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Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

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Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#21

Again, and this is important: A bug is a bug. A “potential vulnerability” is a bug. A vulnerability is verifiable as having security implications with a proof of concept or other substantial evidence. Words matter. Bugs matter. It’s important to fix large amounts of bugs, just as it always has been, and has been done. Let that be impressive on its own, because it IS impressive. Mythos didn’t write 271 PoC for vulnera…

I was a bit confused by your definitions, but here's how Mozilla broke out [1] the 271, um, things: > As additional context, we apply security severity ratings from critical to low to indicate the urgency of a bug: > * sec-critical and sec-high are assigned to vulnerabilities that can be triggered with normal user behavior, like browsing to a web page. We make no technical difference between these, but sec-critical b…

I work at Mozilla; I fixed a bunch of these bugs.

In general, I would say that our use of "vulnerability" lines up with what jerrythegerbil calls "potential vulnerability". (In cases with a POC, we would likely use the word "exploit".) Our goal is to keep Firefox secure. Once it's clear that a particular bug might be exploitable, it's usually not worth a lot of engineering effort to investigate further; we just fix it. We spend a little while eyeballing things for the purpose of sorting into sec-high, sec-moderate, etc, and to help triage incoming bugs, but if there's any real question, we assume the worst and move on.

So were all 271 bugs exploitable? Absolutely not. But they were all security bugs according to the normal standards that we've been applying for years.

(Partial exception: there were some bugs that might normally have been opened up, but were kept hidden because Mythos wasn't public information yet. But those bugs would have been marked sec-other, and not included in the count.)

So if you think we're guilty of inflating the number of "real" vulnerabilities found by Mythos, bear in mind that we've also been consistently inflating the baseline. The spike in the Firefox Security Fixes by Month graph is very, very real: https://hacks.mozilla.org/2026/05/behind-the-scenes-hardenin...

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I was a bit confused by your definitions, but here's how Mozilla broke out [1] the 271, um, things: > As additional context, we apply security severity ratings from critical to low to indicate the urgency of a bug: > * sec-critical and sec-high are assigned to vulnerabilities that can be triggered with normal user behavior, like browsing to a web page. We make no technical difference between these, but sec-critical b…

I work at Mozilla; I fixed a bunch of these bugs. In general, I would say that our use of "vulnerability" lines up with what jerrythegerbil calls "potential vulnerability". (In cases with a POC, we would likely use the word "exploit".) Our goal is to keep Firefox secure. Once it's clear that a particular bug might be exploitable, it's usually not worth a lot of engineering effort to investigate further; we just fix i…

I'm not a security dev or researcher or anything, but as an outsider my understanding matches how Mozilla uses the terms. Though words used by specialists and the general public can offer differ...

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I was a bit confused by your definitions, but here's how Mozilla broke out [1] the 271, um, things: > As additional context, we apply security severity ratings from critical to low to indicate the urgency of a bug: > * sec-critical and sec-high are assigned to vulnerabilities that can be triggered with normal user behavior, like browsing to a web page. We make no technical difference between these, but sec-critical b…

I work at Mozilla; I fixed a bunch of these bugs. In general, I would say that our use of "vulnerability" lines up with what jerrythegerbil calls "potential vulnerability". (In cases with a POC, we would likely use the word "exploit".) Our goal is to keep Firefox secure. Once it's clear that a particular bug might be exploitable, it's usually not worth a lot of engineering effort to investigate further; we just fix i…

What types of vulnerabilities was it finding? Cross site scripting, privilege escalation, etc? Mostly memory corruption or any Javascript logic bugs?

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#28

Let's see, how this will improve the daily soc work. I still don't see, what's the big difference between Mythos and Opus, security wise. I'm confident, that this kind of vul detection is a long-term improvement. But does specifically Mythos makes such a big difference to "normal" models? I would love to see, what's the actual difference.

There doesn't have to be a huge qualitative discontinuity between Opus and Mythos. It's just that Mythos has reached a threshold where it's finally smart enough that putting it in a loop and asking it to find bugs is suddenly really effective. Especially at the beginning, Mozilla wasn't doing anything particularly clever with prompts. Mythos is just smart enough that the hit rate on obvious prompts is high enough to matter. (Maybe you can get similar performance out of Opus 4.6 with really smart prompts, but AFAICT nobody had managed it until Mythos.)

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#29
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Coverity (similar to lint) scans various open source software products for vulnerabilities. see https://www.blackduck.com/static-analysis-tools-sast/coverit... and for Firefox-related alleged defects, see https://scan.coverity.com/projects/firefox You have to create an account to view the actual reported defects. There are just over 5000 reported defects still outstanding. I don't know how many overlap with the repor…

How many of those are false positives though? Probably just over 5000? You get bug bounties if you report the kind of bugs Mythos identified. There's a reason no-one collected bounties from the "5000 defects" Coverity identified. The Mythos reports have several examples of chaining a whole bunch of logic in different parts of the program together to exploit something very subtle. The Coverity reports aren't anything…

Yeah, fuzzing, sanitizers, and bug bounties were our main pre-AI tools for finding bugs.
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