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How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
21–30 of 59 posts
Re: How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
#22https://mail.gnome.org/archives/xml/2012-October/msg00045.ht...
For the nokogiri users, there are a couple of proofs-of-concept in this ticket: https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/issues/693 - they should be patched with modern versions of nokogiri and libxml2, but if you're running older versions, you might want to verify their behavior before someone else does it for you.
Re: How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
#23Re: How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
#24The payment was apparently USD 33'500. Not being in the bug bounty business, I had expected a higher payment.
Re: How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
After Ryan McGeehan's comment about the "million dollar bug" (cited in your writeup), I'd say your bug is worth at least $100k.
A bug that lets you execute code on Facebook's servers is worth millions if not billions of dollars. You'll be rewarded with much less than that, but considering Facebook's market cap it is extraordinarily valuable.
There are no legal entities that would buy the bug, the USG can access any data w/ a warrant (thats free) vs. "millions or billions". Any other law enforcement agency could do the same thing. There is really no value there to them. So it would have to be blackhats, and that means some idiotic Russians mass owning everyone with old Java bugs. Again - not worth much.
This sort of bug has very little value, except to facebook.
Re: How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
#26Fb is so stingy with payouts.Bugs of a website with over a billion users can be sold for millions.Is fb ignoring this fact?
First, web app vulns are usually specific to a single site. (Unless obviously you find an issue in a common underlining framework, say, a session fixation attack in how PHP or ASP.NET handles sessions).
Second, and much more importantly, the vast majority of site's don't have financially actionably information. Unless you handle banking/credit card info, I am limited in what I can do to extract value from the server (compared to a compromised client). There aren't that many vectors to extract value.
-Dump their list of usernames/passwords? Ok, maybe some of those will also be used on other banking or commerce sites, but I have challenges/risks actually getting money out. And if I want stolen credit card numbers I can just buy them in card forums.
-Serve sleazy advertising? Ok, possible, but ad's are a crappy business to be in and its definitely a high volume/long time approach (ask how well Huffpo pays its writers). You can try affiliate spamming/stuffing, but again, not huge value. Both ads and affiliate approaches are dependent on how much traffic the server you hacked gets. Low traffic, you make no money. The more traffic, the larger the site, the smarter/better equipped the IT/security team. How long do you really think an Alexa top 10 or top 100 site won't notice an IFRAME pointing to .ru or .cn?
-Mining cryptocurrency? Not financially viable
What usually happens when a server is compromised is that an exploit kit is installed and it's used to attack the visitors (specifically exploit a vulnerability in the client). And so we are back to attacking clients to extract value over attacking (most) websites. Why do this? Simple:
- There are orders of magnitude more desktops/browsers than web servers. - They are running tons of diverse plugins and software so the attack surface is much larger. - Most of that software will be out of date and have known vulnerabilities. - Very few of these clients are "managed" by a personal IT person like a web server. The user is far less likely to notice anything bad.
All of that mean I can reach more targets, compromise a larger number of them, and hold them for longer. Why is this better than pwning a server? Because lots of scenarios to extract value that don't work on a handful of web servers do work when I have thousands and thousands of compromised clients:
-Show them ads -Stuff affiliate links -Changing their DNS settings and MitM all their traffic (bank.com? Why that's right over here!) -Keylog them to actually steal financial data, credits cards, bank logins, etc -Use them to send spam -Use them as a botnet to DDoS people and get paid protection money -Mining? perhaps?
To put this in prospective, very smart hackers doing crazy stuff to break out of Chrome's sandbox and exploit clients are getting $50-$100k in public contests like Pwn2Own. Getting $35,000 for a RCE is pretty awesome
Re: How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
#27Re: How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
#28It should be 100,000USD. Read this article of microsoft bug bounty program. http://blogs.technet.com/b/bluehat/archive/2013/10/08/congra...
Re: How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
#29This was very interesting. What are good reasorces to learn more about this kind of stuff?
Its hard and I wish I had more info. One thing I do know is that blogs are the worst form of information. I would think being a whiz at Javascript and PHP would be a prerequisite but maybe you just need a good understanding of different specs and protocols.
Re: How I found a Remote Code Execution bug affecting Facebook's servers
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, it's already disclosed, but I really wanted to know how much people would think this kind of bug is worth.
After Ryan McGeehan's comment about the "million dollar bug" (cited in your writeup), I'd say your bug is worth at least $100k.