This is a weird post to be honest. You've found a whole bunch of serious security issues, filed two PRs, one of which is adding some quotes because > Those aren't exploitable XSS, but it doesn't hurt to have a second layer of defense. The other suggests breaking clients that aren't using the more secure version of an OAuth method because > I can't think of any OAuth client that would like to [use it] That second one…
Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
21–30 of 60 posts
Re: Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
#22It doesn't appear like the author is acting in good faith, instead grandstanding in public because they feel superior.
Re: Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
#23This is a weird post to be honest. You've found a whole bunch of serious security issues, filed two PRs, one of which is adding some quotes because > Those aren't exploitable XSS, but it doesn't hurt to have a second layer of defense. The other suggests breaking clients that aren't using the more secure version of an OAuth method because > I can't think of any OAuth client that would like to [use it] That second one…
Closing the PR without providing feedback beyond "needs further discussion" does not engender said further discussion.
and there is open issue for that discussion https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/8634
Re: Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
#24This is a weird post to be honest. You've found a whole bunch of serious security issues, filed two PRs, one of which is adding some quotes because > Those aren't exploitable XSS, but it doesn't hurt to have a second layer of defense. The other suggests breaking clients that aren't using the more secure version of an OAuth method because > I can't think of any OAuth client that would like to [use it] That second one…
The discussion seems to be already happening https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/8634, author of the blog just did drive-by PR rather than looking at issue tracker
It's very much "I know better, do what I told you despise not thinking a second about any second order effects the change might cause" attitude that is so common with security people
Re: Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
#25This is a weird post to be honest. You've found a whole bunch of serious security issues, filed two PRs, one of which is adding some quotes because > Those aren't exploitable XSS, but it doesn't hurt to have a second layer of defense. The other suggests breaking clients that aren't using the more secure version of an OAuth method because > I can't think of any OAuth client that would like to [use it] That second one…
Closing the PR without providing feedback beyond "needs further discussion" does not engender said further discussion.
There also was feedback saying approximately that they've been burned by security changes in the recent past and don't want to run into similar issues without due consideration.
Re: Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
#26The author's attitude is so off-putting. What gives? Did Forgejo hurt you? The Forgejo disclosure process looked pretty simple and straightforward to me. The bold and all-caps words that bothered the author are just making sure you know how to disclose vulnerabilities safely without leaking zero-day exploits to a wider audience than necessary. I'm also not impressed with a carrot disclosure that looks like this. Runn…
> Show us the exploit hitting a remote server.
Watch out, their script works on HN too, as a proof here's me logging in to YOUR computer's root account (a bit more redacted for obvious reasons):
$ python3 ./poc/chain_alpha.py --target dangus > out.txt
$ grep Backdoor out.txt | sed -r 's@[^:]+$@ [REDACTED]@g'
[+] Backdoor admin created: [REDACTED]
$ grep IP out.txt | sed -r 's@[^:]+$@ [REDACTED]@g'
[+] IPv4 address for dangus: [REDACTED]
$ grep 'debug2: shell' out.txt
[+] debug2: shell request accepted on channel 0
$ tail -n12 out.txt
================================================================
[+] COMMAND EXECUTION CONFIRMED!
================================================================
Server-side output (received via SSH, with `set -x`):
+ id -u
0
+ id -g
0
================================================================
$ sha256 ./poc/chain_alpha.py
c10d28a5ff74646683953874b035ca6ba56742db2f95198b54e561523e1880d7 ./poc/chain_alpha.pyRe: Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
#27This is a weird post to be honest. You've found a whole bunch of serious security issues, filed two PRs, one of which is adding some quotes because > Those aren't exploitable XSS, but it doesn't hurt to have a second layer of defense. The other suggests breaking clients that aren't using the more secure version of an OAuth method because > I can't think of any OAuth client that would like to [use it] That second one…
> That second one is a good idea, but the maintainer is also right to ask for some discussion before introducing a breaking change. The discussion seems to be already happening https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/8634 , author of the blog just did drive-by PR rather than looking at issue tracker It's very much "I know better, do what I told you despise not thinking a second about any second order effects the…
Re: Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
#28> But given the sorry state of the codebase
I honesty want a refund on the 10 minutes I wasted reading this.
Re: Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
#29Did the author actually disclose this RCE or just open random PRs and claim there's an issue? It doesn't appear like the author is acting in good faith, instead grandstanding in public because they feel superior.
> Carrot Disclosure, dangling a metaphorical carrot in front of the vendor to incentivise change. The main idea is to only publish the (redacted) output of the exploit for a critical vulnerability, to showcase that the software is exploitable. Now the vendor has two choices: either perform a holistic audit of its software, fixing as many issues as possible in the hope of fixing the showcased vulnerability; or losing users who might not be happy running a known-vulnerable software. Users of this disclosure model are of course called Bugs Bunnies.
Re: Carrot Disclosure: Forgejo
#30In the age of AI, carrot disclosure is potentially a full disclosure with extra steps. I'm no security expert, but with the context provided, the forgejo codebase and the outline of the redacted script, I think there is a good chance I could use codex to crunch through the vuln chain and reproduce the script.