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Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]

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Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]

#21

Post by digiown »

runjake wrote: post #14
modeless wrote: post #12

[flagged]

This is your blog post, so I'll ask you a question. What are you trying to state in Belief #1? The message is unclear to me with how it's worded: > In this table, in the "iCloud Backup (including device and Messages backup)" row, under "Standard data protection", > the "Encryption" column reads "In transit & on server". Yes, this means that Apple can read all of your messages > out of your iCloud backups. In addition…

Or Apple can also push an update, which you can't refuse, that upon first message to iCloud just uploads your private key. It's a bit foolish to count on encryption implemented by the adversary you're trying to hide from. Of course, this will most likely only affect individuals targeted by state-level actors.

Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]

#23

Post by jkubicek »

varispeed wrote: post #17
goalieca wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Apple did create a boolean for that. They call it lockdown mode. > Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that’s designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people are never targeted by attacks of this nature. When Lockdown Mode is enabled, your device won’t function like it typically…

If Pegasus can break the iOS security model, there’s no reason to think it politely respects Lockdown Mode. It’s basically an admission the model failed, with features turned off so users feel like they’re doing something about it.

Lockdown mode works by reducing the surface area of possible exploits. I don't think there's any failures here. Apple puts a lot of effort into resolving web-based exploits, but they can also prevent entire classes of exploits by just blocking you from opening any URL in iMessage. It's safer, but most users wouldn't accept that trade-off.

Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]

#24

Post by digiown »

drnick1 wrote: post #20

But all the software is closed source, and there is little to no opportunity to verify all these security claims. You don't have the encryption keys, so effectively the data is not under your control. If you want to see security done well (or at least better), see the GrapheneOS project.

GrapheneOS also doesn't give you the encryption keys. If you run the official version, there is no way for you to extract the data from your device at all beyond what app developers will let you access. This means that you do not own the data on your device. The backups are even less effective than Apple's, although they say they will work on it.

The developers also appear to believe that the apps have a right to inspect the trustworthiness of the user's device, by offering to support apps that would trust their keys [1], locking out users who maintain their freedom by building their own forks.

It's disheartening that a lot of security-minded people seem to be fixated on the "AOSP security model", without realizing or ignoring the fact that a lot of that security is aimed at protecting the apps from the users, not the other way around. App sandboxing is great, but I should still be able to see the app data, even if via an inconvenient method such as the adb shell.

1. https://grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-gu...

Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]

#25

Post by Retr0id »

rrgok wrote: post #22

Sometime I wonder how much overhead all these security features take in terms of performance. I would really like to see a benchmark with and without security measures.

It's not really possible to make a direct comparison, given that a big chunk of the features are baked into the silicon, or are architecture-level choices.

Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]

#27

Post by bri3d »

whitepoplar wrote: post #15

Given that A19 + M5 processors with MIE (EMTE) were only recently introduced, I wonder how extensively MacOS/iOS make use of the hardware features. Is it something that's going to take several years to see the benefit, or does MIE provide thorough protection today?

I think all of the kernel allocators and most (?) system processes in iOS 26 have MIE enabled, as does libpas (the WebKit allocator), so it’s already doing quite a lot.

Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]

#28

Post by wcfrobert »

Apple's commitment to privacy and security is really cool to see. It's also an amazing strategic play that they are uniquely in the position to take advantage of. Google and Meta can't commit to privacy because they need to show you ads, whereas Apple feels more like a hardware company to me.

Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]

#29

Post by zb3 »

digiown wrote: post #24
drnick1 wrote: post #20

But all the software is closed source, and there is little to no opportunity to verify all these security claims. You don't have the encryption keys, so effectively the data is not under your control. If you want to see security done well (or at least better), see the GrapheneOS project.

GrapheneOS also doesn't give you the encryption keys. If you run the official version, there is no way for you to extract the data from your device at all beyond what app developers will let you access. This means that you do not own the data on your device. The backups are even less effective than Apple's, although they say they will work on it. The developers also appear to believe that the apps have a right to ins…

For some reason they don't release userdebug versions which was a dealbreaker for me.. (the device should be secure, but not against me)

But if you wish to build it from source, it could probably be a good option.

Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]

#30

Post by digiown »

zb3 wrote: post #29
digiown wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

GrapheneOS also doesn't give you the encryption keys. If you run the official version, there is no way for you to extract the data from your device at all beyond what app developers will let you access. This means that you do not own the data on your device. The backups are even less effective than Apple's, although they say they will work on it. The developers also appear to believe that the apps have a right to ins…

For some reason they don't release userdebug versions which was a dealbreaker for me.. (the device should be secure, but not against me) But if you wish to build it from source, it could probably be a good option.

You can re-sign it using https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot

I don't currently have any root on the phone, but I reserve the right to add it or run the userdebug build at a later date

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