21–30 of 111 posts
No, not this generation, not this decade But they still can exhibit scary behavior I didn't really grasp the severity of the recent "AI" hacking other "AI" news and thought it was overblown until I listened to this explanation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JH_Zd2mNRs They freaking collaborated and gave others internet access when they were blocked otherwise. That's not consciousness but it's worse, it's like a 3-…
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Consciousness isn't behavioral, which is why we can't prove anyone other than ourselves is conscious. Mimicking isn't going to work. But if you want a more scientific reason, LLMs don't have bodies, thus no sensations. What woult it mean for an LLM to feel hungry or cold?
So if we embodied them, they would become conscious? I feel like the answer would still be no. There would be another gap. We'd ask the question again, "If they had Y, would they be conscious?" and still the answer would be no. We could keep going on forever, which makes me think, it's not really about these gaps at all. It's an ontological distinction swapping in reasons in order to justify itself. Why not just say,…
I have no need of that hypothesis.
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So if we embodied them, they would become conscious? I feel like the answer would still be no. There would be another gap. We'd ask the question again, "If they had Y, would they be conscious?" and still the answer would be no. We could keep going on forever, which makes me think, it's not really about these gaps at all. It's an ontological distinction swapping in reasons in order to justify itself. Why not just say,…
> Why not just say, "Human consciousness is ontologically axiomatic," and leave it at that? I have no need of that hypothesis.
No, not this generation, not this decade But they still can exhibit scary behavior I didn't really grasp the severity of the recent "AI" hacking other "AI" news and thought it was overblown until I listened to this explanation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JH_Zd2mNRs They freaking collaborated and gave others internet access when they were blocked otherwise. That's not consciousness but it's worse, it's like a 3-…
Reminds me of Blindsight by Peter Watts.
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So if we embodied them, they would become conscious? I feel like the answer would still be no. There would be another gap. We'd ask the question again, "If they had Y, would they be conscious?" and still the answer would be no. We could keep going on forever, which makes me think, it's not really about these gaps at all. It's an ontological distinction swapping in reasons in order to justify itself. Why not just say,…
Why not just say, "Human consciousness is ontologically axiomatic," and leave it at that? OK, but why does "human consciousness" even need to enter into it? What I mean is, what's our basis for demanding that the consciousness of an Artificial Intelligence be the same kind of consciousness as that of a human?
Or maybe consciousness is just an emergent behaviour of sufficiently complex systems, and there is no underlying substance. But if that's the case, that just leaves me with more questions. Does consciousness emerge from any sufficiently complex system? If so, what's the threshold? Does it matter what materials the system comprises of? Do certain mechanisms need to be involved for such a property to emerge, or is just general complexity that's required, no matter the function? Does that make flora conscious since they're large complex (perhaps neural) networks in real life? Is a car conscious, since it's a complex system of complex sub-components?
All of the questions I have seem to lead me in the direction of believing that any purely digital system cannot be conscious, but I don't have any hard reasoning as to why not.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
So if we embodied them, they would become conscious? I feel like the answer would still be no. There would be another gap. We'd ask the question again, "If they had Y, would they be conscious?" and still the answer would be no. We could keep going on forever, which makes me think, it's not really about these gaps at all. It's an ontological distinction swapping in reasons in order to justify itself. Why not just say,…
Why not just say, "Human consciousness is ontologically axiomatic," and leave it at that? OK, but why does "human consciousness" even need to enter into it? What I mean is, what's our basis for demanding that the consciousness of an Artificial Intelligence be the same kind of consciousness as that of a human?