This is why we have a 2 party system :-)
Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
21–30 of 78 posts
Re: Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
#22Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I realize that the American public has been indoctrinated for the past few decades that voting is the only way you make yourself heard This has never been true. Americans have always protested, signed petitions, and even joined special interest groups like the ACLU and the NRA. Americans have a very long tradition of things like that.
Tell that to the next person who complains that their vote doesn't count.
It's entirely possible to be active in the ACLU, for example, and still be annoyed that since you live in Montana your vote for a Democratic presidential candidate is basically pointless.
Re: Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
#23Approval Voting mostly solves the "strategic voting" part that almost forces you to choose the "most likely to win" candidate, or if you hate that one, the one closest to him, while eliminating the spoiler effect, and giving 3rd party candidates a much higher chance of winning than with current traditional voting systems. http://www.electology.org/approval-voting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting
Let's say there are two head-line candidates: A and B. I hate A, am neutral towards B, and love the less popular of the three candidate C.
So do I vote 0/0/1 or 0/1/1? Well, that depends on how popular the three are and is very much an example of strategic voting.
When proposing an alternative, one should probably be up-front with its flaws.
Re: Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
#24Preferential voting solves all these problems. You vote by ranking the candidates on order of preference. If your top candidate does not win the vote goes to next guy down the line until eventually it ends up for one of two candidates.
Preferential voting does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting#Voting_sy...
To demonstrate this, consider the following.
80 people: A, C, B
50 people: B, C, A
35 people: C, B, A
IRV eliminates C (as it has the fewest first-place votes) and elects B. But voters on the whole prefer C over B (115 to 50). This is the failure that Pinckney refers to.
Re: Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
#25This is off. Voting is not a system for selecting the best candidate. Voting, in whatever forms it exists, is a system to avoid violence and conflict.
Each side feels it had a fair shot, regardless of outcome. The purpose of voting is to leave you with that feeling, to avoid unpleasant behavior from the losing party. The best person for the job almost never gets it. That's why we don't vote people in when hiring somebody at a company.
Re: Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
#26This is off. Voting is not a system for selecting the best candidate. Voting, in whatever forms it exists, is a system to avoid violence and conflict. Each side feels it had a fair shot, regardless of outcome. The purpose of voting is to leave you with that feeling, to avoid unpleasant behavior from the losing party. The best person for the job almost never gets it. That's why we don't vote people in when hiring some…
Yes, and in addition it's also a system to ensure that elected officials and their parties have accountability. If you win an election and then "betray" your voters, you won't be reelected. If you can't be reelected, you could damage the chances of your party. In essence, democracy in its current form is not so much about choosing the right/best candidate. It's more about making sure the winner cannot become a despot.
Re: Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
#27Approval Voting mostly solves the "strategic voting" part that almost forces you to choose the "most likely to win" candidate, or if you hate that one, the one closest to him, while eliminating the spoiler effect, and giving 3rd party candidates a much higher chance of winning than with current traditional voting systems. http://www.electology.org/approval-voting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting
Let's say there are two head-line candidates: A and B. I hate A, am neutral towards B, and love the less popular of the three candidate C. So do I vote 0/0/1 or 0/1/1? Well, that depends on how popular the three are and is very much an example of strategic voting. When proposing an alternative, one should probably be up-front with its flaws.
That's not strategic voting according to the definition. In both cases you're still voting for C, the candidate you like the most.
"In voting systems, tactical voting (or strategic voting or sophisticated voting or insincere voting) occurs, in elections with more than two candidates, when a voter supports a candidate other than his or her sincere preference in order to prevent an undesirable outcome.[1]"
If you mean it in the larger sense of using strategy when voting, Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem shows that no voting system is strategy free unless it's either dictatorial or nondeterministic.
Re: Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
#28Approval Voting mostly solves the "strategic voting" part that almost forces you to choose the "most likely to win" candidate, or if you hate that one, the one closest to him, while eliminating the spoiler effect, and giving 3rd party candidates a much higher chance of winning than with current traditional voting systems. http://www.electology.org/approval-voting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting
Let's say there are two head-line candidates: A and B. I hate A, am neutral towards B, and love the less popular of the three candidate C. So do I vote 0/0/1 or 0/1/1? Well, that depends on how popular the three are and is very much an example of strategic voting. When proposing an alternative, one should probably be up-front with its flaws.
Would it be better to have something like 0/1/2 which is essentially IRV, or some other method of point distribution among candidates?
Re: Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
#29I find it interesting that in all those discussions about voting systems, which are mostly focused on USA president elections, nobody mentions two-round voting, also known as run-off voting. This is what we have in Slovenia for electing our president. In the first round, there are many candidates, and each voter can vote for one. If any candidate gets at least 50% of votes, he automatically wins. If, on the other han…
I don't believe this satisfies the Condercet criterion either. Consider these rankings of preferences:
20% A ...
20% B ...
15% C ...
15% D C ...
15% E C ...
15% F C ...
Re: Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
Let's say there are two head-line candidates: A and B. I hate A, am neutral towards B, and love the less popular of the three candidate C. So do I vote 0/0/1 or 0/1/1? Well, that depends on how popular the three are and is very much an example of strategic voting. When proposing an alternative, one should probably be up-front with its flaws.
Would it be better to have something like 0/1/2 which is essentially IRV, or some other method of point distribution among candidates?
No, IRV actually makes the strategic voting problem even worse than our current system. Approval voting seems to have the best mix of desirable traits.