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Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

bugs.pwno.io

21–30 of 36 posts

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#21

Hmm interesting. You can see recent edits to the file here https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commits/master/libavcodec/e... This specific issue is fixed here https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/4bfac71ecd96488dd2dc...

Well, maybe it does and maybe it doesn't. Since this commit neither adds nor fixes any tests, we'll never know.

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#22
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bugs are not equivalently findable and different techniques surface different bugs. The direct comparison you're trying to draw here doesn't hold.

It does not matter what purported categories buffer overflows are in when manual fuzzing finds 100 and "AI" finds 5. If Google gave open source projects $100,000 per year for a competent QA person, it would cost less than this "AI" money straw fire and produce better results. Maybe the QA person would also find the 5 "AI" detected bugs.

This would make sense if every memory corruption vulnerability was equivalently exploitable, which is of course not true. I think you'll find Google does in fact fuzz ffmpeg, though.

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#23
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It does not matter what purported categories buffer overflows are in when manual fuzzing finds 100 and "AI" finds 5. If Google gave open source projects $100,000 per year for a competent QA person, it would cost less than this "AI" money straw fire and produce better results. Maybe the QA person would also find the 5 "AI" detected bugs.

This would make sense if every memory corruption vulnerability was equivalently exploitable, which is of course not true. I think you'll find Google does in fact fuzz ffmpeg, though.

Google gives a pittance even for full ossfuzz integration. Which is why many projects just have the bare minimum fuzz tests. My original point was that even with these bare minimum tests ossfuzz has found way more than "AI" has.

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#24
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This would make sense if every memory corruption vulnerability was equivalently exploitable, which is of course not true. I think you'll find Google does in fact fuzz ffmpeg, though.

Google gives a pittance even for full ossfuzz integration. Which is why many projects just have the bare minimum fuzz tests. My original point was that even with these bare minimum tests ossfuzz has found way more than "AI" has.

Another weird assumption you've got here is that fuzzing outcomes scale linearly with funding, which, no. Further, the field of factory-scale fuzzing and triage is one Google security engineers basically invented, so it's especially odd to hold Google out as a bad actor here.

At any rate, Google didn't employ "AI" to find this vulnerability, and Google fuzzing probably wouldn't have outcompeted these researchers for this particular bug (totally different methods of bugfinding), so it's really hard to find a coherent point you'd be making about "fuzzers", "AI", and "Google" here.

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#25
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Google gives a pittance even for full ossfuzz integration. Which is why many projects just have the bare minimum fuzz tests. My original point was that even with these bare minimum tests ossfuzz has found way more than "AI" has.

Another weird assumption you've got here is that fuzzing outcomes scale linearly with funding, which, no. Further, the field of factory-scale fuzzing and triage is one Google security engineers basically invented, so it's especially odd to hold Google out as a bad actor here. At any rate, Google didn't employ "AI" to find this vulnerability, and Google fuzzing probably wouldn't have outcompeted these researchers for…

My guess is the main "AI" contribution here is to automate some of the work around the actual fuzzing. Setting up the test environment and harness, reading the code + commit history + published vulns for similar projects, identifying likely trouble spots, gathering seed data, writing scripts to generate more seed data reaching the identified trouble spots, adding instrumentation to the target to detect conditions ASan etc don't, writing PoC code, writing draft patches... That's a lot of labor and the coding agents can do a mediocre job of all of it for the cost of compute.

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#26
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Another weird assumption you've got here is that fuzzing outcomes scale linearly with funding, which, no. Further, the field of factory-scale fuzzing and triage is one Google security engineers basically invented, so it's especially odd to hold Google out as a bad actor here. At any rate, Google didn't employ "AI" to find this vulnerability, and Google fuzzing probably wouldn't have outcompeted these researchers for…

My guess is the main "AI" contribution here is to automate some of the work around the actual fuzzing. Setting up the test environment and harness, reading the code + commit history + published vulns for similar projects, identifying likely trouble spots, gathering seed data, writing scripts to generate more seed data reaching the identified trouble spots, adding instrumentation to the target to detect conditions ASa…

If it's finding exploitable bugs prior factory-scale fuzzing of ffmpeg hasn't, seems like a pretty big win to me.

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#27
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Google gives a pittance even for full ossfuzz integration. Which is why many projects just have the bare minimum fuzz tests. My original point was that even with these bare minimum tests ossfuzz has found way more than "AI" has.

Another weird assumption you've got here is that fuzzing outcomes scale linearly with funding, which, no. Further, the field of factory-scale fuzzing and triage is one Google security engineers basically invented, so it's especially odd to hold Google out as a bad actor here. At any rate, Google didn't employ "AI" to find this vulnerability, and Google fuzzing probably wouldn't have outcompeted these researchers for…

[flagged]

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#28
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Another weird assumption you've got here is that fuzzing outcomes scale linearly with funding, which, no. Further, the field of factory-scale fuzzing and triage is one Google security engineers basically invented, so it's especially odd to hold Google out as a bad actor here. At any rate, Google didn't employ "AI" to find this vulnerability, and Google fuzzing probably wouldn't have outcompeted these researchers for…

[flagged]

I am a professional software developer and have been since the 1990s.

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#29
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My guess is the main "AI" contribution here is to automate some of the work around the actual fuzzing. Setting up the test environment and harness, reading the code + commit history + published vulns for similar projects, identifying likely trouble spots, gathering seed data, writing scripts to generate more seed data reaching the identified trouble spots, adding instrumentation to the target to detect conditions ASa…

If it's finding exploitable bugs prior factory-scale fuzzing of ffmpeg hasn't, seems like a pretty big win to me.

For sure, and I think it expands the scope of what factory scale efforts can find. The big question of course being how to handle remediation because more bugs without more maintainer capacity is a recipe for tears.

Re: Heap Overflow in FFmpeg EXIF

#30
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is another drawback of security research, but one that had already existed before "AI" with ossfuzz. You basically cannot commit in public to the main branch and audit and test everything 3 months before a release, because any error can be picked up, will be publicized and go into the official statistics.

> ... go into the official statistics. There are no "official" statistics. None of this matters. If we judged projects by the number of security holes they had, then no one would be using ffmpeg, which had hundreds of serious vulns. Vulnerability research is useful insofar that the bad guys are using the same techniques (e.g., the same fuzzing tools), so any bugs you squash make it harder for others to attack you. If…

It’s the projects without CVEs that scare me.

Because nobody’s even looking…

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