output is application input. All forms of input need to be sanitized, period.

Re: TXT Record XSS

#25

This is hilariousy, but could this potentially be a real threat to anything ?

Whenever you have credentials stored on the same host as the dns frontend. I imagine that a few domain-registrars will have similar tools available on their servers, so that users can check data on their own domains.

Imagine being logged in as your hostmaster account on http://your-registrar.com/, and having a malicious website redirect you to http://your-registrar.com/webtools/nslookup-tool.php?domain=....

Re: TXT Record XSS

#27
post #23
post #4

So uh. This works on a few websites. A couple I've found http://dig.whois.com.au/dig.php?dom=jamiehankins.co.uk&type=... http://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=txt:jamiehankins....

Our dns lookup tool is safe from this: https://www.misk.com/tools/#dns/jamiehankins.co.uk

OH! Now I get it. Honestly, this is hilarious

Re: TXT Record XSS

#28
post #17

From any Linux (or probably OS X) workstation / server, you can run the command "host -t TXT jaimehankins.co.uk" ie: $ host -t TXT jamiehankins.co.uk ;; Truncated, retrying in TCP mode. jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text " " jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text "v=spf1 include:spf.mandrillapp.com ?all" jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text " " jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text "google-site-verification=nZUP4BagJAjQZO…

This is hilarious, but what's up with this line? >jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text "v=spf1 include:spf.mandrillapp.com ?all"

Why is mandrillapp.com (tranactional email startup) included?

Re: TXT Record XSS

#30
post #28
post #17

From any Linux (or probably OS X) workstation / server, you can run the command "host -t TXT jaimehankins.co.uk" ie: $ host -t TXT jamiehankins.co.uk ;; Truncated, retrying in TCP mode. jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text " " jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text "v=spf1 include:spf.mandrillapp.com ?all" jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text " " jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text "google-site-verification=nZUP4BagJAjQZO…

This is hilarious, but what's up with this line? >jamiehankins.co.uk descriptive text "v=spf1 include:spf.mandrillapp.com ?all" Why is mandrillapp.com (tranactional email startup) included?

It's my personal domain, I use mandrill for some stuff.
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