This is awesome news! It isn't a jailbreak in and of itself, but it is the first step. Right now we only have a reliable jailbreak (checkm8) for up to iOS 18 (and that's only thanks to one iPad model). Some app developers are pretty aggressive about dropping support for older iOS versions. This affects iPhone XR, XS, 11, SE 2nd gen, and a smattering of iPads. Many of these devices got the iOS 27 beta and will likely…
Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
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Re: Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
#22This is awesome news! It isn't a jailbreak in and of itself, but it is the first step. Right now we only have a reliable jailbreak (checkm8) for up to iOS 18 (and that's only thanks to one iPad model). Some app developers are pretty aggressive about dropping support for older iOS versions. This affects iPhone XR, XS, 11, SE 2nd gen, and a smattering of iPads. Many of these devices got the iOS 27 beta and will likely…
Also great new for Cellebrite?
Re: Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
#23> BPR, or Boot Process Register, was a feature implemented in iOS 14 in order to additionally secure devices from bootROM based attacks. Crucially, it restricts data access when a device is booted directly from DFU mode, which is required by both checkm8 and usbliter8. In iOS 14 and 15, this manifested as the requirement to disable your passcode when jailbreaking A11 devices with checkra1n/palera1n, and is the reason why A11 devices must be first erased if they previously had a passcode before jailbreaking with palera1n. A10 devices were not affected by this as they had a SEP exploit, known as blackbird, which prevented this issue from arising. We do not have a SEP exploit for A11 and newer.
Re: Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
#24Re: Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
Reboot your phone after the feds have it before you unlock it again
Once the feds have the phone, they aren't going to allow him to touch it, much less reboot it.
Re: Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
#26I first thought of SecuROM, a CD/DVD copy protection scheme applied to computer game discs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SecuROM
That's what I thought as well. I read the headline and was surprised that SecuROM was still around and was confused what it had to do with Apple... until I saw your comment.
Re: Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
#27Since this can only underflow and some written bits are not attacker-chosen, does this not imply that the patchable part of the software could reliably detect this just in time and panic on suspected USB DMA corruption? Where is the catch?
Re: Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
#28Ohhhh this is interesting!!!!! I really miss the glory days of jailbreaking, it just unlocked so many handy, fun, and cool stuff. From running webservers to speeding up the terribly slow animations.
...or adding system-wide Copy and Paste when the iPhone first launched without it...
(well, to be honest this is a bad example to show the system is closed, because copy and paste was difficult on linux too during wayland)
Re: Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
#29Earlier quoted context omitted.
Once the feds have the phone, they aren't going to allow him to touch it, much less reboot it.
They have to reboot it to use a bootloader exploit. Reboot it again after you get it back to erase whatever they did.
Re: Usbliter8: an A12/A13 SecureROM Exploit
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
They have to reboot it to use a bootloader exploit. Reboot it again after you get it back to erase whatever they did.
I realized they might have added a fake reboot menu. So either use the exploit yourself to check it's the real bootloader (no realistic chance the FBI made a fake bootloader exploit in the fake reboot menu) or let the battery run out or remove it.