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Code Spaces data and backups deleted by hackers

codespaces.com

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Re: Code Spaces data and backups deleted by hackers

#21
Seems to be down so cache: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:qpjW4k2...

"We are experiencing massive demand on our support capacity, we are going to get to everyone it will just take time. Code Spaces : Is Down!

Dear Customers,

On Tuesday the 17th of June 2014 we received a well orchestrated DDOS against our servers, this happens quite often and we normally overcome them in a way that is transparent to the Code Spaces community. On this occasion however the DDOS was just the start.

An unauthorised person who at this point who is still unknown (All we can say is that we have no reason to think its anyone who is or was employed with Code Spaces) had gained access to our Amazon EC2 control panel and had left a number of messages for us to contact them using a hotmail address

Reaching out to the address started a chain of events that revolved arount the person trying to extort a large fee in order to resolve the DDOS.

Upon realisation that somebody had access to our control panel we started to investigate how access had been gained and what access that person had to the data in our systems, it became clear that so far no machine access had been achieved due to the intruder not having our Private Keys.

At this point we took action to take control back of our panel by changing passwords, however the intruder had prepared for this and had already created a number of backup logins to the panel and upon seeing us make the attempted recovery of the account he proceeded to randomly delete artifacts from the panel. We finally managed to get our panel access back but not before he had removed all EBS snapshots, S3 buckets, all AMI's, some EBS instances and several machine instances.

In summary, most of our data, backups, machine configurations and offsite backups were either partially or completely deleted.

This took place over a 12 hour period which I have condensed into this very brief explanation, which I will elaborate on more once we have managed our customers needs.

Data Status

All svn repositories that had the following url structure have been deleted from our live EBS's and all backups and snapshots have been deleted: https://[ACCOUNT].codesapces.com/svn/[REPONAME]

All Svn repositoies using the following url format are still available for export but all backups and snapshots have been deleted: https://svn.codespaces.com/[ACCOUNT]/[REPONAME]

All Git repositories are available for export but all backups and snapshots have been deleted

All Code Spaces machines have been deleted except some old svn nodes and one git node.

All EBS volumes containing database files have been deleted as have all snapshots and backups.

Code Spaces Status

Code Spaces will not be able to operate beyond this point, the cost of resolving this issue to date and the expected cost of refunding customers who have been left without the service they paid for will put Code Spaces in a irreversible position both financially and in terms of on going credibility.

As such at this point in time we have no alternative but to cease trading and concentrate on supporting our affected customers in exporting any remaining data they have left with us.

All that we can say at this point is how sorry we are to both our customers and to the people who make a living at Code Spaces for the chain of events that lead us here.

In order to get any remaining data exported please email us at support[at]codespaces.com with your account url and we will endeavour to process the request as soon as possible.

On behalf of everyone at Code Spaces, please accept our sincere apologies for the inconvenience this has caused to you, and ask for your understanding during this time! We hope that one day we will be able to and reinstate the service and credibility that Code Spaces once had!"

Re: Code Spaces data and backups deleted by hackers

#24

Leaving aside the obviously deficient sysadmin work here: the timeline of the story doesn't add up. I can only hope this explanation is not accurate. You find notes in your AWS control panel saying you should contact some Hotmail address. OK. So the first thing you do is reach out to that address and take the time to communicate intricate extortion details? Only after that you think maybe it's a good idea to start ch…

I feel that a lot of people here are being unnecessarily harsh. It was all a bit of a silly mistake in hindsight but Code Spaces was a very new service I'm not even certain it had secured funding yet.

The timeline looks to me like email address shows up. Check email address. Email address contains extortion details. Try to change passwords. Hacker gets in again and again while deleting stuff. Cannot get rid of hacker. Do not have money. Within 12 hours everything is gone.

Re: Code Spaces data and backups deleted by hackers

#25
Is it possible to 'lock' your amazon control panel to a specific set of IP addresses?

In the payment world it is a fairly common feature to use a block-by-default strategy for such crucial controls.

Hosting your project management and your sources with other companies always did feel strange to me. I can see how it works well for open source project and git (after all, every repo is a complete copy) but to host the master of a subversion repo 'in the cloud' and to have your project management in the cloud feels uneasy to me.

If this or something like it would happen to github and all the github issues would be lost that would be a fairly major disaster.

You never know how solid the infrastructure and solutions chosen behind a nice looking web front are until it goes down, and this one went down hard.

Condolences to the users of codespaces.com, they are the ones who lost most in all this.

From codespaces backup page:

" Real Time Backups Backup

All your Source Code is backed up in real time, so that in the unlikely event of a system break down your data is safe.

Not only do we Back Up your data we also give you access to our backup up data via the Code Spaces Admin console so you can keep your own copies.

Whenever you make a change we make a backup."

So much for that I guess, if it is spinning and online it is not a backup.

Re: Code Spaces data and backups deleted by hackers

#26
post #16

From the Amazon RDS documentation: When the backup retention changes to a non-zero value, the first backup occurs immediately. Changing the backup retention period to 0 turns off automatic backups for the DB instance, and deletes all existing automated backups for the instance. http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/Overvi...

> and deletes all existing automated backups for the instance.

That could do with some sort of gracetime, both against shoot-in-your-foot scenarios and bad guys.

Re: Code Spaces data and backups deleted by hackers

#27

Is it possible to 'lock' your amazon control panel to a specific set of IP addresses? In the payment world it is a fairly common feature to use a block-by-default strategy for such crucial controls. Hosting your project management and your sources with other companies always did feel strange to me. I can see how it works well for open source project and git (after all, every repo is a complete copy) but to host the m…

Amazon's web services and their control panels support multi-factor authentication methods and customisable permissions models. For details see: http://aws.amazon.com/iam/

Re: Code Spaces data and backups deleted by hackers

#28
post #9

All I can say is this: If you can delete it with a single control panel, it doesn't count as an offsite back. Fire the devops

Not to be too flippant, but the company's closing shop. So, yeah, the DevOps are fired, along with everybody else.

As for the rest of us: AWS is a great one-stop shop. Unfortunately, using just AWS puts you in the "all the eggs in one basket" scenario that we were warned against as children.

Re: Code Spaces data and backups deleted by hackers

#29
post #27

Is it possible to 'lock' your amazon control panel to a specific set of IP addresses? In the payment world it is a fairly common feature to use a block-by-default strategy for such crucial controls. Hosting your project management and your sources with other companies always did feel strange to me. I can see how it works well for open source project and git (after all, every repo is a complete copy) but to host the m…

Amazon's web services and their control panels support multi-factor authentication methods and customisable permissions models. For details see: http://aws.amazon.com/iam/

There is no reason people shouldn't be using multi-factor auth with their AWS master account. Please do so!

(ops guy)

Re: Code Spaces data and backups deleted by hackers

#30

Is it possible to 'lock' your amazon control panel to a specific set of IP addresses? In the payment world it is a fairly common feature to use a block-by-default strategy for such crucial controls. Hosting your project management and your sources with other companies always did feel strange to me. I can see how it works well for open source project and git (after all, every repo is a complete copy) but to host the m…

> So much for that I guess, if it is spinning and online it is not a backup.

True, although with S3, you can make backups very difficult to remove:

http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/UsingMFADelet...

"If a bucket's versioning configuration is MFA Delete enabled, the bucket owner must include the x-amz-mfa request header in requests to permanently delete an object version or change the versioning state of the bucket. The header's value is the concatenation of your authentication device's serial number, a space, and the authentication code displayed on it. If you do not include this request header, the request fails."

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